Adam Świeżyński

Contents: Danuta Ługowska, 'Incommensurability of Paradigms Exemplified by the Differences Between the Western and Eastern European Image of the Human Person' ; Maria-Magdalena Weker, 'Light, Body and Soul – the Issues Fundamental for Theories of Vision. A Historical Survey' ; Dariusz Kucharski, 'The Conception of Sensory Perception and Scientific Research. (The Theory of Sign within Philosophy of G. Berkeley and T. Reid)' ; Grzegorz Bugajak, 'Causality and Determinism in Physics' ; Anna Lemańska, 'Truth in Mathematics' ; Anna Latawiec, 'Troubles with the Philosophy of Medicine' ; Adam Świeżyński, 'Values, Axiological Experience, and Scientific Research' ; Grzegorz Bugajak, 'Fears of Science. Nature and Human Actions' ; Adam Świeżyński, 'Some Remarks on the Human Search for Sense in the Context of Human Actions'.

The problem of scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event should be considered in the frame of the question: what does a scientific explanation of events mean? Thus appears the necessity to characterize scientific laws and their role in scientific (natural) explanations. Due to the establishments made, it is possible to verify the thesis about the scientific inexplicability of miraculous events as well as to point to the conditions of this thesis. The final conclusion is the postulate of modifying the theorem about the scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event. Speaking of its scientific inexplicability seems wrong, because this theorem is the consequence of understanding a miracle as the violation of the regularities of nature; and this cannot be proved; what is more, there is no necessity of such a proof. We can claim, however, that a miraculous event is the one which has to be scientifically unexplained at the moment of its occurrence and of its examination by the scientists.

A language of theology have been always (and still is) subjected on two extremes. One from them is statement, that about God we have nothing to say, because divine existence there is completely outside of human ability of speaking about it. Second extreme expresses conviction, that theological conceptions can be used univocally both in speaking about God, and about a man. The manner of avoidance both of indicated ways is to use an analogy in speaking about God. A dissonance between „theory” of God and „experience” of His activities (or of lack of His activity) in somebody’s own life determines challenge for present theology. The application the method of analogy in deciding about God does not protect from appearing of conflict between universally recognized statements of God and an experience flowing from commonplaceness. But in the metaphorical analogy exists a mediation, which can be qualified as an intermediately recognition of some states of things by psyche of man. How does it influence on the recognition of God? Perhaps, we are convicted on continuous passing from one analogy to the next in order to grasp the fact of His presence and action.

The term “miracle” is used both in everyday speech, as well as specialized discourse (theological). Often, the terms associated with the “miracle”, such as “an unusual event”, “supernatural”, “inexplicable”, “an event that violates the laws of nature”, etc., covers a variety of content. It requires clarification and confrontation them with the findings of modern natural science, philosophy of science and theology. Otherwise there is a danger that the concept of the miracle we have, will be used in an outdated and inadequate manner. That is why to modern man we should speak of miracles so as not to expose them to the accusation or indulge a sense of wonder or the universal complaint of extreme rationalization of miracle. Finally, acceptance of the existence of the miraculous events is a matter of religious faith, but faith should not be deprived of rationality derived from the findings of natural science and from logic and consequences of the religious image of the world.

Zasada poszanowania życia ludzkiego praktycznie stosowana jest bar dziej do fizycznej strony egzystencji człowieka niż do jej specyficznie ludzkich aspektów. Poszanowanie życia interpretuje się najczęściej je dynie jako nieodbieranie komuś życia, pomaganie mu w jego utrzyma niu lub walkę o nie do samego końca. Jednak przedłużanie procesu umie rania może być sensowne i do zaakceptowania tylko wtedy, gdy służy określonym ludzkim wartościom. Pomocy udzielanej pacjentowi nie określa to, co jest konieczne albo pożądane dla życia tylko fizycznego, lecz ostatecznie to, czym służy się mu jako człowiekowi. Wyzwanie, rzucane zjawisku śmierci, często ogranicza się właśnie do walki o zachowanie życia śmiertelnie chorego pacjenta. Biegunowo prze ciwną postawą jest całkowita bierność i rezygnacja z jakiegokolwiek zaangażowania na rzecz człowieka umierającego. Pomiędzy tymi dwie ma skrajnymi postawami istnieje jeszcze forma „rzucenia wyzwania śmierci” przez pomoc umierającemu w godnym i bezbolesnym przekro czeniu owej „granicy życia”1. Trudność stanowi jednak przetrwanie cza su poprzedzającego śmierć, w sytuacji, gdy nie ma już możliwości dzia łania. Gdy bowiem okazuje się, że „nic już nie da się zrobić” w walce z chorobą często pojawia się zawód.

Jaki więc obraz Boga wyłania się z propozycji ״teizmu otwartego”? Przede wszystkich jest to Bóg, którego człowiek usiłuje sobie jak najbardziej przybliżyć i pozbawić wszelkich znamion tajemnicy, niejako obnażyć z niej, ale nie przez zwykłą ciekawość, lecz w poszukiwaniu poczucia pewności poznania Boga płynącej z przekonania o Jego uchwytnej i pojmowalnej racjonalności. Niewątpliwie więc jest to Bóg skrojony na ludzką miarę, podobny do nas, ״wzajemny nam”. Biblijne zdanie: ״Uczyńmy człowieka na Nasz obraz, podobnego Nam” (Rdz 1,26), które wypowiedział Bóg-Stwórca w szóstym dniu stworzenia, znalazło swoisty respons w koncepcji zwolenników ״teizmu otwartego”, którzy zdają się mówić: ״Uczyńmy Boga na nasz obraz, podobnego nam”.

Wobec współcześnie nasilających się tendencji społeczno-kulturowych, z których jedne ukierunkowują człowiek w stronę skrajnie racjonalnego (w znaczeniu racjonalizmu empirycznego) pojmowania rzeczywistości, a inne proponują mu rozmaite formy irracjonalności, propozycja zawarta w Księdze Rodzaju wydaje się być prawdziwą drogą „złotego środka”. Jest bowiem usytuowana w obszarze szerokiego pola ludzkiej racjonalności, w którym możliwe okazuje się przyjęcie i zaakceptowanie nie tylko prawidłowości i praw tworzących strukturę rzeczywistości, ale także istnienia „luzów” dla działania przypadków oraz „wolnych miejsc” na działanie wolnej woli i jej niekiedy nieracjonalnych decyzji. Wszystkie one można uznać za tak wkomponowane w strukturę całości, że nie tylko nie niszczą jej racjonalności (sensowności), ale być może są wręcz jej warunkiem. Jeżeli zgodzimy się na taką koncepcję, to ludzkie dramaty i istnienie zła przestają być argumentem na rzecz bezsensu, lecz stają się tym, co można określić jako tajemnicę sensu, w istnienie którego można i warto wierzyć. Wierzymy wszak nie z powodu posiadania niezbitego dowodu, ale dlatego, że dostrzegamy w takiej postawie wartość. W symbolice genezyjskiego „owocu” kryje się więc swoista wiedza rozumiana jako uzyskanie pełnego i ostatecznego wglądu w znaczenie (sens) wszystkiego, co nas i innych ludzi spotyka w życiu, ale jest to wiedza pozbawiona ufności w istnienie czegoś więcej niż ona sama, wiedza zamknięta na dalszy rozwój zdarzeń, niegotowa do powierzenia siebie Temu, który może wykazać jej zbawienną absurdalność.

The event known as the miracle is usually regarded as an expression of God’s omnipotence, which in any way could interfere in the material world, not counting its laws. In the definitions of the miracle, with which we can meet in the literature, it is emphasized that the miracle can speak only when the phenomenon occurs outside the order of nature, or is contrary to this order. The miracle as a supernatural event is considered to be exceeded not only the laws of natural science, but also the laws of nature. In this understood, the miracle is treated as a kind of “proof” of theology in favor of both the existence of God and God’s omnipotence. If, however, deprive the concept of a miracle characteristics related to its supernaturality and propose the concept of miracle as an event of natural course, and at the same time caused by God, does not necessarily mean the elimination of His omnipotence. The action of God and of man in the material world is a conditional operation of many factors. It is traditionally understood as one-sided action of God: God has a purpose for man and the world, and wanting to achieve it, simply enters the world and produces certain effects. In the light of relational-communicating ontology of miracle we would, however, change that perspective and realize that the effects of God’s actions in the world are the result of the interaction between Him all existing reality in which God is one of many factors and causes (although the cause of the most significant). Thus appearing miraculous events are the creative synthesis of the results of the activity of God, human and natural factors. In this perspective, human and divine action cannot therefore be construed neither as absolutely omnipotent (that is, not counting the effects of other factors) or as completely powerless. In this perspective, the miraculous events appear as natural-personal events, which are experiences that are both personal and communal. In fact they reflect the communal and individual openness of man to God, which allows the emergence of extraordinary and turning moments in human life.

Doświadczenie samotności postrzega się najczęściej jako negatywny aspekt ludzkiej egzystencji, wymagający przezwyciężenia. Warto jednak spróbować uwolnić się od utrwalonego tradycyjnym postrzeganiem samotności dążenia do natychmiastowego zredukowania jej jako jednego z podstawowych źródeł ludzkich udręk i ponownie przemyśleć jej znaczenie dla życia człowieka. Aby to zrobić, należy najpierw rozważyć zagadnienie istoty samotności (ontologia samotności), a następnie zbadać kwestię jej aksjologicznego statusu, czyli wartościowości (aksjologia samotności). Wymiar ontologiczny i wymiar aksjologiczny podjętej problematyki powinny łącznie stworzyć możliwość skonstruowania koncepcji samotności ludzkiej uwzgledniającej jej aspekt zewnętrzny (fenomenalny) i aspekt wewnętrzny (istotowy). Celem niniejszego opracowania jest zaproponowanie zarysu koncepcji samotności, która, wychodząc od ustaleń dotyczących jej istoty, zmierza do określenia jej aksjologicznego charakteru. Jako punkt wyjścia zostanie przyjęty biblijny obraz samotności człowieka ukazany w Księdze Rodzaju (Rdz 2,4b-24).

The desire to determine what the Genesis “fruit” was comes from both its mystery and the fact that it became the source of the fall – as a result of being picked and consumed by a human. Generally speaking, all the known proposals of the interpretation of “the fruit of the tree of knowledge of good and evil” can be divided into a literal interpretation, which refers to a particular natural fruit, and symbolic interpretations, in which the “fruit” is a symbol. The strictly theological proposal of understanding the “fruit” is maintained in the mainstream of moral theology, because it directs the symbolism of the “fruit” to the moral dimension of human behavior and leads to a situation of non-compliance of the prohibition, and so breaking the right given to man by God. This article is attempt to interpret the early chapters of the Book of Genesis which in hermeneutic and biblical philosophy seek deep and universal meanings of the Genesis “fruit” symbol.

The concrete question hiding under the term the «forbidden fruit» has probably pervaded readers of the biblical Book of Genesis since its inception, and perhaps the audience of the history of the origin of the world and human being during its orally formation. The desire to determine what this «fruit» was comes from both its mystery and the fact that it became the source of the fall – as a result of being picked and consumed by a human – the consequences of which, according to the biblical picture, humanity bears to this day.

A paradox is an argument that produces an inconsistency, typically within logic or common sense. Most paradoxes are known to be invalid arguments but are still valuable in promoting critical thinking. In astrophysics and physical cosmology, Olbers’ paradox (photometric), named after the German astronomer Heinrich Olbers and also called the “dark night sky paradox”, is the argument that the darkness of the night sky conflicts with the assumption of an infinite and eternal static universe. The darkness of the night sky is one of the pieces of evidence for a non-static universe such as the Big Bang model. If the universe is static and populated by an infinite number of stars, any sight line from Earth must end at the (very bright) surface of a star, so the night sky should be completely bright. This contradicts the observed darkness of the night. Modern research on the essence of the paradox of Olbers (and attempts to neutralize it undertaken in the history of science) lead to the conclusion that its paradoxicality is resulting primarily from the precedence of human thought (ideas, theories) in relation to the possibility of its proper empirical verification. Therefore, the paradox of “dark night-sky” and attempts to overcome it may be instructive proof that something so plain and obvious, as available to anyone look at the starry night sky, sometimes, for respectively keen observer, give an opportunity to look ahead much further (and sometimes more accurately to reality) than empirical research allow at the moment. The Olbers’ paradox created an opportunity for the unveiling of a new cognitive horizon by exceeding the existing scheme of thought and thereby acquiring new scientific knowledge, enriching the knowledge gained so far and deepening our understanding of Universe.

Spontaneous generation, sometimes also called “naive” spontaneous generation is – most generally speaking – a view, according to which living creatures come into being spontaneously and voluntarily from inanimate matter. Such a broad formulation of this idea, however, does not show significant differences that occur in understanding it. The basis for these differences is constituted by different definitions of what should be considered inanimate matter, and what – animate matter. A thorough consideration of the arguments that have been offered in the history of research into the nature in order to justify the idea of spontaneous generation, and an investigation into the modern debates and controversies concerning this idea allow discovering a variety of interpretations of the view of a spontaneous and voluntary origin of biological organisms. The variety was formed together with the development of the scientific empirical method and with the participation of philosophical concepts explaining the way the animate world functions. With time, the idea of a spontaneous origin of organisms underwent many transformations, first consisting in limiting the range of its application (from macroscopic organisms with complex structure to relatively simple microorganisms), then in a change in its understanding, and finally to questioning the very idea. Also the way changed, in which the possibility of the occurrence of spontaneous generation in the nature was motivated. However, it seems that the very core of the idea of spontaneous generation, which contains a general thought about transformation of matter leading to the origin of living organisms is still maintained in the contemporary natural science, in modern theories of abiogenesis.

Persecution of Jews from the beginning of the 15th century and the need for emigration did not create conditions favorable to the intellectual development of Jewish communities. However, the movement caused by them and the creation of intellectual contacts with the non-Jewish community resulted in a partial depressurization of the Jewish intellectual and scientiÞ c community. As a result of signaled processes, Jewish thought began to take on an increasingly eclectic and universal character. Some Jewish thinkers were convinced that the philosophy of nature and the emerging science (and medicine in particular) is independent of the religious worldview in the sense that it provides universal knowledge about nature and its regularities. However, some representatives of Jewish thought at the time recognized this “insensitivity” of modern science to religious differences as a basis for discrediting medicine and other fields of science, not because they are false or ineffective, but because they only concern matter and empiricism with their interest and methodology. Analysis of the views of representatives of Jewish thought from the 16th and 17th centuries, such as: Judah Loew, David Gans, Joseph Solomon Delmedigo and Tobias Cohn, allows to show their scientific and philosophical activity as a tool for realizing non-scientific goals, which were: rapprochement and dialogue with representatives of non-Jewish backgrounds in order to prevent mutual hostility, gain the respect and recognition of the then social elite, protect Jewish communities from further persecution. Finally, the idea was to make the Jews remain in the sphere of religious beliefs and cultural traditions while avoiding harmful intellectual and social isolation on the part of the Christian community and to co-create the scientific climate of modern Europe. The developing science was, in the intention of mentioned researchers, to be a tool and at the same time a place for the fulfillment of this ideal.

We współczesnych dyskusjach na temat występowania i natury cudu daje się zaobserwować charakterystyczna tendencja badaczy do naturalizacji zdarzenia cudownego. Przybiera ona dwie zasadnicze formy: (1) dążenie do wytłumaczenia i uzasadnienia występowania zdarzeń cudownych przez zaproponowanie sposobu, w jaki Bóg miałby działać w przyrodzie (wyjaśnienie swoistego mechanizmu działania Boga); (2) sprowadzenie zdarzeń cudownych do wydarzeń całkowicie naturalnych, których wytłumaczenia należy szukać w ustaleniach stale rozwijającego się przyrodoznawstwa. Oba wymienione sposoby naturalizacji cudu niosą ze sobą określone trudności. Pierwszy sposób, który można określić jako naturalizację umiarkowaną, choć zachowuje pojęcie cudu i dopuszcza występowanie zdarzeń cudownych, naraża się na zarzut dość arbitralnego narzucania określonej wizji działania Boga w świecie, starając się uzgodnić tę wizję z aktualnym stanem wiedzy przyrodniczej na temat funkcjonowania świata. Natomiast drugi sposób, który może zostać nazwany naturalizacją radykalną, idzie dalej i zmierza wprost do zakwestionowania tradycyjnego rozumienia cudu oraz możliwości jego wystąpienia, a w konsekwencji do uznania go za zwykłe zjawisko przyrodnicze.

The article is devoted to the presentation of the position of Judah Loew (Maharal) on the relationship between the scientific and religious view of the world. In his opinion, scientific and theological explanations are disproportionate and are located at various epistemic levels. Consequently, there can be no conflict between them. Each of them refers to a different history of their course, describing them as historia divina and historia naturalis. Although Loew clearly did not reject the path of scientific cognition, he expressed doubts about the effectiveness of contemporary scientific research due to the variety of scientific views and the multiplicity of the proposed solutions. The knowledge of religious revelation, which is, in his opinion, always reliable and accurate, is completely different. The consequence of the described position is his recognition that scientific knowledge remains potentially available to all people equally, regardless of their religion. However, there is a fundamental difference between Jews and other nations in terms of their internal, spiritual “equipment,” resulting from the experience, status and religious tradition of the Jews. Maharal’s position on the relationship between the natural science and Jewish theology seems to be an expression of religious exclusivity on the one hand and thus becomes close to the contemporary trends of religious fundamentalism, and on the other, expresses a strict separation of scientific and religious explanation of reality

Bilinear theories of the beginning of life contain the idea of abiogenesis, which is a modern and scientifically transformed version of the old idea of spontaneous generation, and the idea of the cosmic origin of life, which has been modified and occurs as protopanspermia. The paper presents dependencies existing between the mentioned ideas and contemporary empirical findings in relation to scientific theories on the origin of life. It also deals with the thesis that the appearance of cosmic abiogenesis theory was possible primarily due to the prior existence of earth abiogenesis theory, and indirectly, due to the philosophical idea of earthly spontaneous generation. The latter was later transformed into the concept of self-organization of matter, in accordance with findings of a scientific (empirical) nature and under the influence of theory of physical and chemical evolution. The final general conclusion is the distinction of two components present in contemporary scientific theories about the origin of life: the philosophical one and the empirical one, and clarification of some relationships existing between them.

The paper is devoted to the presentation of the position of Judah Loew (Maharal) on the relationship between the scientific and religious views of the world. In his opinion, scientific and theological explanations are disproportionate and are located at various epistemic levels. Consequently, there can be no conflict between them. Each of them refers to a different history of their discipline, describing them as historia divina and historia naturalis. Undoubtedly, getting to know the world was treated by Maharal as an important value, although not every cognitive strategy was equally valuable for him. In turn, human cognitive activity is always associated with the choice between the values of human cognition and understanding of the world. Among these values, there are two principles that, however, conflict with each other. The first is to achieve unambiguous explanations and a sense of cognitive certainty (1a), which is usually carried out at the expense of simplifying the image of reality (1b). On the other hand, the second is an attempt to preserve the actual complexity of the image of reality (2b), which in turn entails ambiguous explanations and evokes a feeling of limited cognitive certainty (2a). Judah Loew made the interesting and original attempt to combine the terms (1a) with (2b), i.e., the certainty of cognition while maintaining the complexity of the image of the cognized reality. It was an ambitious and philosophically important idea, and in addition, it was implemented in the context of the pursuit of religious-national identity. However, it is questionable whether this goal is achievable.

Historia współistnienia nauk przyrodniczych i teologii naznaczona jest próbami przeciwstawiania sobie tych dwóch płaszczyzn poznania rzeczywistości. Współcześnie takie próby podejmowane są także względem kosmologicznej i teologicznej wizji powstania Wszechświata. Chodzi przede wszystkim o rozpowszechnianie się poglądu, jakoby ewolucyjny charakter istnienia Wszechświata oraz niedająca się wykluczyć możliwość, że nie posiada on początku czasowego, stanowiły argumenty zaprzeczające działaniu Boskiego aktu stworzenia jako przyczyny trwania rzeczywistości. Wydaje się, że najważniejszym źródłem tego błędnego twierdzenia jest mieszanie zasad i terminów ściśle filozoficznych (metafizycznych) z przyrodniczymi. Wbrew temu, co niekiedy próbuje się głosić, stosowane w obrębie teologii chrześcijańskiej ontologiczne rozumienie początku Wszechświata jako zaistnienia wszelkiej materii wskutek stwórczego oddziaływania Boga nie zakłada wcale, że zaistnienie to dokonało się w ramach czasu linearnego, ale wskazuje na stałą, ponadczasową zależność stworzenia od Stwórcy. Podkreślić trzeba również, że analiza zakresu metod badawczych stosowanych w naukach przyrodniczych prowadzi do wniosku o ich niewystarczalności do definitywnego rozstrzygnięcia kwestii czasowego początku Wszechświata materialnego. Na gruncie przyrodoznawstwa można bowiem w sposób uprawniony rozpatrywać wyłącznie zagadnienie początku czasowego obecnie obserwowanego, fizycznego stanu Wszechświata. Wynika z tego, że dla poprawnego zrozumienia natury relacji zachodzącej między kosmologiczną i teologiczną koncepcją kosmogenezy kluczowe znaczenie ma precyzyjne i ścisłe rozumienie znaczenia pojęć zastosowanych w obu koncepcjach powstania Wszechświata, które przynależą do dwóch odrębnych epistemologicznie płaszczyzn poznania rzeczywistości. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i porównanie kosmologicznego i teologicznego rozumienia początku Wszechświata oraz udzielenie odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy są to stanowiska wzajemnie wykluczające się czy komplementarne.

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie i wyjaśnienie metamorfozy, jakiej uległo rozumienie cudu w filozofii żydowskiej. Początkowo, w okresie średniowiecza, myśliciele żydowscy starali się racjonalnie uzasadnić możliwość występowania zdarzeń cudownych. W okresie nowożytnym, a następnie współcześnie zakwestionowano tradycyjne rozumienie cudu jako szczególnego działania Boga w świecie (w przyrodzie i w historii). Decydującym czynnikiem zmiany rozumienia cudu było wydarzenie Holokaustu. Obecnie cud jest rozumiany przez filozofów pochodzenia żydowskiego przede wszystkim jako odrodzenie się państwa Izrael i jego trwanie mimo wszelkich niesprzyjających okoliczności. Cud wiązany jest głównie z działaniem ludzkim, czynem dokonywanym w codziennym życiu społeczności żydowskiej przez jej członków. Można zatem wykazać, że w filozofii żydowskiej nastąpiło istotne przeobrażenie rozumienia cudu w aspekcie jego pochodzenia i znaczenia. Trwałym elementem w postrzeganiu cudu pozostaje natomiast zachwyt i zdumienie, jakie wywołuje on w ludzkiej świadomości.

The year 2023 marks 200 years since Heinrich Wilhelm Olbers wrote a text entitled On the Transparency of Space [Ueber die Durchsichtigkeit des Weltraums, 1823], which is sometimes wrongly considered to be the text containing the first explicit formulation of the so-called “dark sky” paradox. For this reason, it is often called “Olbers’ paradox.” The aforementioned article also contains a proposal for the solution of this paradox, in which Olbers proposes to assume the existence of gaseous clouds in infinite interstellar space, absorbing and attenuating the radiation of stars. A careful reading of his argumentation makes it possible to demonstrate the presence in it of threads of a metaphysical and even theological nature, with which the author supports his astronomical-cosmological argumentation. It seems that in Olbers’ view, metaphysics is still necessary in the sense that science needs metaphysical assumptions in connection with the search for answers to the questions posed in science. For Olbers, science is a stepping stone on the road to contemplating the universe, its beauty and goodness, not only through the knowledge of it thus obtained, but also through a sacred reverence for the fact of its existence – two of the most powerful tools for dispelling the darkness of the human mind. The present study contains a presentation and discussion of the most important passages of the aforementioned text by Olbers, which has not yet been translated into Polish in its entirety, and in the literature is sometimes used selectively and fragmentarily, without taking into account the context of the author’s entire statement, which leads to a distorted understanding of his position.

The book series “Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century” comprises monographs on the thought of prominent representatives of this philosophical tradition, active primarily in the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century. A separate volume is devoted to each philosopher, organized as follows: a biography and bibliography of the author, sources of philosophical inspiration (the influence of their own philosophical school, borrowings from other systems), the author’s preferred philosophical concept, the problems addressed and proposed solutions, a glossary of basic terms, and the polemics and discussions the author engaged in both domestically and internationally. Additionally, each volume is supplemented by an anthology of philosophical texts representative of the author. This volume is dedicated to Jan Krokos—a philosopher of knowledge, phenomenologist and epistemologist.

The book series “Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century” comprises monographs on the thought of prominent representatives of this philosophical tradition, active primarily in the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century. A separate volume is devoted to each philosopher, organized as follows: a biography and bibliography of the author, sources of philosophical inspiration (the influence of their own philosophical school, borrowings from other systems), the author’s preferred philosophical concept, the problems addressed and proposed solutions, a glossary of basic terms, and the polemics and discussions the author engaged in both domestically and internationally. Additionally, each volume is supplemented by an anthology of philosophical texts representative of the author. This volume is dedicated to Miaczysław Lubański (1924–2015)—a philosopher of nature and science.

Chapter 1 deals with the introductory, phenomenological analysis of a miraculous event. It also makes some fundamental distinctions concerning the notion of miracle. The most important distinction, following from these analyses, is distinguishing two aspects of the philosophy of miracle: the ontological and epistemological one. As far as the ontological aspect is concerned, the considerations focus on the structure and elements of a miraculous event as well as on the relations between them. Within the epistemological aspect, however, the fundamental problem is the question of recognizability of miraculous events and the possibility of distinguishing them from the non-miraculous ones, as well as their explicability. Both perspectives of analyzing the notion of miracle constitute the general framework for further more detailed considerations presented in subsequent chapters. Another important distinction concerning the notion of miracle involves distinguishing its most fundamental characteristics; these are: the extraordinariness of a miraculous event and the divine causality conditioning its occurrence. The feature of extraordinariness requires further clarification and more detailed definition, so this chapter attempts to present in more detail and clarify its content. This part of the considerations leads to the distinction between two aspects of extraordinariness of miraculous event: its supernaturality (the ontology of miracle) and its scientific inexplicability (the epistemology of miracle). The attribute connected with the divine causality of a miraculous event requires, in turn, the separate presentation of the manner God acts in miraculous events (ontological aspect); it also requires the presentation of the religious sense of these events (epistemological aspect). In chapters 2 and 3, the author elaborated on the question of extraordinariness of a miraculous event. The aim of these chapters is to prove that using the terms “a supernatural event” (chapter 2) and “a scientifically inexplicable event” (chapter 3) in relation to the miracle is not sufficiently justified. Chapters 4 and 5 contain the detailed analyses of the way and nature of God’s action in a miraculous event, as well as the procedures of recognizing certain events as the miraculous ones. The last problem mentioned here is directly related to the religious sense of miraculous events. The aim of these considerations is to modify the traditional (causal) way of understanding God’s action in a miraculous event and to determine the course and nature of the procedure leading to recognizing a given event as a miraculous one (chapter 5). In order to realize the aims just mentioned, the author has to conduct a thorough analysis of all the elements of the notion of miracle in both ontological and epistemological aspects. In chapter 2, devoted to the supernatural character of a miraculous event, first of all, the supernatural course and cause of an event should be distinguished. The more detailed characteristics of its supernaturality is possible only after presenting what is its natural cause and course. What seems extremely important, in the course of the analyses conducted is the definition of the supernatural course of an event as the course which doesn’t conform to the so-called laws of nature; another very important thing is the distinction between the non-personal and the personal aspect of the supernatural cause of this event. The results of the analyses make us start criticizing the conception of the supernaturality of miraculous event. The final conclusion is as follows: we can talk about the miraculous event as about the supernatural one only if we mean that it is caused by a supernatural personal cause, but not when we classify its course as the supernatural one. In chapter 3, which deals with the problem of scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event, first, it should be determine what is scientific explanation of the events. That’s why; there appears the necessity to characterize the scientific laws and their role in scientific (natural) explanations. Due to the establishments made, it is possible to verify the thesis about the scientific inexplicability of miraculous events as well as to point to the conditions of this thesis. The final conclusion of this chapter is the postulate of modifying the theorem about the scientific inexplicability of a miraculous event. Talking about its scientific inexplicability seems wrong, because this theorem is the consequence of understanding a miracle as violating the regularities of nature; and this cannot be proven; what is more, there is no necessity of such a proof. We can claim, however, that a miraculous event is the one which has to be scientifically unexplained at the moment of its occurrence and of its examination by the scientists. Chapter 4 deals with God’s action in a miraculous event. The more detailed description of His action requires, at first, presenting the typology of God’s actions within the material world. Then, it should be chosen, from among these actions, the one, which applies in the case of miraculous event and we should also justify our choice. Another problem, which needs clarification, is the way God influences the nature in the case of a miraculous event. Because of the problems posed by the one-sided causal understanding of God’s action within the conceptions of miracle proposed so far, completing the sense of this action through highlighting its personal aspect is worth thinking about. Perceiving God’s action in its personal aspect, like human actions, allows for applying the conception of a basic action in the case of miraculous events. Further modifications of this approach lead towards the proposal of the model of creative action of God in a miraculous event. A miraculous event, within this model, is understood as an effect of both miraculous and non-miraculous action, i.e. the creative action which adds to the reality the new element and which enables God to establish the relationship with the existing world, without violating the regularities of the events taking place in the nature so far; what we have here is rather the expansion of this set of regularities. Chapter 5, the theme of which is the sense of a miraculous event, elaborates on the epistemological issues concerning the miracle. Because of the clarification of the term “sense” and of the distinction between the religious and non-religious sense of a miraculous event, the presentation of the complex structure of the process of recognizing miraculous events becomes possible. Two perspectives of determining the religious sense of a miraculous event are present in this process, i.e. the dynamic and axiological and the static and doctrinal one. Each of these two perspectives takes into account the religious context and value of such an event, yet each of them has its own purpose: recognizing the religious value of an event and the religious explanation of it, respectively. Moreover, the semiotic conception of miracle, promoted by the contemporary theology, doesn’t take into account, in a sufficient way, the dynamic and axiological perspective. As a result, the religious, “pre-theological” recognition of the miracle remains underestimate, and it is the basis for establishing the religious value of the event, necessary for determining its religious sense. Thus, it should be highlighted again that the way of establishing the religious sense of a miraculous event, (the religious sense is absolutely necessary to talk about the miracle), includes both subjective and objective aspect. That’s why we can talk about the subjectivized and objectivized interpretation as the elements constituting the process of recognizing the miracle as a whole. This process should be regarded as the form of interpreting reality, which, although still, to a great extent, based on the assumptions somebody accepts, doesn’t lack the objective element coming from the non-individual assessment of an event; what is more, it is the response to the human need of capturing the sense of the events taking place in reality. Chapter 6, containing the proposal of the system approach towards the miracle, is the continuation and development of the analyses presented in the previous chapters. This proposal concludes the considerations from the previous chapters; it also enables drawing the conclusions, which, in turn, constitute the basis for formulating the adequate conception of a miraculous event. It preserves the division into the ontological and epistemological aspect of the approach towards the miracle. The system approach towards the miracle is based on the conviction that the complex issues, requiring the interdisciplinary approach, should be captured in a system way. Thus, the problem of miracle, because of its interdisciplinary character, should be captured in a system way, because such approach enables the more adequate and comprehensive presentation of these issues. The system approach towards the ontology of miracle (6.1.), which first presents its assumptions and then its characteristics, leads towards the relational and communicational conception of a miraculous event. It appears that this conception presents a miraculous event in its complexity, including the person and action of God, the character and phenomena of the nature, and the person and activity of a man. This approach pays the sufficient attention to the elements of ontology of the miracle, which were underestimated within the conceptions proposed so far. What is meant here is, first of all, a human being as an active participant of a miraculous event and his diverse activities, and the relationships, which they bring about, and which do not remain insignificant for the occurrence of the miracle. The system approach towards the epistemology of miracle (6.2.), in turn, with its own assumptions and characteristics, is the attempt of the more adequate presentation of the relationship between the scientific-natural and theological stage of recognizing the miracle. Because of using system categories, it is possible to present the common foundations (environment) of the system of scientific-natural research and the system of theological interpretation, which can be described as the rationality of knowledge. The result of adopting the system epistemology of miracle is noticing the relations between the scientific-natural research and theological interpretation in their system complexity. Determining these relations leads to the more general conclusion that the natural sciences and theology as the separate and autonomous systems of gaining the knowledge of reality do not have to be treated as the competing but rather as the complementary ones, with their methodological diversity and limitations in mind. Taking a closer look at the conceptions of a miraculous event, which appeared in the course of human thought development, we can clearly see that they were influenced by the scientific (natural) picture of the world and by the development of theological doctrine. It appears, therefore, that both fields and their development will also determine the potential changes in the way of understanding miracle in the future. Philosophy, within which the dialogue between the two fields mentioned above takes place may thus still be the intellectual dimension of the thorough analyses of miracle and its adequate conceptualization. This publication is the conscious step in this direction.

The book series “Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century” comprises monographs on the thought of 13 prominent representatives of this philosophical tradition, active primarily in the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century (Mieczysław Gogacz, Piotr Lenartowicz, Stanisław Kamiński, Kazimierz Kloskowski, Kazimierz Kłósak, Feliks Koneczny, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, Tadeusz Styczeń, Tadeusz Ślipko, Józef Tischner, Karol Wojtyła, Jacek Woroniecki, Zofia J. Zdybicka). A separate volume is devoted to each philosopher, organized as follows: a biography and bibliography of the author, sources of philosophical inspiration (the influence of their own philosophical school, borrowings from other systems), the author’s preferred philosophical concept, the problems addressed and proposed solutions, a glossary of basic terms, and the polemics and discussions the author engaged in both domestically and internationally. Additionally, each volume is supplemented by an anthology of philosophical texts representative of the author. This volume is dedicated to Kazimierz Kłósak (1911–1982)—a philosopher of nature, philosopher of God, and theologian.

The book series “Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century” comprises monographs on the thought of 13 prominent representatives of this philosophical tradition, active primarily in the 20th century and at the beginning of the 21st century (Mieczysław Gogacz, Piotr Lenartowicz, Stanisław Kamiński, Kazimierz Kloskowski, Kazimierz Kłósak, Feliks Koneczny, Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec, Tadeusz Styczeń, Tadeusz Ślipko, Józef Tischner, Karol Wojtyła, Jacek Woroniecki, Zofia J. Zdybicka). A separate volume is devoted to each philosopher, organized as follows: a biography and bibliography of the author, sources of philosophical inspiration (the influence of their own philosophical school, borrowings from other systems), the author’s preferred philosophical concept, the problems addressed and proposed solutions, a glossary of basic terms, and the polemics and discussions the author engaged in both domestically and internationally. Additionally, each volume is supplemented by an anthology of philosophical texts representative of the author. This volume is dedicated to Kazimierz Kloskowski (1953–1999)—a philosopher of nature, bioethicist, and theologian.

Contents: Introduction ; Part One: Historical Perspective: Chapter 1 - Rationalization of Miraculous Events – Maimonides Case (Adam Świeżyński) ; Chapter 2 - God’s Relationship to the World in George Berkeley’s Presentationism (Dariusz Kucharski) ; Chapter 3 - Two Dimensions of the Faith-Science Relationship (Danuta Ługowska) ; Part Two: Contemporary View ; Chapter 4 - Creation and Evolution: Towards a Coherent Picture of the World and Mankind (Grzegorz Bugajak, Jacek Tomczyk) ; Chapter 5 - Suffering, Death and Chance as the Elements of the World Structure (Adam Świeżyński) ; Chapter 6 - Has God Predicted Chance? (Anna Latawiec) ; Chapter 7 - The Significance of the Philosophy of Nature for Theology (Anna Lemańska).

The more thorough analysis of the notion of miracle as an extraordinary event leads us towards distinguishing two more features of the miracle, i.e. its supernaturality and scientific inexplicability. Considering the miracle as the event caused by God’s action requires, in turn, distinguishing another element, which is the religious significance. Distinguishing and presenting the fundamental features of miraculous event (supernaturality, scientific inexplicability, the effect of God’s action, religious significance), which are present, although not always expressed in the same way, in the definitions of the miracle, the literature suggests, is aimed at indicating the basic directions of further analysis of the problem in question. At the same time, we will mention the main problems, which appear in connection with accepting the above features. These problems concern various ways, the miracle is understood, so they require the revision of the meaning of this notion. Miracle as an ‘extraordinary event’, may be understood in two ways: (1) as a supernatural event (the ontological aspect) and (2) as a scientifically inexplicable event (epistemological aspect). The directions of further analyses are determined by making a distinction between two aspects of philosophical problems concerning the miracle, namely, the ontology and epistemology of the miracle. This book is devoted to the issue of epistemology of miracle.

The more thorough analysis of the notion of miracle as an extraordinary event leads us towards distinguishing two more features of the miracle, i.e. its supernaturality and scientific inexplicability. Considering the miracle as the event caused by God’s action requires, in turn, distinguishing another element, which is the religious significance. Distinguishing and presenting the fundamental features of miraculous event (supernaturality, scientific inexplicability, the effect of God’s action, religious significance), which are present, although not always expressed in the same way, in the definitions of the miracle, the literature suggests, is aimed at indicating the basic directions of further analysis of the problem in question. At the same time, we will mention the main problems, which appear in connection with accepting the above features. These problems concern various ways, the miracle is understood, so they require the revision of the meaning of this notion. Miracle as an ‘extraordinary event’, may be understood in two ways: (1) as a supernatural event (the ontological aspect) and (2) as a scientifically inexplicable event (epistemological aspect). The directions of further analyses are determined by making a distinction between two aspects of philosophical problems concerning the miracle, namely, the ontology and epistemology of the miracle. This book is devoted to the issue of ontology of miracle.

In Chapter 1 I discuss the basic problem which made me undertake the issue of human death. That problem was the dualism in the depiction of human nature which has not been fully overcome yet, the dualism which leads to the emergence of new difficulties in contemporary attempts at adequately solving the problem of human death. They include the separation of soul from the body in the moment of death, and the borderline between the moment of death and the moment of resurrection. Chapter 2 is devoted to the presentation of a new anthropological perspective, of an anthropology build “from the bottom up”, that is “from foundations”, and taking into account man’s rooting in the biological environment, and thus also in the genetic heritage taken over from our pre-human ancestors. That anthropology brings new aspects into traditional anthropology by extending it to include new ways of explaining the genesis of the human body and spirit, and new depictions of man’s death. In Chapter 2 I will also present the concept of evolution proposed by P.T. de Chardin, which I appreciate for its comprehensive evolutionary perception of the world. This concept has provoked various responses, but it certainly provides a creative inspiration for further attempts at applying the idea of evolution to various issues. The general framework of the evolutionary model proposed by the French researcher turns out to be useful also when applied to the evolutionary understanding of human death. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the principal premises of the evolutionary concept of human death taken from analyses carried out by T. Wojciechowski concerning the issue of time, space, and the structure of variable material beings. A being is variable because it has a temporal structure, and the changes that occur are the derivatives of that structure. The temporal structure may be seen as endless, in which a being, even though its existence had a beginning, will exist for ever. Material substance should not be seen statically, but in dynamic and evolutionary terms. In evolution, time becomes a driver of development, an element shaping and directing the evolution of the entire cosmos. Man’s substance has been made capable of two levels of being and acting: the spatial and temporal level, and the endless and immanent level. Together, they form the one essence of man. Thus, the human person is partially immersed in the material cosmos, and partially elevated above it. Chapter 4 presents the evolutionary approach to the moment of man’s death. The views of T. Wojciechowski will be presented in which the moment of death is seen as a moment of transformation and perfection of the structure of the essence of human existence. Furthermore, the issue of the relationship existing, according to T. Wojciechowski, between man’s death and resurrection will be discussed. Understood in evolutionary terms, the moment of death is the time when the structure of human existence is transformed. Death transfers man fully into eternity and enables his life on a higher level of existential being. The element of flesh is retained, but changes its nature. Such view of death allows it to be understood as the moment of resurrection and the culmination of the evolutionary process of life. Death is therefore an “invention” of the evolution and should be seen as a natural and positive phenomenon. At this point, I also propose a solution to the question about reconciliation between temporal and endless existence. In Chapter 5 I take up the issue of consequences flowing from the postulated understanding of human death. They have been pointed to by T. Wojciechowski, but need to be further developed and clarified. He believed two lines in man’s development need to be recognized: that of natural and that of supernatural evolution. Both have the same direction, while occurring on different planes. In each of these lines, death is a natural element of life, pre-planned and, so to say, “encoded” in the cosmic matter. Therefore, the treatment of biological death as the consequence of sin is not only contrary to the evolutionary understanding of life, but in addition artificially combines that which is natural with that which is supernatural. Man’s authentic experience of his own present is a condition of his achieving full existential perfection in the moment of this death. Full engagement in the present is, in a way, a harbinger of the future; thus, the life “here” and “there” may not be inherently inconsistent. In the light of the evolutionary concept, death is not a punishment, but the most positive experience of man’s life in that it enables him to achieve full existential perfection. Chapter 6 is devoted to a substantiation of the possibility of evolutionary transformation of the structure of human existence in the moment of death. An adequate cause needs to be identified which could substantiate that transformation and achievement of perfection. I believe an appropriate substantiation can be found in God’s creative act, interpreted in evolutionary terms. The process of evolution, with its subsequent stages, is only a necessary condition for that “transformation” and “elevation”. The sufficient condition is fulfilled by the continuous creative intervention of God. The concept of God’s creative activity in the moment of man’s death finds its continuation in Chapter 7, where I present a detailed analysis of God’s activity at the time of man’s death. The concept of God’s creative activity extended over the entire process of evolution makes it possible to consider the moment of death as the moment of man’s resurrection. The moment of death is thus a moment of creation in evolutionary terms. Thus, as long as man is related to temporal and spatial elements, his development, or creation, continues. Death is only the completion of the final stage of creation, which may be painful and evoke fear, but in fact should give hope, for it involves resurrection. I also propose that the creative act in the moment of man’s death-resurrection be considered a basic action of God, which explains the manner in which God’s activity is contained within the framework of the creative act, encompassing also the moment of death-resurrection. The final Chapter 8 describes a didactic model illustrating the concept proposed here. I use the analogy of white light dispersion effect in the prism, and compare the incident ray to the creative act, and the dispersed rays going through the prism to the line of man’s natural and supernatural evolution. This model also shows the difference in the perspectives from which the phenomenon of death is seen by God and by man.