Makoto Sueyoshi（SUEY）

This paper argues that the irreducible non-correspondence between descriptive regimes—here termed translation resistance—is not a defect of finite cognition but a constitutive condition of creative becoming. Beginning from a transcendental argument about the structure of ontological description, I show that translation resistance is structurally homologous with what Whitehead calls Eros: the cosmological lure toward novel realization that depends on the non-coincidence of actuality and possibility. Both phenomena share a relational structure of productive asymmetry and a self-cancellation condition—their resolution would destroy the dynamic they enable. From this structural homology two further claims follow: love is best understood not as achieved mutual transparency but as sustained responsiveness to an irreducibility one neither resolves nor abandons; and creativity is the generation of a new descriptive regime through resonance across resistant registers, not the overcoming of difference but its amplification into form. The paper situates these claims in dialogue with Whitehead, Deleuze, and Buddhist pratītyasamutpāda, arguing that a meta-ontological account of translation resistance clarifies why these traditions converge on the productive necessity of non-identity.

Why these five axioms and not others? IIT's foundational structure rests on phenomenological stipulation rather than principled derivation—a gap that has resisted resolution within IIT's own resources. This paper closes that gap. We introduce Translational Ontology, a meta-ontological framework that derives four of IIT's five axioms from the structure of description itself, replaces the contested exclusion axiom with the Maximum Ψ Principle, and dissolves the substrate-selection problem by showing that descriptive regimes are self-constituting. The central concept is translation resistance: the structural non-isomorphism that persists between any two descriptive regimes after all available translation operations have been applied. Grounding translation resistance in the Fisher–Rao metric, we define Ψ (Translation-Closure Integration) as the geodesic excess of an experiential trajectory—a trajectory-level complement to Φ that allows multiple experiential streams to coexist with graded phenomenological salience. The result is an extension of IIT, not a rejection: consciousness is not what happens when integration overcomes resistance, but what happens when resistance is inhabited productively.

This paper proposes Translational Ontology, a meta-ontological framework investigating the formal conditions under which ontological description is possible at all. Rather than advancing a new first-order inventory of what exists, the framework shifts focus to the structural constraints presupposed by any ontological claim. The central thesis is that translation, understood in a formal and non-linguistic sense, is a necessary condition of describability. What is described can never fully coincide with its description. From this starting point, the paper introduces interconnected concepts: Qualions as minimal units of describability, Response Fields as loci of interaction, Translation Resistance as the formal impossibility of complete identity, and Homeostatic Regression as a dynamic constraint preserving stability without teleology. The notion of an Infinite Phase grounds distinction itself as a pre-distinct transcendental condition. Shared Qualion Fields and Dual-Mode Existence explain hierarchical organisation while avoiding reductionism and strong emergentism. The framework is applied to dissolve the mind–body problem by reframing it as a category error arising from the conflation of descriptive modes with ontological kinds. Situated in dialogue with Kantian transcendental philosophy, process thought, and East Asian relational traditions, Translational Ontology offers a systematic account of why relational and non-substantialist ontologies recur across philosophical contexts. The result is not a new metaphysics of being, but a metaontology of describability. This paper is a conceptual preprint and does not present an empirical or testable theory.