Scott R. Stroud

ABSTRACT What does democracy entail, especially in pluralistic and divided modern communities? How might religion be summoned as a motivation for democracies commands? This article engages the work of Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch in a rumination on democracy and its religious aspects. Simkhovitch is an under-studied voice in the pragmatist tradition, and her unpublished speeches on religion, love, and care for others gives us the materials with which to construct a notion of democracy that proffers attention to the local community that surrounds us, and that makes up larger senses of community beyond us. Simkhovitch’s Christian-inspired sense of loving one’s neighbor—and living actively among them—helps us see that democracy has a very local sense. It also shows a way that a pragmatic approach to religion can provide a pro-social path of melioration and activism.

In his work on aesthetics, John Dewey provocatively (and enigmatically) called art the “most universal and freest form of communication,” and tied his reading of aesthetic experience to such an employment. I will explore how art, a seemingly obscure and indirect means of communication, can be used as the most effective and moving means of communication in certain circumstances. Dewey’s theory of art will be shown to hold that art can be purposively employed to communicatively evoke a certain experience through an auditor’s experience of an art object. Such a use is shown to be an extension of Dewey’s conceptions of scientific method and the role of experience in criticism and communication, and is discussed in light of examples drawn from contemporary film, sculpture, and classical Japanese poetry.

In The Evolution of Pragmatism in India, Scott R. Stroud delivers a comprehensive exploration of the influence of John Dewey’s pragmatism on Bhimrao Ambedkar, architect of the Republic of India’s constitution. Stroud traces Ambedkar’s development in Dewey’s Columbia University classes in 1913–1916 through his final years in 1950s India when he rewrote the story of Buddhism. Stroud examines pragmatism’s influence not only on the philosophical ideas underpinning Ambedkar’s fight against caste oppression but also how his persuasive techniques drew on pragmatism’s commitment to reconstruction and meliorism. At the same time, Stroud is careful to point out the ways that Ambedkar pushed back against Dewey’s paradigm and developed his own approach to challenges in India. The result is a nuanced study of one of the most important figures in Indian history.

ABSTRACT What sort of education does democracy require? How can we balance the ideals of openness to others and assertion of our own ideas to disagreeing others that democracy demands? This article explores the tempting solutions to the paradoxical charges of democracy—skepticism and partisan dogmatism—and finds them lacking. Using insights from William James and John Dewey, this study argues that there are two habits or senses of charity needed in pluralistic democracies. These habits of imagination open us to the complexities of other agents and to moral situations in general. Democratic education thereby seeks these habits as a way to maintain the tentative balances required by living among agreeing and disagreeing others.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:John Dewey and India:Expanding the John Dewey-Bhimrao Ambedkar StoryScott R. StroudFor those who appreciate the complexity of the pragmatist tradition, the addition of international aspects and figures into recent narratives of its evolution comes as no surprise. John Dewey's influence on his students—and future reformers—from China has been usefully explored, focusing most notably on Hu Shih. Hu saw the value of Dewey's thought, even though he did not imbibe all of it. Later, he would recall the power of the pragmatist's thoughts to provoke creative new ways of expanding pragmatism as a practical philosophy: "John Dewey, with his slow way of lecturing and conversation, was always throwing out right and left these 'seed ideas'—ideas which may fall on fertile soil in the mind of some of his students and grow into intellectual structures probably beyond the dream of the originator" (Hu Shih 95). Hu would return to China after his time in Dewey's classroom and nurture various "seeds" planted in the classrooms of Columbia University into his own creative literary and philosophical approaches to China's problems in the early twentieth century.By now, the Chinese episode of pragmatism's global history is well-known.1 But what of pragmatism's connection to India? Sitting in the same classroom as Hu and Dewey in 1915–1916 was a young Indian student, Bhimrao Ambedkar (1891–1956)—a thinker and leader who would serve a similar function to Hu, germinating useful ideas from Dewey into a new philosophy and a new context. Ambedkar would become a profound thinker who authored many books on a range of subjects pertinent to India's social problems and its democratic hopes. As a political leader, he led many protests for "untouchable" rights, and he served as one of the chief architects for India's democratic constitution in the 1940s. But he was also a deeply pragmatic thinker, one who took inspiration from parts of Dewey's thought that he first encountered while a student at Columbia University 1913–1916. [End Page 65] Ambedkar would write in the Columbia Alumni News in 1930 that "the best friends I have had in my life were some of my classmates at Columbia and my great professors, John Dewey, James Shotwell, Edwin Seligman, and James Harvey Robinson" (qtd. in "'Untouchables' Represented" 12). Ambedkar would be called back to Columbia in 1952 to receive an honorary degree; while he was bouncing around from airport to airport on his way to New York, Dewey died of pneumonia. Ambedkar sat in the King's Crown Hotel across from Columbia University's campus on 4 June and wrote to his wife, Savita, lamenting the news of Dewey's passing: "I am so sorry. I owe all my intellectual life to him. He was a wonderful man."2 Ambedkar had not seen Dewey in person since June 1916, but his work bears the undeniable marks of pragmatism in its unique anti-caste democratic emphases.3Ambedkar would imbibe the thought of Dewey—along with his other progressive professors at Columbia University (as well as institutions in London after 1916)—and return to India to get increasingly involved in the fight for "untouchable" (now referred to as "Dalit," the self-chosen Marathi term meaning "crushed") rights in India. His insistence on gaining the respect that thousands of years of the caste system had denied to him and his fellow Dalits put him at odds with figures like Gandhi, who wanted to emphasize political independence of the Indian nation over what they considered social challenges like caste. While all parts of Ambedkar's education were significant for his fight against caste oppression, he had a particular affinity for Dewey. As recent research has demonstrated, Ambedkar extended and adapted the ideal of social democracy and psychological ethics that he learned from Dewey's courses (Philosophy 231 in the Fall of 1914) and engaged the conversation on custom and force that he heard in Dewey's Philosophy 131-132 course on Moral and Political Philosophy in 1915–1916 (Stroud, "Recovering the Story"). Ambedkar also appropriated Dewey's method of reconstruction and employed it in novel argumentative ways in...

The thought of William James, due to its pragmatically-inclined and contextually-engaged character, would seem to hold great resources for normative subfields of philosophy such as business ethics. Yet not much research has been done on what James could tell us about substantive topics in business ethics, or in terms of the methodology of ethics research. I start such an exploration by examining the concept of the ideal in James's work and how it can be a conscious and vivid way of infusing activity with a larger significance, solving the problems James notes about current orientations toward activity that are driven by mere habit. I tie this analysis into two important issues in business ethics: the debate over what "integrity" is and the concern over the differing methods used in business ethics research.

In the present work, I constructively engage the thought of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Zen Buddhist Dōmgen on moral cultivation. I argue that Dewey presents a useful notion of moral development and growth with a focus on attentiveness to one's situation, but I also note that he leaves out extended analysis of how one is to foster such an orientation. Turning to the writings of Dōmgen, I argue that Deweyan moral theory can be supplemented by the methods that Zen Buddhism prescribes to bring attentiveness back to one's experience of activity. This analysis is placed in the context of my overall project of orientational meliorism, or the alteration of one's orientation toward self, world, and activity with the goal of improving the quality of one's future experience.

Defining “criticism” is a simple—but bedeviling—task. No less a critic and theorist than Edwin Black begins with the simple statement that “criticism is what critics do.” While he admits that this seems like an empty definition, Black does note that it has one redeeming feature—“It compels us to focus on the critic” (1978, 4). Criticism and those who engage in it are integrally connected, and any account of critical activity must deal with both the activity and its actor. In this way, it is much like art—one could easily utter that “art is what artists do.” Criticism is often tied to art and its products, so this appears to be a fair way to proceed in an investigation of criticism. Yet I would argue ..

ABSTRACT Democracy proposes the impossible: that each citizen makes community with those they consider opponents or foes. In the increasingly embittered partisan environment animating so many democracies, this paradoxical demand justifies more attention. This article explores the challenges of democracy among polarized and divided groups by engaging the political theory of Bhimrao Ambedkar’s Navayana pragmatism. Ambedkar, an Indian political figure and thinker who felt the crushing oppression of caste discrimination, reshapes the pragmatism of John Dewey to better encapsulate the importance of overcoming divisions and injustices while forging a community of shared interests. Using Ambedkar’s merging of the values of liberty, equality, and fraternity into a pragmatist vision of democracy as a habit or way of life, this article demonstrates that justice can be usefully taken as a balancing of values among agreeing and disagreeing citizens. This also leads to a recognition of the tragedy of democracy, or the fact that attending to the end and means of fraternity places limits on what one group can do to their opponents in the pursuit of freedom or equality.

This essential new text is designed for courses in contemporary moral issues, applied ethics, and leadership. Emphasizing personal choice in the study of ethics, the authors take the reader on a journey of self-discovery rather than a mere academic survey of the field of ethics.A Practical Guide to Ethics: Living and Leading with Integrity helps students develop their skills in ethical decision-making and put those decisions into effective practice. Its unique focus on leadership, especially the moral dimensions of understanding one's own values, teaches students to understand and, through dialog and negotiation, communicate their own beliefs as a step to building coalitions with those who may hold different views. It is also distinctive in combining ethical theory with both multicultural ethics and a practical orientation to moral decision-making and leadership.

Pragmatism’s star in the field of rhetorical studies continues to rise, with more and more scholars mining the depths of figures such as Dewey, James, Addams, and beyond for rhetorically useful material. Part of the challenge comes from the complex historical context that such thinkers are embedded in; another challenge stems from pragmatism’s own commitment to praxis over the production of abstract—and all too often academic—theories divorced from the historical-material conditions of their emergence. Often, its best thinkers are those who both engage in political practice and guide criticism instead of those who exclusively write scholarly books removed from the world of praxis. Steven Mailloux is one of the...

This article addresses the ongoing debate between pluralistic and monistic approaches to dealing with critical disagreement. I return to the theory of world hypotheses advanced by Stephen C. Pepper, an understudied figure in aesthetics and pragmatism, to enunciate a version of pluralism that centers on the nature of critical evidence and its functioning in social settings of argument. I argue that Pepper's expansive philosophy holds interesting implications for what can be called the metaphysics of criticism, a point missed by partisans of standard views of pluralism and monism. Building on his analysis of equally autonomous (but noncommensurable) world hypotheses, this study enunciates an explicit notion of rhetorical pluralism that goes beyond simple relativism. This account can be labeled “evidentiary pluralism,” since it internalizes standards for evaluation to specific worldviews and recognizes their changeable nature in the context of critical disagreement.

One theme that unites many, if not all, pragmatists is the theme of community, whether in the form of communal matters of truth production and verification in shared experience or in the search for the ideal sociopolitical public. Thus Richard Bernstein closes his study of community, a concern “so fundamental in the pragmatic tradition,” by connecting it to the communicative interests of all the pragmatist thinkers he examines: “Fallibility, openness, criticism, mutual respect, and recognition are essential dimensions of their understanding of communities” (1998, 154). Bernstein reminds us that individuality and community are inseparably linked: individuals are the “matter” that gives existence to a community ..

while many have explored the international reception of Dewey’s thought—for instance, by Hu Shih in the Chinese context—little has been said about the fate of pragmatism in India. Yet there is a line of discernable influence to Indian politics and civil rights movements in the person of Bhimrao Ambedkar. Ambedkar was a famous Indian statesman and anti-caste activist, but he was also a formidable intellectual and philosopher whose collected works span over twenty volumes. He also was highly educated in the West, earning degrees from universities in America and England. Importantly for the fate of pragmatism in India, one of the academic mentors that made a significant impact on Ambedkar during his...

Many see narrative as important for life in terms of its persuasive value, including through the process of identification. This article examines narrative and argument with particular attention to how desire and self-image warp processes of narrative judgment and appropriation. In seeking a way to transcend only accepting narratives or storied accounts of important events that confirm what we want to believe, this article proposes the idea of narrative skepticism as a limiting disposition to our reactions to narratives we are poised to accept and those accepted by our partisan opponents. Narrative skepticism, if employed in a positive and pluralistic fashion, can follow through on the ideals posited by thinkers such as John Dewey that involve deeply democratic and unified communities of diverse but respectful partisans.

ABSTRACT What are the obstacles to believing that narratives can argue? How can we be assured that narratives argue well? This article will explore major objections to accounts of narrative argument and literary truth, and explore a theory of narrative reasoning that emphasizes identification as a vital part of argument. In exploring the account of narrative offered by Walter Fisher in light of concerns with narrative in rhetorical studies and philosophy, I explicate a renewed sense of identification and narrative reasoning that can meet many of these objections to giving narrative a role in human communication and argument. Of particular interest are the resources available in narratives for active identification by an auditor or reader as good reasons for action or belief in their own extratextual activities.