John Lippitt

This article connects Kierkegaard’s warnings about social comparison to “vices of pride” such as self-righteousness, domination, presumption, vanity and hyper-autonomy. In Sect. 1, I stress the ways these vices use social comparison and show their connections with self-importance. In Sect. 2, I investigate Kierkegaard’s prima facie startling claim that “pride is cowardliness”, showing why it is more plausible than might initially appear. “Pride is cowardliness” insofar as the vices of pride involve failing to face up to, or pursue, the truth. They distort the truth, serve as obstacles to truth-seeking, and hamper our capacity for knowledge and understanding. In Sect. 3, I show that if we suppose that on some level we know this, then the failure to face up to what on some level we know is itself a form of cowardliness. The vices of pride are amongst the ways through which we self-deceptively hide from ourselves (albeit incompletely) what we are doing. But if some forms of social comparison encourage us to be cowardly and dishonest with ourselves, thus hampering our capacity for knowledge and understanding, then it becomes important to ask: which, and how? In Sect. 4, I explore the prospects for two Kierkegaard-inspired answers: when the motivation for social comparison is “shrewdness’”, and when we use “the crowd” or “the public” as problematic reference networks. In Sect. 5, I briefly explore the implications for classic and contemporary social comparison theory, demonstrating some epistemic vice-risks it commonly overlooks.

Kierkegaard shows an intense fascination with Socrates and Socratic self-knowledge. This chapter traces (1) the young Kierkegaard’s autobiographical reflections on self-knowledge, when first coming to understand his task as an author; (2) Socrates as a negative figure in _The Concept of Irony_—where self-knowledge is understood in terms of separation from others and the surrounding society (3) in _Either/Or_, the connection between self-knowledge and self-transparency, and the link between self-knowledge and “choosing oneself”, understood as willing receptivity; (4) in writings such as _The Concept of Anxiety_ and _The Sickness unto Death_, the importance of sin and our utter dependence upon God for the question of whether self-knowledge is ever really possible; and (5) in _Judge for Yourself!_ and related journal entries, a more precise specification of what Christian self-knowledge might amount to. Treatments of Kierkegaard as a proto-existentialist risk misleadingly downplaying the deeply and explicitly Christian nature of his thought.

This chapter argues that jest [Spøg] - an apparently marginal and comparatively overlooked feature of Kierkegaard’s treatment of the comic, humor and irony - has far greater significance than is normally realized. It argues that jest is the expression of an existentially important kind of humility. To see this, we need to understand the relation between jest and earnestness (especially, how jest reveals the limits of earnestness for humans qua finite creatures) and the link between this and the important Kierkegaardian category of “infinite resignation.” The chapter then explores the dangers of the “spirit of comparison” discussed in Kierkegaard’s 1847 discourses on the lilies and the birds. It argues that jest addresses these dangers through expressing a particular kind of humility, one typified by a recognition of our dependence and a focus on others, rather than underestimating ourselves or not exaggerating our abilities or importance. Finally, it suggests that the relationship between such humility, “eschatological trust” and hope sheds new light on how best to understand Kierkegaard’s claim that awareness of a “way out” must be present if a use of the comic is to be ethically “legitimate.”

Concerns about the dangers of social comparison emerge in multiples places in Kierkegaard’s authorship. I argue that these concerns—and his critique of the role of “the public”—take on a new relevance in the digital age. In this article, I focus on one area where concerns about the risks of social comparison are paramount: the contemporary debate about moral grandstanding or “virtue-signaling”. Neil Levy and Evan Westra have recently attempted to defend virtue-signaling against Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke’s critique. I argue that these defences fail and that a consideration of epistemic bubbles and echo chambers is critical to seeing why. The over-confidence to which they give rise exacerbates certain vices with the potential to do moral, social and epistemic harm: I focus in particular on self-righteousness (complementing Kierkegaard’s discussion of envy). I then argue that Kierkegaard’s contrast between the religious category of the “single individual”—the genuine person of “character”—and the person who effectively appeals to the authority of some version of “the public” deepens our understanding of why we should reject defences of virtue-signaling. It helps us to distinguish between two kinds of virtue-signaler (“superficial enthusiasts” and “clear-eyed cynics”), both of whom contribute, in different ways, to the negative impacts of the vice of self-righteousness. Contrary to Levy’s claim that virtue-signaling is virtuous, I conclude that typically it is closer to vice than to virtue.

In recent commentary on Kierkegaard’s Works of Love, a distinction is commonly drawn between ‘proper’ and ‘selfish’ forms of self- love. In arguing that not all vices of self-focus can be captured under the heading of selfishness, I seek to distinguish selfishness from self-centredness. But the latter vice has a far more handsome cousin: proper self-focus of the kind necessary for ‘becoming a self’. As various feminist thinkers have argued, this will be missed if we valorise self-sacrifice too uncritically. But nor need the latter concept be ditched. By distinguishing varieties of self-sacrifice, we can see the importance of avoiding the all too easy slide from proper self-sacrifice to outright self-annihilation. And we can discover that this avoidance is aided by recognising a kind of pride as part of true self- love

Søren Kierkegaard is one of the key figures of nineteenth century thought, whose influence on subsequent philosophy, theology and literature is both extensive and profound. Fear and Trembling , which investigates the nature of faith through an exploration of the story of Abraham and Isaac, is one of Kierkegaard’s most compelling and widely read works. It combines an arresting narrative, an unorthodox literary structure and a fascinating account of faith and its relation to ‘the ethical’. The Routledge Guidebook to Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling introduces and assesses: Kierkegaard’s life and the background to Fear and Trembling , including aspects of its philosophical and theological context The text and key ideas of Fear and Trembling , including the details of its account of faith and its connection to trust and hope The book’s reception history, the diversity of interpretations it has been given and its continuing interest and importance This Guidebook assumes no previous knowledge of Kierkegaard's work and will be essential reading for anyone studying the most famous text of this important thinker

Kierkegaard is widely regarded as the 'father of existentialism', although his influence can be observed across the spectrum of twentieth century continental philosophy and philosophy of religion. Fear and Trembling is his most compelling and popular work and is heralded as a benchmark in twentieth century philosophy. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling examines the major themes that arise in this classic work of religious and existential philosophy. It also explores the broader aspects of Kierkegaard's influence on philosophy as a whole. The book assumes no previous knowledge of Kierkegaard's work and will be essential reading for any student studying the ideas of this important thinker. Kierkegaard and Fear and Trembling introduces and assesses: Kierkegaard's life and the background to Fear and Trembling The ideas and text of Fear and Trembling , his most famous work Kierkegaard's continuing importance in philosophy

The Oxford Handbook of Kierkegaard brings together some of the most distinguished contemporary contributors to Kierkegaard research together with some of the more gifted younger commentators on Kierkegaard's work. There is significant input from scholars based in Copenhagen's Søren Kierkegaard Research Centre, as well as from philosophers and theologians from Britain, Germany, and the United States. Part 1 presents some of the philological, historical, and contextual work that has been produced in recent years, establishing a firm basis for the more interpretative essays found in following parts. This includes looking at the history of his published and unpublished works, his cultural and social context, and his relation to Romanticism, German Idealism, the Church, the Bible, and theological traditions. Part 2 moves from context and background to the exposition of some of the key ideas and issues in Kierkegaard's writings. Attention is paid to his style, his treatment of ethics, culture, society, the self, time, theology, love, irony, and death. Part 3 looks at the impact of Kierkegaard's thought and at how it continues to influence philosophy, theology, and literature. After an examination of issues around translating Kierkegaard, this section includes comparisons with Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein, as well as examining his role in modern theology, moral theology, phenomenology, postmodernism, and literature.

This is a provocative international and interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars of Nietzsche and philosophers of religion. Nietzsche, famous for declaring the death of God, nevertheless was responsible throughout his writing for the most telling modern meditation on the nature of the religions of the world, mysticism, the divine as a principle in culture, and the relation of mankind to the infinite. This collection deals with the full scope of Nietzsche's thought on this topic, encompassing Greek, Hebraic, Asian and Mystic religion. Nietzsche scholarship has flourished immeasurably in recent years, not least in respect to the religious question. Nietzsche and the Divine will be an essential underpinning of this area for Nietzsche scholars and theological scholars alike.

Uses insights from Kierkegaard to explore contemporary problems of self, time, narrative and death Is each of us the main character in a story we tell about ourselves, or is this narrative understanding of selfhood misguided and possibly harmful? Are selves and persons the same thing? And what does the possibility of sudden death mean for our ability to understand the narrative of ourselves? These questions have been much discussed both in recent philosophy and by scholars grappling with the work of the enigmatic 19th-century thinker Søren Kierkegaard. For the first time, this collection brings together figures in both contemporary philosophy and Kierkegaard studies to explore pressing issues in the philosophy of personal identity and moral psychology. It serves both to advance important ongoing discussions of selfhood and to explore the light that, 200 years after his birth, Kierkegaard is still able to shed on contemporary problems.

The problem of whether we should love ourselves - and if so how - has particular resonance within Christian thought and is an important yet underinvestigated theme in the writings of Søren Kierkegaard. In Works of Love, Kierkegaard argues that the friendships and romantic relationships which we typically treasure most are often merely disguised forms of 'selfish' self-love. Yet in this nuanced and subtle account, John Lippitt shows that Kierkegaard also provides valuable resources for responding to the challenge of how we can love ourselves, as well as others. Lippitt relates what it means to love oneself properly to such topics as love of God and neighbour, friendship, romantic love, self-denial and self-sacrifice, trust, hope and forgiveness. The book engages in detail with Works of Love, related Kierkegaard texts and important recent studies, and also addresses a wealth of wider literature in ethics, moral psychology and philosophy of religion.

Though there are significant points of overlap between Michelle Kosch's reading of Fear and Trembling and my own, this paper focuses primarily on a significant difference: the legitimacy or otherwise of looking to paradigmatic exemplars of faith in order to understand faith. I argue that Kosch's reading threatens to underplay the importance of exemplarity in Kierkegaard's thought, and that there is good reason to resist her use of Philosophical Fragments as the key to interpreting the 'hidden message' of Fear and Trembling. Key to both claims is the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. I also briefly sketch an alternative reading of the 'hidden message', one in which Kierkegaard's Christian commitments play a notably different role.

What does it take to forgive oneself? I argue that reflection on Briony Tallis in Ian McEwan’s Atonement can help us understand two key aspects of self-forgiveness. First, she illustrates an unorthodox conception of humility that, I argue, aids the process of responsible self-forgiveness. Second, she fleshes out a self-forgiveness that includes continued self-reproach. While Briony illustrates elements of the self-absorption about which critics of continued self-reproach are rightly concerned, she also shows a way of getting beyond this, such that the delicate balance between self-forgiveness and self-condemnation is upheld. Atonement also shows the significance for the task of self-forgiveness of a particular kind of narrative continuity.

Kierkegaard’s Works of Love has often been accused of being unable to deal adequately with ‘special relationships’. This debate has re-emerged in a fresh form in a recent disagreement in the secondary literature between M. Jamie Ferreira and Sharon Krishek. Krishek charges Ferreira with failing to acknowledge some important conflicts in Kierkegaard’s account of preferential love. In this article, I argue that some key passages are indeed insufficiently addressed in Ferreira’s account. Yet ultimately, I argue, Krishek ends up condemning the Kierkegaard of Works of Love unfairly. As a solution to Krishek’s concerns, I present a defence of Kierkegaard’s position centred round the image of God as a ‘filter’ through which our loves must pass. Also, while acknowledging that Krishek raises some important questions for Ferreira’s account, I outline a possible response, based in part on Kierkegaard’s idea that neighbour love is only a ‘sketch’ until brought to fruition in any given manifestation of concrete love. Ultimately, I claim, Kierkegaard’s position in Works of Love can indeed be defended from Krishek’s critique

Is it possible to forgive oneself? If so, should the person who has done so, for a serious wrongdoing, be fully at peace with herself? Some philosophers, perhaps most famously Hannah Arendt, have denied the coherence of the very idea of self-forgiveness.1 Others, such as Charles Griswold, have recognized it as both coherent and important: a distinct phenomenon from accepting the forgiveness of others, and vital in circumstances where seeking such forgiveness is morally problematic. Yet Griswold still holds self-forgiveness to fall short of what he calls "paradigmatic" forgiveness.2 One of the key ideas behind this article is that part of the problem with understanding self-forgiveness is a mistaken tendency to...