Adam Świeżyński

Zasadnicza problematyka książki została podzielona na dwie części, uwzględniające tradycyjny podział na filozofię przyrody nieożywionej i filozofię przyrody ożywionej. Zastosowanie wspomnianego podziału jest uzasadnione zarówno charakterem bytów przyrodniczych, jak i dotychczasową literaturą przedmiotu. Te części poprzedzone zostały omówieniem zagadnień metodologicznych związanych z uprawianiem filozofii przyrody. Czwartą, dodatkową część publikacji, zatytułowaną Tajemnice przyrody, stanowią refleksje nad całością świata przyrodniczego ułożone w filozoficzny tryptyk: Przypadek, Cud, Sens. Są one próbą poszukiwania odpowiedzi na najbardziej podstawowe pytania, które pojawiają się na styku badań przyrodoznawstwa, refleksji filozoficzno-przyrodniczej i teologii przyrody.

From the deliberations presented in the foregoing, it follows that God’s intervention in the natural processes is possible for the purpose of bringing about miraculous events without transgressing either the laws of nature or the principle of causality. Our justifications of knowledge claims about miracle will depend on our metaphysical views about determinism and indeterminism. If the universe is open to radical chance or to unique actions of God, we should be opened to the possibility of encountering what appear to us as sui generis event.

Zebrane w niniejszej publikacji prace są owocem namysłu zarówno badaczy przyrody, jak i filozofów oraz teologów. Prezentują one różnorodne spojrzenie na elementy dziejów dialogu między naukami przyrodniczymi, filozofią i teologią, a także własne poszukiwania autorów dotyczące współczesnych aspektów tej problematyki. W pierwszej części zostanie przedstawione spojrzenie na charakterystyczne punkty historycznego procesu formowania się relacji między różnymi dziedzinami ludzkiego poznania. Czytelnik będzie mógł prześledzić etapy jednoczenia się religijnego i filozoficznego obrazu rzeczywistości na gruncie chrześcijańskiej starożytności i średniowiecza. Ukazane też zostanie oświeceniowe rozejście się teologii i nowożytnej filozofii pod wpływem rozwoju nauk szczegółowych. Współczesny etap poszukiwań obszarów i perspektyw, w których możliwy jest dialog pomiędzy wyodrębnionymi z filozofii naukami przyrodniczymi a samą filozofią oraz teologią, zostanie zaprezentowany w drugiej części niniejszej publikacji. Składają się na nią artykuły dotyczące zarówno aspektów metodologicznych, jak i konkretnych problemów pojawiających się na styku elementów triady: przyrodoznawstwo – filozofia – teologia.

On Limited Divine Knowledge in the structure of Open Theism ‘Open Theism,’ also known as ‘open theology,’ ‘open view’ and ‘openness of God’ is not a new philosophical position, but it has not been presented and analyzed in detail in the Polish philosophy of religion. Open theism is a significant modification of the traditional Christian concept of God, some important aspects of God’s nature and God’s relationship with the world created by Him. Briefly speaking, ‘open theism’ is a philosophical model of God and His activity in the world, made on the basis of analytical philosophy of religion, referring to the biblical image of God, including such issues as God’s omniscience, human freedom, the problem of evil and providence. Sometimes ‘open theism’ is also referred to as ‘free will theism’, because it is concerned with the problem of the freedom of human will and the related question of God’s omniscience. It is this latter issue that seems to be regarded by advocates of ‘open theism’ as the essential point. So someone can get the impression that the central content of this philosophical position is the problem of God’s knowledge (His foreknowledge) and the limitations of this knowledgecharacteristic of ‘open theism’. In the light of a closer analysis, however, it turns out that it is important to define precisely the role of the concept of God’s limited knowledge in the structure of ‘open theism.’ This article aims to reconstruct and present the essential elements of the ‘open theism’ with particular emphasis on the role played in it by the concept of God’s limited foreknowledge, and to clarify the place of individual elements of the structure and their relationships. Keywords: open theism, God’s foreknowledge, free will, concept of God

The system approach to the miracle is based on the conviction that the complex issues, requiring the interdisciplinary approach, should be captured in a system way. Thus, the problem of miracle, because of its interdisciplinary character, should be captured in a systemic way, because such approach enables the more adequate and comprehensive presentation of these issues. The system approach towards the epistemology of miracle is the attempt of the more adequate presentation of the relationship between the scientific-natural research and theological stage of recognizing the miracle. Because of using systemic categories, it is possible to present the common foundations (environment) of the system of scientific-natural knowledge and the system of theological interpretation, which can be described as the rationality of knowledge. The result of adopting the systemic epistemology of miracle is noticing the relations between the scientific-natural research and theological interpretation in their system complexity. Determining these relations leads to the more general conclusion that the natural sciences and theology as separate and autonomous systems of gaining the knowledge of reality do not have to be treated as the competing but rather as the complementary ones, with their methodological diversity and limitations in mind.

It has been common for some time to think of a miracle as a special, extraordinary event possessing a supernatural cause. Such a supernaturalistic account of miracles might be constructed with an eye to apologetic concerns, in the hope that the occurrence of a miracle might provide a defense for theism. The general strategy of such an apologetic appeal is to suggest that a miracle is an event that nature could not produce on its own. It is thought of as an event that is incapable of receiving a natural explanation. Thus the supernaturalist hopes that the occurrence of a miracle will point to the operation of a causal force from outside of nature, i.e. one that is supernatural. The miracle as an “extraordinary event” can be understood in two ways: (1) as a supernatural event and (2) as an event inexplicable by natural sciences. I will seek to show that in (1) we can talk about a supernatural event as a miraculous one only when we mean the fact that it is caused by a supernatural cause (God) and not when we mean that the very event (the way it proceeds) is supernatural. And with respect to (2), I suggest that talking about scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event doesn’t make sense because it results from understanding the miracle as a violation of the laws of nature and that cannot be proven (and there is no need to do it). My concern is to show the difficulties of such an account of miracles, and to show how our concept of the miraculous could do without it

Zazwyczaj, najkrócej rzecz ujmujc, określa się cud jako „niezwykłe zdarzenie spowodowane przez Boga”. Bliższa analiza pojęcia niezwykłości prowadzi do wyróżnienia dwóch innych cech cudu – ponadnaturalności i naukowej niewyjaśnialności. Wyodrębnienie i przedstawienie dwóch podstawowych charakterystyk zdarzenia cudownego (ponadnaturalność i naukowa niewyjaśnialność), które występuj (choć nie zawsze w jednakowy sposób wyrażone) w definicjach i określeniach cudu proponowanych w literaturze przedmiotu, może posłużyć do wskazania zasadniczych kierunków, w których powinny być prowadzone dalsze analizy tytułowego zagadnienia. Warto także zasygnalizować główne problemy, jakie pojawiaj się w związku z przyjęciem wspomnianych określeń. Problemy te dotyczą różnorodnej treści podkładanej pod poszczególne rozumienia cudu i dlatego wymagają ponownego przemyślenia istotnego znaczenia tego pojęcia. W trakcie analizy określenia cudu jako „zdarzenia niezwykłego” zamierzam więc uzasadnić twierdzenie, że cud jako „zdarzenie niezwykłe” jest rozumiany na dwa sposoby: (1) jako zdarzenie ponadnaturalne i (2) jako zdarzenie naukowo niewyjaśnialne. Następnie będę starał się pokazać, że w przypadku (1) można mówić o zdarzeniu ponadnaturalnym jako o zdarzeniu cudownym tylko wtedy, gdy ma się na myśli to, że jest ono spowodowane ponadnaturalną przyczyną (za którą uznaje się Boga), a nie wtedy, gdy za ponadnaturalny uznaje się jego przebieg. Z kolei odnośnie do przypadku (2) proponuję przyjć pogląd, że mówienie o naukowej niewyjaśnialności zdarzenia cudownego nie ma sensu, gdyż twierdzenie to jest konsekwencją rozumienia cudu jako pogwałcenia prawidłowości przyrody, a tego nie można wykazać (i nie ma takiej potrzeby). Można natomiast utrzymywać, że zdarzenie cudowne to takie zdarzenie, które musi być niewyjaśnione naukowo w momencie, gdy zachodzi.

Abiogenesis, sometimes also called “naïve”, spontaneous generation (Lat. generatio spontanea) is – most generally speaking – a view, according to which living creatures come into being spontaneously and voluntarily from inanimate matter. Such a broad formulation of the idea of autogeny, however, does not show significant differences that occur in understanding it. The basis for these differences is constituted by different definitions of what should be considered inanimate matter, and what – animate matter. A thorough consideration of the arguments that have been offered in the history of research into the nature in order to justify the idea of autogeny, and an investigation into the modern debates and controversies concerning this idea allow discovering a variety of interpretations of the view of a spontaneous and voluntary origin of biological organisms. The variety was formed together with the development of the scientific empirical method and with the participation of philosophical concepts explaining the way the animate world functions. With time, the idea of a spontaneous origin of organisms underwent many transformations, first consisting in limiting the range of its application (from macroscopic organisms with complex structure to relatively simple microorganisms), then in a change in its understanding, and finally to questioning the very idea. Also the way changed, in which the possibility of the occurrence of autogeny in the nature was motivated. However, it seems that the very core of the idea of autogeny, which contains a general thought about transformation of matter leading to the origin of living organisms is still maintained in the contemporary natural science.

The question of the origin of life interested people for centuries. All existing views on this subject can be classified into different areas of human knowledge about the world: natural sciences, philosophy, and theology (religion). It is interesting to look at them closer and to classify all the typical groups of the theories about the origins of life. We can then see links existing between them and relationships that indicate their own nature. Nowadays, driving forces of prebiological chemical evolution and the mode of explanation of the transition ‘non-life into life’ give a great variety of solutions. The differences between the theories, however, as well as the current controversies in the scientific community (what ‘in the beginning’ was?; where and when the prebiotic evolution may took place? etc.) will be shown as of secondary importance for the theories’ systematization in comparison with several much more profound philosophical assumptions underlying the origin-of-life-studies. My proposal to organize and classify different types of the theories of genesis of life allows for extracting conceptions of different kind: metaphysical and scientific, and also for comparing them with each other. Some of them answer the question of the emergence of life in general and others on the question of the origin of life on the Earth only. In the perspective of contemporary scientific research on the origin of life it seems interesting that two main ideas concerning the problem of the origin of life, spontaneous generation and panspermia, are still present as presuppositions of certain theories but have been modified. Thus a ‘philosophical key’ seems to be the most appropriate to systematize all kinds of theories on the origin of life. This paper is an attempt to justify the position adopted. Most important conclusion is that the philosophical basis or implications, which are irreducibly present and possible to be found within the scientific theories of the origin of life, indicates that this problem is not just the strictly scientific one; it is the philosophical problem, too; thus it cannot be fully solved merely through referring to the empirical aspect of biogenesis.

The experience of loneliness is usually seen as a negative aspect of human existence and something to overcome. However, it is worth trying to break free, if only on a trial basis, from the established traditional perception of loneliness, and strive to reduce it immediately from being one of the main sources of human affliction and to rethink its importance in human life. In order to do this, we must first consider the question of the essence of loneliness, and then examine the question of its axiological status, i.e. its value. The ontological dimension and the axiological dimension of the issue should include the opportunity to construct the concept of human loneliness, by taking into account its internal and external aspect. The purpose of this paper is to propose an outline concept of loneliness, which, on the basis of findings on its essence, seeks to determine its axiological nature. The designated point of departure is the biblical image of human loneliness presented in Genesis.