•  15
    Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics: The Philosophy and Theory of Language of Anton Marty (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 229-232. 1993.
  •  12
    Disputatio 8 (43): 173-185. 2016.
    According to metaphysical realism, we would have to compare our thought with mind-independent reality, if we want to gain knowledge about the world. Such a comparison is impossible. Yet we can gain knowledge about the world. So metaphysical realism is false. — I take this to be the historically most influential argumentative line opposing metaphysical realism. The paper develops this argument, the Main Anti-Realist Argument, in more detail and offers a brief critical discussion of its crucial as…Read more
  •  537
    Analyticity, Carnap, Quine, and Truth
    Philosophical Perspectives 10 281-296. 1996.
    Quine’s paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” is famous for its attack on analyticity and the analytic/synthetic distinction. But there is an element of Quine’s attack that should strike one as extremely puzzling, namely his objection to Carnap’s account of analyticity. For it appears that, if this objection works, it will not only do away with analyticity, it will also do away with other semantic notions, notions that (or so one would have thought) Quine does not want to do away with, in particular,…Read more
  •  17
  • Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Chisholm
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3): 359-360. 1988.
  •  6
    Sprache und Ontologie (review)
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 22 199-201. 1984.
  • Substantivism and Deflationism in the Theory of Truth
    Dissertation, The University of Arizona. 1990.
    The main concern of this work is to understand and evaluate the debate between substantivism and deflationism in the theory of truth. According to substantive theories, truth consists in, and has to be explained in terms of, a special relation between the truth bearing item and reality. According to deflationism, such theories offer a needlessly inflated account of truth. ;Chapter one sketches a paradigmatic substantive theory of truth that explains the notion of truth by invoking the notions of…Read more
  •  23
    Correspondence and Disquotation: An Essay on the Nature of Truth
    with Leon F. Porter
    Philosophical Review 105 (1): 82. 1996.
    The so-called “disquotational theory of truth” has not previously been developed much beyond the thesis that saying, for example, that ‘Snow is white’ is true amounts only to saying that snow is white. Marian David has set out to see what further sense can be made of the disquotational theory, and to compare its merits with those of correspondence theories of truth. His prognosis is that an intelligible disquotational theory of truth can be developed but will suffer from drastic shortcomings tha…Read more
  •  17
    Review of K. Mulligan (ed.): Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 229-232. 1993.
  •  350
    The correspondence theory of truth
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Narrowly speaking, the correspondence theory of truth is the view that truth is correspondence to a fact -- a view that was advocated by Russell and Moore early in the 20 th century. But the label is usually applied much more broadly to any view explicitly embracing the idea that truth consists in a relation to reality, i.e., that truth is a relational property involving a characteristic relation (to be specified) to some portion of reality (to be specified). During the last 2300 years this basi…Read more
  •  129
    Kim's functionalism
    Philosophical Perspectives 11 133-48. 1997.
    In some recent articles, Jaegwon Kim has argued that non-reductive physicalism is a myth: when it comes to the mind-body problem, the only serious options are reductionism, eliminativism, and dualism.[1] And when it comes to reductionism, Kim is inclined to regard a functionalist theory of the mind as the best available option—mostly because it offers the best explanation of mind-body supervenience. In this paper, I will discuss Kim’s views about functionalism. They may be contended on two gener…Read more
  •  57
    Review of F. Schmitt: Truth, A Primer (review)
    Philosophical Review 106 (3): 441-443. 1997.
    Schmitt allots a chapter to each of the main types of theories about truth: pragmatism, coherentism, deflationism, and the correspondence theory. He discusses various arguments for these positions and concludes that only the arguments supporting the correspondence theory are successful. Schmitt's positive case for correspondence makes up the least original part of the book. He explicitly credits Field and remarks that he is mainly concerned with making Field's difficult account more accessible —…Read more
  •  20
    Das Problem des Kriteriums und der Common Sense
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 28 (1): 3-16. 1986.
    Es gibt zwei Schlüsselfragen in der Theorie der Erkenntnis: ''Was wissen wir?" und "Wie wissen wir?". Chisholm hat argumentiert, daß uns der Versuch, diese Fragen zu beantworten, in eines der wichtigsten und schwierigsten philosophischen Probleme führt: in das Problem des Kriteriums. In dieser Arbeit wird in erster Linie die dem Common Sense verpflichtete Position des "Partikularismus" betrachtet, die von Chisholm als Lösung des Problems des Kriteriums vorgeschlagen wurde. Dabei wird der Frage n…Read more
  •  72
    Quine's ladder: Two and a half pages from the philosophy of logic
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1): 274-312. 2008.
    I want to discuss, in some detail, a short section from Quine’s Philosophy of Logic. It runs from pages 10 to 13 of the second, revised edition of the book and carries the subheading ‘Truth and semantic ascent’.1 In these two and a half pages, Quine presents his well-known account of truth as a device of disquotation, employing what I call Quine’s Ladder. The section merits scrutiny, for it has become the central document for contemporary deflationary views about truth
  •  23
    Lynch's functionalist theory of truth
    In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 42. 2013.
  •  68
    Truth as One and Many
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4): 743-746. 2011.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 743-746, December 2011
  • Horwich's World
    In Patrick Greenough & Michael P. Lynch (eds.), Truth and Realism, Clarendon Press. 2006.
  •  160
    Marian David defends the correspondence theory of truth against the disquotational theory of truth, its current major rival. The correspondence theory asserts that truth is a philosophically rich and profound notion in need of serious explanation. Disquotationalists offer a radically deflationary account inspired by Tarski and propagated by Quine and others. They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of pl…Read more
  •  3
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 23 (1): 37-58. 1985.
    Die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen, aufgefaßt als abstrakte und allgemeine Gegenstände, ist einer der Zankäpfel des Universalienstreites in seiner heutigen Form. Da der Verfasser in diesem Streit auf der Seite jener steht, die, wie Piaton sagt, "alles aus dem Himmel und dem Unsichtbaren auf die Erde herabziehen", werden einige Überlegungen angestellt, die darauf abzielen, platonistische Argumente zu unterminieren, welche häufig im Rahmen einer realistischen Bedeutungstheorie sowie im …Read more
  •  78
    Truth as the Primary Epistemic Goal: A Working Hypothesis
    In Matthias Steup, John Turri & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology (Second Edition), Wiley-blackwell. pp. 363-377. 2013.
  •  35
    Nonexistence and Reid’s Conception of Conceiving
    Grazer Philosophische Studien 25 (1): 585-599. 1985.
    Brentano's famous thesis of the Intentionality of the Mental was already formulated by Thomas Reid who used it in his campaign against the Locke-Berkeley-Hume Theory of Ideas. Apphed to the case of conceiving the thesis says that to conceive is to conceive something. This principle stands in apparent conflict with the common-sensical view, defended by Reid, that we can conceive what does not exist. Both principles, it is argued, are plausible and should be retained. The problem is how to resolve…Read more
  •  28
    Kim's Functionalism
    Noûs 31 (S11): 133-148. 1997.