J. Martin

Humans rely on social agreement to assess the credibility of information, but an illusion of consensus can arise through repeated exposure to the same source (dependent consensus), which can make people overestimate credibility. The current work investigated the limits of this illusion across multiple exposures to claims based on either an independent or dependent consensus. In two studies (N = 1015), participants rated their belief in a claim after exposure to an increasing number of consensual claims within a mock social media environment. Initially, when exposed to only a small number of claims, people were equally persuaded by dependent and independent consensus, but independent consensus had a greater impact on beliefs as exposures accumulated. Bayesian nonlinear modeling showed that independent consensus led to a higher asymptotic level of belief and more rapid belief revision than dependent consensus. These effects were robust over variations in claim valence (Experiment 1) and topic (Experiment 2) and were further supported by the free‐text justifications participants provided. Our findings show that the illusion of consensus may be less of a concern than previous research suggested, at least in environments where a high amount of repeated exposure to the same claim is common. They also provide some evidence for a novel mechanism contributing to belief in repeated claims, namely, that repetition of such claims by a secondary source is perceived as a proxy for claim credibility.

Este artículo analiza cómo la inteligencia artificial reproduce y consolida la normatividad androcéntrica a través de las affordances que surgen en el diseño, el entrenamiento y el uso de los sistemas algorítmicos. Basándonos en la teoría de las affordances, que entiende estas como invitaciones a la acción, sostenemos que los artefactos tecnológicos no solo facilitan determinadas prácticas, sino que también encarnan normas implícitas, dando forma a modos de acción situados culturalmente. Aunque la bibliografía sobre el sesgo algorítmico ha documentado manifestaciones de desigualdad de género, a menudo carece de un marco que explique cómo dichos sesgos se consolidan como normas a través de la interacción entre el usuario y el sistema. Para subsanar esta laguna, proponemos una tipología de affordances normativas androcéntricas en tres niveles: (i) datos y corpus de entrenamiento, (ii) arquitecturas y objetivos de diseño, y (iii) configuraciones de interfaz y prácticas de uso. Esta tipología se ilustra con minicasos, como la traducción automática de Google, que históricamente ha asignado las profesiones de cuidados a las mujeres. Al conceptualizar el sesgo androcéntrico como un conjunto de affordances normativas, el artículo ofrece un marco crítico para diagnosticar cómo los sistemas de IA normalizan las jerarquías de género y para replantear su diseño hacia prácticas sociotécnicas más democráticas.

Ninguna figura del círculo más amplio de la Escuela de Frankfurt ha ejemplificado mejor que Walter Benjamin la futilidad de intentar homogeneizar su legado en un corpus de ideas coherente y sistemático. Su trágica incapacidad para escapar del fascismo europeo y unirse a sus colegas del Instituto de Investigación Social en su exilio estadounidense fue tristemente emblemática de su insalvable distancia con el proyecto común. A veces más rigurosamente marxista y otras veces más abiertamente teológico que otros miembros del Instituto, era, como dijo Adorno en una ocasión, "l’écart de tous les courants".

En La imagen-movimiento y en La imagen-tiempo Deleuze presenta una filosofía del cine basada en el pensamiento de Henri Bergson. En el presente artículo desarrollaremos la concepción del movimiento y de la imagen del filósofo de la durée y el modo en que Deleuze se apropia de estas nociones para la hermenéutica del fenómeno cinematográfico. A modo de ejemplificación y siguiendoa este último, recurriremos a Film, de Samuel Beckett, obra en la cual se refleja la imagen-movimiento tal como es en sí misma.---“The Movement-Image. Deleuze and the Beckett-Bergson relationship”. In The Movement-Image and in The Time-Image Deleuze presents a philosophy of cinema based on the thought of Henri Bergson. This paper will develop the conceptions of movement and image of the philosopher of the durée and the way in which Deleuze makes these notions his own for the hermeneutics of the cinematographic phenomenon. As an example and following the latter, the paper refers to Film, by Samuel Beckett, film in which the movement-image is reflected as it is in itself.

El objetivo de este trabajo es, más allá de la polémica biográfica suscitada en su día por Victor Farías, insistir en la profunda relación que hay entre la Ontología y la Política en la obra de Heidegger. Al respecto se recuperan algunos textos significativos, en particular el fragmento de una conferencia que dio como Rector en el Instituto de Anatomía Patológica de la universidad de Friburgo, a finales de 1933, que se traduce e interpreta al final en el contexto de Ser y Tiempo. Tomando como hilo conductor la hipótesis de que el totalitarismo en general no puede justificarse filosóficamente si con anterioridad no se ha suprimido la subjetividad de la conciencia que fundamenta, a su vez, la autonomía de la persona, es preciso separarse del corte epistemológico practicado por la hermenéutica tradicional. En el caso extraordinariamente anti-‐‑moderno (y anti-‐humanista) del totalitarismo nazi tenemos que hilar más fino: el racismo es el medio por el que la subjetividad de la persona, aquello que se llamaba intencionalidad de la conciencia o simplemente conciencia, puede ser destruida en aras de la auténtica subjetividad histórica del pueblo alemán. El nazismo y el “pensar” (Denken) de Heidegger tenían un mismo a priori existencial-‐‑nacional: el final de la filosofía, su destrucción como parte esencial de la vuelta atrás.

Somatoform disorders (SD), commencing during adolescence, represent a major problem in health care systems. While literature underlines the high presence of mental health problems among children and adolescents afflicted by somatic symptoms in the general population, limited evidence is available on the prevalence of comorbid somatic symptoms in child and adolescent psychiatric populations. We assessed the prevalence of somatic symptoms, depression, and anxiety by validated questionnaires in an inpatient cohort. We further screened for the presence of SD. Out of 434 inpatients aged 11-17 years, 371 were included and a total of n = 288 (77.6%) children and adolescents participated in the study. A total of 93.8% of the inpatients reported somatic symptoms within the past six months and still almost half (45.7%) of the sample reported at least one somatic symptom within the last seven days prior to inquiry. Relating to the past six months, 59.5% were positively screened for SD, and 44.6% reported symptoms eligible for positive screening within the past seven days prior to the survey. Somatoform symptomatology was highly associated with anxiety and depression scores, but functional decline was amenable to the number of somatic symptoms only. We provide evidence that somatic symptoms are frequent in children and adolescents being treated in child and adolescent psychiatry and are relevant to everyday functioning. Screening for somatic symptoms should be introduced in the routine diagnostic procedures for early detection of SD in the commencing stages.

Synaesthesia is a condition in which one type of stimulation evokes the sensation of another, as when the hearing of a sound produces photisms, i.e. mental percepts of colours. R is a 20 year old colour blind subject who, in addition to the relatively common grapheme-colour synaesthesia, presents a rarely reported cross modal perception in which a variety of visual stimuli elicit aura-like percepts of colour. In R, photisms seem to be closely related to the affective valence of stimuli and typically bring out a consistent pattern of emotional responses. The present case study suggests that colours might be an intrinsic category of the human brain. We developed an empirical methodology that allowed us to study the subject's otherwise inaccessible phenomenological experience. First, we found that R shows a Stroop effect elicited by photisms despite the fact that he does not show a regular Stroop with real colours. Secondly, by manipulating the colour context we confirmed that colours can alter R's emotional evaluation of the stimuli. Furthermore, we demonstrated that R's auras may actually lead to a partially inverted emotional spectrum where certain stimuli bring out emotional reactions opposite to the normal ones. These findings can only be accounted for by considering R's subjective colour experience or qualia. Therefore the present paper defends the view that qualia are a useful scientific concept that can be approached and studied by experimental methods

Including articles translated from the Italian for the first time, this unique set is the first systematic collection of critical commentary on this influential figure. Reprinting some thirty years of Gramsci criticism, the collection features individual volume introductions as well as a general overview introduction. The thematically-organized volumes include: * Volume I: Life, Context and Intellectual Development * Volume II: Marxism, Philosophy and Politics * Volume III: Revolution, Praxis and the Party * Volume IV: Contemporary Applications.

This article examines the religious and Christian aspects of Federico García Lorca’s Poet in New York. Despite the significance of these themes in the work of the Granada-born poet, they have often been overlooked in some analyses. García Lorca expresses an existential and critical faith that, in response to the exploitation and dehumanization found in capitalist society in New York, takes on prophetic and even apocalyptic characteristics in a biblical sense. The mystical and Christological elements are surprisingly abundant and profound. Lorca’s insights align him with the existential faith of Unamuno and Marcel, as well as the reflections of Krause and Ortega.

This book is a defence of perspectivism in the age of post-truth. At the crossroads of science, art and philosophy, it unearths a tradition that we must rediscover: the point of view is not only what divides, it is also what is shared. The book makes a case why perspectivism alone can avoid us falling back into epistemological naivetés. It presents a series of case studies ranging from innovative interpretations of classical authors and key moments in the history of art—from ancient painting, trompe l’oeil, and Brunelleschi’s experiment in Renaissance Florence—to the issue of perspective in the work of contemporary artists such as Robert Smithson.

The rapid growth of cultural evolutionary science, its expansion into numerous fields, its use of diverse methods, and several conceptual problems have outpaced corollary developments in theory and philosophy of science. This has led to concern, exemplified in results from a recent survey conducted with members of the Cultural Evolution Society, that the field lacks ‘knowledge synthesis’, is poorly supported by ‘theory’, has an ambiguous relation to biological evolution and uses key terms (e.g. ‘culture’, ‘social learning’, ‘cumulative culture’) in ways that hamper operationalization in models, experiments and field studies. Although numerous review papers in the field represent and categorize its empirical findings, the field's theoretical challenges receive less critical attention even though challenges of a theoretical or conceptual nature underlie most of the problems identified by Cultural Evolution Society members. Guided by the heterogeneous ‘grand challenges’ emergent in this survey, this paper restates those challenges and adopts an organizational style requisite to discussion of them. The paper's goal is to contribute to increasing conceptual clarity and theoretical discernment around the most pressing challenges facing the field of cultural evolutionary science. It will be of most interest to cultural evolutionary scientists, theoreticians, philosophers of science and interdisciplinary researchers.

Unamuno, Zubiri y Bueno son tres filósofos de la religión que han marcado tendencia en la filosofía de la religión española de los últimos cien años. Unamuno sitúa el núcleo de la religión en el anhelo de inmortalidad carnal. Zubiri lo sitúa en el fundamento de la realidad sobre la que todo ser humano hace su vida. Bueno teoriza un desarrollo de la religión en tres etapas, de las cuales la primera tiene a los animales como númenes originales. Se trata de tres visiones distintas que han creado escuela y a partir de las cuales pueden orientarse numerosas investigaciones empíricas. Los tres autores comparten una lengua común y una cultura marcada por el cristianismo, aunque sus posiciones personales sean muy distintas (heterodoxa, católica y atea, respetivamente). Los tres además coinciden en el rechazo de fundar sus teorías sobre abstracciones ideales, intentándolo hacer más bien en el hombre de carne y hueso (Unamuno), la realidad (Zubiri) o los animales numinosos de la prehistoria (Bueno).

This study seeks to explore the genealogy and some of the repercussions of textualism, the main linguistic profile of postmodernism. Textualism, the doctrine that equates reality with a text or texts, while not new and rooted in Judeo-Christian philosophical and/or religious thought, represented a discontinuity and a break with that thought. The Romantic movement had a decisive influence on this; it is not in vain that postmodernism can be considered a neo-Romanticism. In connection with these theses, the article addresses the question of how textualism contributes to the destruction of the Western cultural and intellectual tradition.

Although philosophers and theologians have speculated on the ability of timeless, ontological truth to manifest itself in the flux of history, most working historians have focused on epistemological questions concerning the relationship between history as what actually happened and history as its present representation. Two extreme positions—naïve positivism and radical constructivism—have proven equally untenable. This chapter examines three alternatives: falsificationism, the new experientialism, and institutional justificationism. It defends the last of these, which posits a self-reflective community of competence, morally obliged to be truthful and engaged in an endless quest for plausible narratives and compelling explanations of past occurrences, as the most persuasive answer to skepticism about historical truth.

Although Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno's notion that “all reification is a forgetting” and Ludwig Wittgenstein's belief that “all knowledge is in the end based on acknowledgment” are outwardly unrelated, Honneth comes up with an endeavor to link these two incongruent statements. In doing so, he attempts to redefine the concept of reification and set this in the context of the theory of recognition of acknowledgment. As the concept of reification has seemingly been forgotten and undermined, the term disqualified alienation, injustice, exploitation, and other such alternatives to illustrate the negative effects of capitalism. Still the term is used without political implications in the context of contemporary theories. This introductory chapter introduces the complexities attributed to reification through incorporating Marxist principles, Hegelian principles, and other such insights of significant philosophers.

While a lot of research has investigated the cognitive mechanisms for lying, its associated affect is often overlooked. Here, we show that honesty and dishonesty cause short-lived, transient affect: honesty triggers relatively more positive affect than dishonesty. To investigate this, participants first performed several specific activities. After that, they answered questions regarding these (and other) activities in an affective priming paradigm. This required participants to first respond honestly or dishonestly to simple yes/no Prime questions, and afterwards to categorise positive or negative Probe words. Results show that participants were slower and more error prone when lying compared to responding honestly in the Prime task, replicating previous findings that it is cognitively more demanding to lie than to tell the truth. Most importantly, we found that telling the truth sensitises for subsequent positive stimuli, and it does more so than lying. Further, emotional habituation seems to take place, lessening the overall affective evaluation of self-produced actions over time. We discuss the functional role that affect may play in the generation and production of dishonesty-based behaviour in the framework of action control.