•  121
    David Lewis has complained about the truthmaker theory as a version of the correspondence theory of truth (Lewis 2001a; Lewis 2001b). His main criticism is that the truthmaker theory, if combined with the redundancy theory, is not a theory about truth, but only »about the existential grounding of all manner of other things: the flying of pigs, or what-have-you« (Lewis 2001a: 279; Lewis 2001b: 603-4). In his view, to call such a truthmaker theory a theory of truth is a »misnomer« (Lewis 2001a: 27…Read more
  •  72
    Norm-reasons and evidentialism
    Analysis 79 (2): 202-206. 2019.
    It has been argued by Clayton Littlejohn that cases of insufficient evidence provide an argument against evidentialism. He distinguishes between evidential reasons and norm-reasons, but this distinction can be accepted by evidentialists, as we argue. Furthermore, evidentialists can acknowledge the existence of norm-reasons stemming from an epistemic norm, like the norm that one should not believe a proposition if one has only insufficient evidence for it. An alternative interpretation of evident…Read more
  •  21
    Rational Belief, Reflection, and Undercutting Defeat
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (3): 354-373. 2023.
    Philosophers disagree about the role of reflection for rationality, understood as the capacity to (properly) respond to genuine, normative reasons. Here, ‘reflection’ means the capacity for self-conscious normative meta-cognition. This article develops and rejects a novel argument – the argument from undercutting defeaters – in favor of the ‘one-level view’ that holds that having the concept of a belief (and of a reason) is necessary for responding to reasons. It will be argued that the ‘two-lev…Read more
  •  19
    This paper will critically engage with Daniel Buckley's argument against “evidential minimalism” (EM), i.e., the claim that necessarily, bits of evidence (are or) provide epistemic reasons for belief. Buckley argues that in some cases, a subject has strong evidence that p (and fulfills further minimal conditions), does not believe p, but nevertheless is not epistemically criticizable and has no epistemic reason to believe p. I will defend EM by pointing out that Buckley's argument trades on an a…Read more
  •  1
    Realismus, Robuste Wahrheit Und Kognitive Nötigung
    In Martin Grajner & Adolf Rami (eds.), Wahrheit, Bedeutung, Existenz, Ontos. pp. 41-56. 2010.
  •  73
    Ansgar Beckermann's account of self-consciousness can be seen as an attempt to locate the origin of self-conscious states in social cognition. It is assumed that in order to acquire self-consciousness, a cognitive system has to 'see itself through the eyes of the others'. This account, however, is doomed to failure, for principled reasons. It cannot provide a satisfactory explanation of the special, identification-free reference of first-person thoughts and, thus, fails to explain crucial featur…Read more
  •  419
    In defence of metaphysical analyticity
    Ratio 21 (3): 300-313. 2008.
    According to the so-called metaphysical conception of analyticity, analytic truths are true in virtue of meaning (or content) alone and independently of (extralinguistic) facts. Quine and Boghossian have tried to present a conclusive argument against the metaphysical conception of analyticity. In effect, they tried to show that the metaphysical conception inevitably leads into a highly implausible view about the truthmakers of analytic truths. We would like to show that their argument fails, sin…Read more
  •  119
    The Structuring Causes of Behavior: Has Dretske Saved Mental Causation?
    with Peter Https://Orcidorg288X Schulte
    Acta Analytica 29 (3): 267-284. 2014.
    Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out …Read more
  •  75
    Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2): 283-297. 2022.
    In this paper I present an account of the rational abilities that make our decisions free. Following the lead of new dispositionalists, a leeway account of free decisions is developed, and the rational abilities that ground our abilities to decide otherwise are described in detail. A main result will be that the best account of the relevant rational abilities makes them two-way abilities: abilities to decide to do or not to do x in accordance with one’s apparent reasons. Dispositionalism about r…Read more
  •  31
    Ratio, Volume 34, Issue 4, Page 277-285, December 2021.
  •  38
    Is Evidence Normative?
    Philosophia 49 (2): 667-684. 2020.
    This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen on whether having evide…Read more
  •  33
    According to an important analogy between knowledge and action, as proposed by Timothy Williamson, intention aims at action just as belief aims at knowledge. This paper investigates the analogy and discusses three difficulties that it has to face. The key is to distinguish between two different norms of intention and to see that the knowledge-action analogy is concerned with one of them only, namely, the realization norm: one ought to intentionally act if one intends to act in a certain way. A m…Read more
  •  54
    Is Evidence Normative?
    Philosophia 49 (2): 1-18. 2020.
    This paper defends the view that in a certain sense evidence is normative. Neither a bit of evidence nor the fact that it is evidence for a certain proposition is a normative fact, but it is still the case that evidence provides normative reason for belief. An argument for the main thesis will be presented. It will rely on evidentialist norms of belief and a Broomean conception of normative reasons. Two important objections will be discussed, one from A. Steglich-Petersen on whether having evide…Read more
  • Anatomie der Subejktivität (edited book)
    with Thomas Grundmann, Catrin Misselhorn, and Veronique Zanetti
    suhrkamp. 2005.
  •  25
    Could robots be phenomenally conscious?
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3): 579-590. 2018.
    In a recent book (Tye 2017), Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The…Read more
  •  32
    Discussion Note on The Rationality of Perception
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2): 265-272. 2019.
    In The Rationality of Perception, Susanna Siegel defends the claim that beliefs can influence our perceptions. Faulty beliefs make our experiences irrational. This explains why the biases some people hold are so tenacious. The authors point out weaknesses in Siegel’s argument.
  •  40
    How to know one’s experiences transparently
    Philosophical Studies 176 (5): 1305-1324. 2019.
    I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer in…Read more
  •  11
    Evolution and Ethics
    Croatian Journal of Philosophy 18 (3): 417-432. 2018.
    This paper is concerned with the reconstruction of a core argument that can be extracted from Street’s ‘Darwinian Dilemma’ and that is intended to ‘debunk’ moral realism by appeal to evolution. The argument, which is best taken to have the form of an undermining defeater argument, fails, I argue. A simple, first formulation is rejected as a non sequitur, due to not distinguishing between the evolutionary process that influences moral attitudes and the cognitive system generating moral attitudes.…Read more
  •  22
    E = K and Non-Epistemic Perception
    Logos and Episteme 9 (3): 307-331. 2018.
    Quite plausibly, epistemic justification and rationality is tied to possession of evidence. According to Williamson, one’s evidence is what one knows. This is not compatible with non-epistemic perception, however, since non-epistemic perception does not require belief in what one perceives and, thus, does not require knowledge of the evidence – and, standardly, knowledge does require belief. If one non-epistemically perceives a piece of evidence, this can be sufficient for possessing it as evide…Read more
  •  25
    Could robots be phenomenally conscious?
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (3): 1-12. 2017.
    In a recent book, Michael Tye argues that we have reason to attribute phenomenal consciousness to functionally similar robots like commander Data of Star Trek. He relies on a kind of inference to the best explanation – ‘Newton’s Rule’, as he calls it. I will argue that Tye’s liberal view of consciousness attribution fails for two reasons. First, it leads into an inconsistency in consciousness attributions. Second, and even more importantly, it fails because ceteris is not paribus. The big, categ…Read more
  •  80
    Wahrheit und Wissen. Einige Überlegungen zur epistemischen Normativität
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (2). 2007.
    Eine der neueren Herausforderungen in der Erkenntnistheorie, die die Frage nach der Struktur epistemischer Werte aufwirft, stellt die so genannte Mehrwert-Intuition dar: Wissen scheint mehr Wert zu haben als bloß wahre Meinung. Ein Wahrheitsmonist vertritt die Auffassung, dass wahre Meinung der einzige intrinsische epistemische Wert ist. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass und wie sich im Rahmen des Wahrheitsmonismus die Mehrwert-Intuition einfangen lässt. Wir können, wie Frege, BonJour, Beckermann und…Read more
  •  54
    How to know one’s experiences transparently
    Philosophical Studies 1-20. 2018.
    I would like to propose a demonstrative transparency model of our immediate, introspective self-knowledge of experiences. It is a model entirely in line with transparency. It rests on three elements: mental demonstration, the capacity to apply concepts to what is given in experience, and ordinary inference. The model avoids inner sense, acquaintance, and any special kind of normativity or rationality. The crucial and new ingredient is mental demonstration. By mental demonstration we can refer in…Read more
  •  30
    Die Rolle des Wissens und des Wissensbegriffs in der Erkenntnistheorie
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1). 2002.
  • Die Rolle von Wissen in der Erkenntnistheorie - Ein Kommentar zu Ansgar Beckermann
    Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (1). 2002.
  • Über die Natur von Tatsachen
    Philosophia Naturalis 42 (2): 313-340. 2005.