• Appearances and the Problem of Stored Beliefs
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. 2023.
    Internalist theories of epistemic justification supposedly have trouble explaining what justifies beliefs that are both stored in memory and currently out of mind. This is the problem of stored beliefs. This chapter provides a preliminary defence of stored/dispositional appearances and suggests that they provide a straightforward solution to the problem of stored beliefs.
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    Ernest Sosa has recently presented three challenges for evidentialism. The challenges concern what is required for epistemically justified judging and suspending of judgment. The aim of this article is to respond to these challenges on behalf of the evidentialist. Importantly, responding to Sosa's challenges requires giving substance to the idea of appreciating what one's evidence supports. This idea has been mentioned by prominent evidentialists but not given adequate development. Hence, this a…Read more
  •  12
    Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism?
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Adam Carter’s book Autonomous Knowledge: Radical Enhancement, Autonomy, and the Future of Knowing is excellent. It is clear, well-written, and interesting. On the whole, Autonomous Knowledge is rea...
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    Understanding how science explains the world
    Cambridge University Press. 2022.
    All people desire to know. We want to not only know what has happened, but also why it happened, how it happened, whether it will happen again, whether it can be made to happen or not happen, and so on. In short, what we want are explanations. Asking and answering explanatory questions lies at the very heart of scientific practice. The primary aim of this book is to help readers understand how science explains the world. This book explores the nature and contours of scientific explanation, how s…Read more
  •  2
    Who Is Raistlin Majere?
    In William Irwin & Christopher Robichaud (eds.), Dungeons & Dragons and Philosophy, Wiley. 2014-09-19.
    Dungeons Dragons is full of great heroes and villains. The many worlds of the DD multiverse are overflowing with them – from heroes such as the twin‐scimitar‐wielding drow Drizzt Do'Urden and the self‐sacrificing knight Sturm Brightblade to villains such as the lord of Barovia, the vampire Count Strahd Von Zorovich, Vecna, the lich who rose to demi‐godhood, and countless others. However, there is one that stands above all others. It is the Master of Past and Present, Raistlin Majere. This chapte…Read more
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    Progressing Bird’s account of scientific progress
    Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 1-6. 2023.
    One of the central claims of Alexander Bird’s book Knowing Science is that the concept of knowledge is central to understanding science. In light of this, it is unsurprising that Bird construes scientific progress solely in terms of the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Although his account of scientific progress is itself promising, there is an underlying tension between Bird’s support for the knowledge-centric account of scientific progress and his case against rival accounts of scientific…Read more
  •  325
    According to Phenomenal Conservatism (PC), if a subject S has an appearance that P, in the absence of defeaters, S has justification for believing P by virtue of her appearance's inherent justifying power. McCain and Moretti (2021) have argued that PC is affected by the problem of reflective awareness: if S becomes reflectively aware of an appearance, the appearance loses its inherent justifying power. This limits the explanatory power of PC and reduces its antisceptical bite. This paper provide…Read more
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    Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles (edited book)
    Routledge. 2023.
    This volume presents new research on the epistemology of seemings. It features original essays by leading epistemologists on the nature and epistemic import of seemings and intuitions. Seemings and intuitions are often appealed to in philosophical theorizing. In fact, epistemological theories such as phenomenal conservatism and dogmatism give pride of place to seemings. Such views insist that seemings are of central importance to theories of epistemic justification. However, there are many quest…Read more
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    Explaining Epistemic Intuitions: From Intuitionist Particularism to Intuitionist Explanationism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2): 120-139. 2022.
    In Radical Skepticism & Epistemic Intuition Michael Bergmann attempts to overcome the threat of radical skepticism as it arises in several different forms. The key to Bergmann’s response to skepticism is his method of intuitionist particularism wherein we give our intuitions about particular beliefs being justified more weight than we do intuitions about the premises of arguments for skepticism. There are two general problems for Bergmann’s response to skepticism. First, he fails to accurately p…Read more
  •  293
    Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. pp. 217-232. 2023.
    Matthew McGrath has recently challenged all theories that allow for immediate perceptual justification. This challenge comes by way of arguing for what he calls the “Looks View” of visual justification, which entails that our visual beliefs that are allegedly immediately justified are in fact mediately justified based on our independent beliefs about the looks of things. This paper shows that McGrath’s arguments are unsound or, at the very least, that they do not cause genuine concern for the sp…Read more
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    Skepticism and Elegance
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (1): 30-43. 2016.
    _ Source: _Page Count 14 Jonathan Vogel has argued in support of an explanationist response to skepticism in several works. Central to this explanationist response is the fact that our non-skeptical view of the world is a better explanation of our experiences than its skeptical rivals. Despite the plausibility of this response to skepticism, it is not without its critics. Recently, Matthew Gifford has argued that Vogel’s response has problems on two fronts. First, Gifford argues that Vogel’s str…Read more
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    "Imaginative cases, or what might be called puzzles, paradoxes, and other thought experiments, play a central role in epistemology. A significant component of understanding epistemological debates and theories is appreciating various cases and what they are thought to show. This volume collects 50 of the most important puzzles, paradoxes, and thought experiments in contemporary epistemology and describes their significance. The volume gives each case a memorable name, describes the details of th…Read more
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    The thirteen newly commissioned essays in _The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations_ represent the cutting-edge of research on underexplored skeptical challenges, dimensions of the skeptical problematic, and responses to various kinds of skepticism.
  • Epistemic Dilemmas, Epistemic Quasi-Dilemmas, and Quasi-Epistemic Dilemmas
    In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. forthcoming.
    In this paper we distinguish between epistemic dilemmas, epistemic quasi-dilemmas, and quasi epistemic dilemmas. Our starting point is the commonsense position that S faces a genuine dilemma only when S must take one of two paths and both are bad. It’s the “must” that we think is key. Moral dilemmas arise because there are cases where S must perform A and S must perform B—where ‘must’ implies a moral duty—but S cannot do both. In such a situation, S is doomed to violate a moral obligation. Analo…Read more
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    It seems plausible that there can be “no win” moral situations in which no matter what one does one fails some moral obligation. Is there an epistemic analog to moral dilemmas? Are there epistemically dilemmatic situations—situations in which we are doomed to violate an epistemic requirement? If there are, when exactly do they arise and what can we learn from them? A team of top epistemologists address these and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. Anyon…Read more
  • Bound by the Evidence
    In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles, Routledge. 2020.
    An evidentialist can be extreme about epistemic requirements in a couple of different ways. At the reductionist end of the spectrum are those who think our epistemic obligations are fully satisfied by the mere having of evidential fit—where having implies nothing about doing. Your beliefs ought to align with your evidence, in other words, but there’s nothing you’re obligated to do in order to get yourself into the epistemically optimal position. At the expansionist end of the spectrum are those …Read more
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    Scientific knowledge is the most solid and robust kind of knowledge that humans have because of its inherent self-correcting character. Nevertheless, anti-evolutionists, climate denialists, and anti-vaxxers, among others, question some of the best-established scientific findings, making claims unsupported by empirical evidence. A common aspect of these claims is reference to the uncertainties of science concerning evolution, climate change, vaccination, and so on. This is inaccurate: whereas the…Read more
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    There are arguably moral, legal, and prudential constraints on behavior. But are there epistemic constraints on belief? Are there any requirements arising from intellectual considerations alone? This volume includes original essays written by top epistemologists that address this and closely related questions from a variety of new, sometimes unexpected, angles. It features a wide variety of positions, ranging from arguments for and against the existence of purely epistemic requirements, reductio…Read more
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    Forgetting memory skepticism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2): 253-263. 2020.
    Memory skepticism denies our memory beliefs could have any notable epistemic good. One route to memory skepticism is to challenge memory’s epistemic trustworthiness, that is, its functioning in a way necessary for it to provide epistemic justification. In this paper we develop and respond to this challenge. It could threaten memory in such a way that we altogether lack doxastic attitudes. If it threatens memory in this way, then the challenge is importantly self-defeating. If it does not threate…Read more
  •  386
    Phenomenal Conservatism (the view that an appearance that p gives one prima facie justification for believing that p) is a promising, and popular, internalist theory of epistemic justification. Despite its popularity, it faces numerous objections and challenges. For instance, epistemologists have argued that Phenomenal Conservatism is incompatible with Bayesianism, is afflicted by bootstrapping and cognitive penetration problems, does not guarantee that epistemic justification is a stable proper…Read more
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    What the Debasing Demon Teaches Us About Wisdom
    Acta Analytica 35 (4): 521-530. 2020.
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    Although inference to the best explanation is ubiquitous in science and our everyday lives, there are numerous objections to the viability of IBE. Many of these objections have been thoroughly discussed, however, at least one objection to IBE has not received adequate treatment. We term this objection the “Disjunction Objection”. This objection challenges IBE on the grounds that it seems that even if H is the best explanation, it could be that the disjunction of its rivals is more likely to be t…Read more
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    What Is Scientific Knowledge? is a much-needed collection of introductory-level chapters on the epistemology of science. Renowned historians, philosophers, science educators, and cognitive scientists have authored 19 original contributions specifically for this volume. The chapters, accessible for students in both philosophy and the sciences, serve as helpful introductions to the primary debates surrounding scientific knowledge.First-year undergraduates can readily understand the variety of disc…Read more
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    Making Understanding Intelligible
    Science & Education 28 (6-7): 797-799. 2019.
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    This brief chapter provides a general overview of evidentialism by explaining evidentialism’s most fundamental claim about epistemic justification, that such justification supervenes on an agent’s evidence. Additionally, the chapter explains that evidentialism requires more clarification and detailing. Finally, short summaries of the other chapters included in this book are provided in this chapter.
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    In this chapter I defend Explanationist Evidentialism, the theory developed and argued for in Evidentialism and Epistemic Justification, from the objections raised by Richard Fumerton, Jonathan Kvanvig, and Matthias Steup. Ultimately, I conclude that although each of these philosophers presents interesting challenges, none of the challenges succeed in undermining Explanationist Evidentialism. It remains a viable theory of epistemic justification.
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    The thirteen newly commissioned essays in _The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations_ represent the cutting-edge of research on underexplored skeptical challenges, dimensions of the skeptical problematic, and responses to various kinds of skepticism.
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    Explanatory Virtues are Indicative of Truth
    Logos and Episteme 9 (1): 63-73. 2018.
    In a recent issue of this journal, Miloud Belkoniene challenges explanationist accounts of evidential support in two ways. First, he alleges that there are cases that show explanatory virtues are not linked to the truth of hypotheses. Second, he maintains that attempts to show that explanatoriness is relevant to evidential support because it adds to the resiliency (stability) of probability functions fail. I contest both of Belkoniene’s claims.