Roger Ariew

_The most widely read anthology_ for the study of modern philosophy, this volume provides key works of philosophers and other leading thinkers of the period, chosen to enhance the reader’s understanding of modern philosophy and its relationship to the natural sciences of the time. The third edition incorporates important contributions of women and minority thinkers into the canon of the modern period, while retaining all of the material of the previous edition. Included are works by Princess Elisabeth, Margaret Cavendish Duchess of Newcastle, Lady Anne Conway, Anton Wilhelm Amo, Lady Damaris Masham, Lady Mary Shepherd, and Emilie Marquise Du Châtelet.

Descartes and the First Cartesians adopts the perspective that we should not approach René Descartes as a solitary thinker, but as a philosopher who constructs a dialogue with his contemporaries, so as to engage them and elements of his society into his philosophical enterprise. Roger Ariew argues that an important aspect of this engagement concerns the endeavor to establish Cartesian philosophy in the Schools, that is, to replace Aristotle as the authority there. Descartes wrote the Principles of Philosophy as something of a rival to Scholastic textbooks, initially conceiving the project as a comparison of his philosophy and that of the Scholastics. Still, what Descartes produced was inadequate for the task. The topics of Scholastic textbooks mirrored the structure of the collegiate curriculum, divided as they typically were into logic, ethics, physics, and metaphysics. But Descartes produced at best only what could be called a general metaphysics and a partial physics. Ariew's original account establishes the significance of his philosophical enterprise in relation to the textbooks of the first Cartesians and in contrast with late Scholastic textbooks.

_An interdisciplinary exploration of Pascal's philosophy across theology, science, and political thought_ Blaise Pascal has emerged as a central figure in early modern thought whose legacy transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries. _A Companion to Pascal_ addresses the growing scholarly need for an integrated perspective on his philosophy, bringing together essays by leading scholars that contextualize, analyze, and extend Pascal's work. It offers a wide-ranging and in-depth examination of Pascal's multifaceted intellectual contributions that enables readers to progressively build and apply knowledge across the disciplines Pascal influenced, ranging from theology and mathematics to epistemology and political philosophy. The Companion opens by situating Pascal within his intellectual milieu—his interactions with Augustinian theology, his responses to Montaigne and Descartes, and his involvement with the Port-Royal community. Parts II and III move into Pascal's technical contributions, including his foundational role in probability and physics and his unique epistemological stance. Subsequent sections examine Pascal's rhetorical strategies and religious commitments alongside his political and ethical views. The final part assesses Pascal's enduring influence, tracing his impact through figures such as Søren Kierkegaard, William James, and Pierre Duhem. A vital resource for those seeking an understanding of Pascal's philosophical outlook and enduring legacy, _A Companion to Pascal:_ Presents a unique interdisciplinary approach to Pascal that spans philosophy, theology, science, literature, and political thought Offers new perspectives on Pascal's engagement with Descartes, Montaigne, and Augustine Explores lesser-known dimensions of Pascal's work, such as his influence on phenomenology and Marxist theory Analyzes the philosophical implications of Pascal's scientific and mathematical innovations Includes focused chapters on Pascal's Wager, logic, epistemology, and his views on grace and predestination With a comprehensive structure that allows both thematic and chronological exploration of Pascal's thought, _A Companion to Pascal_ is ideal for advanced students and scholars in philosophy, theology, history of science, and French literature. It is particularly valuable for university-level courses in Early Modern Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, and Intellectual History, and serves as an essential reference for academics, educators, and interdisciplinary researchers.

Episodes of the wide diffusion of Galileo’s letters prompts me to consider whether the same thing could be demonstrated for Descartes. The question that interests me most is the circulation of Descartes’ correspondence before the publication of Clerselier’s edition of it, in three volumes, 1657–1667. Thus I examine the influence of Descartes’ unpublished correspondence in Jacques Du Roure’s La Philosophie divisée en toutes ses parties (Paris, 1654). It contains paraphrases of some letters by Descartes and a number of Descartes’ views whose contents were not available in the published corpus. I discuss in particular: 1. To Clerselier, June or July 1646 (about fi rst principles); 2. To Elisabeth, August 4, 1645 (about happiness); 3. To Mersenne?, May 27, 1641?, or To Mesland?, February 9, 1645? (about freedom of indifference). I also examine the evidence of a missing letter: To Mesland, February 9, 1645 (about transubstantiation and individuation). As with the case of the wide diffusion of Galileo’s unpublished letters, we can see a rather quick dissemination of Descartes’ correspondence. Th ree of four letters were circulated, if not by Descartes’ correspondents, at least by Clerselier just after Descartes’ death, even before the publication of his Lettres de Mr. Descartes.

The medieval account of fossils is that animals are sometimes changed into stones because of the petrifying virtue of certain places. This doctrine continues well into the second half of the seventeenth century. The standard account, then, is that fossils are the remains of animals; it inherits the difficulty of explaining how the remains are petrified, or are constituted by some matter different from that of the original animals. It is easy to see how this doctrine could evolve to become the view of Athanasius Kircher and others that fossils are the creation of the power of the place mimicking animals, without there being any actual remains of animals. Kircher and the others provide a ready answer for the obvious differences between fossils and living creatures, including the problem of the stony matter of the fossils, but they achieve this status at the cost of severing links between creatures and fossils. This is the background for Leibniz’s writings on fossils. I trace Leibniz’s development from a follower of Kircher to one of his critics (having been influenced by Nicolaus Steno among others). I also show the resilience of the original doctrine; ultimately Leibniz’s rejection is only partial.

Descartes is perhaps most closely associated with the title, "the Father of Modern Philosophy." Generations of students have been introduced to the study of philosophy through a consideration of his Meditations on First Philosophy. His contributions to natural science is shown by the fact that his physics, as promulgated by the Cartesians, played a central role in the debates after his death over Isaac Newton's theory of gravitation. Descartes also made major contributions to the field of analytic geometry; we still speak today of "Cartesian coordinates" and the "Cartesian product." This second edition of Historical Dictionary of Descartes and Cartesian Philosophy covers the history through a chronology, an introductory essay, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has over 300 cross-referenced entries on various concepts in Descartes' philosophy, science, and mathematics, as well as biographical entries about the intellectual setting for Descartes' philosophy and its reception, both with Cartesians and anti-Cartesians. This book is an excellent access point for students, researchers, and anyone wanting to know more about Descartes.

Résumé Dans quelle mesure la Logique de Port-Royal peut-elle être considérée comme une logique cartésienne? Et dans quelle mesure l’ Art de penser diffère-t-il des logiques antérieures? Telles sont les deux questions, étroitement liées l’une à l’autre, auxquelles je souhaite répondre dans cette étude en procédant à une série de comparaisons, d’une part avec ce que Descartes appelait sa logique, d’autre part avec ce que les cartésiens de la première génération entendaient par logique cartésienne, et pour finir avec l'évolution de la logique scolastique au cours du XVII e siècle. Je conclus que la logique élaborée par les cartésiens est simplement venue confirmer certains des développements de la logique scolastique au XVII e siècle. La Logique de Port-Royal qui, pour les cartésiens de la fin du XVII e siècle, représente par excellence la logique cartésienne, a également bien des traits en commun avec une logique néo-scolastique.

Gregorio Baldin’s book, La croisée des savoirs, concerns the intellectual relations among Hobbes, Mersenne, and Descartes. The study is limited to the time between 1634 and 1648, starting when Hobbes first met Mersenne in Paris and ending when Mersenne died. It covers three main topics. Part i is devoted to the relations maintained by Hobbes with the circle of Mersenne during 1634–1636, which Baldin thinks are essential for the development of Hobbes’ scientific thought. Part ii develops the theme of the “hidden” influence of Mersenne on Hobbes’ thought, highlighting points of contact between the two authors, such as mechanism, research in optics, and their approach to epistemology. Part iii concerns Hobbes’ influence on Mersenne’s thought. It addresses several themes, starting with Mersenne’s interest in Hobbes’ system, the attitudes of Mersenne, Gassendi, and Hobbes toward Cartesian metaphysics, and ending with scientific themes debated in Mersenne’s circle during the 1640s.

No single text could be considered more important in the history of philosophy than Descartes' Meditations. This unique collection of background material to this magisterial philosophical text has been translated from the original French and Latin. The texts gathered here illustrate the kinds of principles, assumptions, and philosophical methods that were commonplace when Descartes was growing up. The selections are from: Francisco Sanches, Christopher Clavius, Pierre de la Ramee, Francisco Suárez, Pierre Charron, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, Scipion Dupleix, Marin Mersenne, Pierre Gassendi, Jean de Silhon, François de la Mothe le Vayer, Charles Sorel, and Jean-Baptiste Morin.

Since the revival of historicist philosophy of science in the 1960s many philosophers have acknowledged a debt to Duhem. But Duhem’s opinions are imperfectly understood and, as McMullin has shown in his (1970) and (1979), there are many strands in the current revival of historicism. We consider here Duhem’s views on the role of history in the appraisal of scientific theories. However, there is no single text offering Duhem’s views on the subject; rather, they are revealed during their application to various historical and contemporary cases. Duhem’s most sustained examination of a contemporary case is his critique of Maxwell’s science and scientific methodology.Duhem’s critique of Maxwell is not a set of isolated or incidental dicta, but the expression of Duhem’s mature thought over the last quarter-century of his life, ranging from (at least) 1893 to his death in 1916.