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55The informational character of representationsBehavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (3): 376-377. 1982.
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181Mental causationIn Kevin A. Stoehr (ed.), The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Bowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. pp. 81-88. 1999.Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional pr…Read more
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Reply: Causal relevance and explanatory exclusionIn Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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72Two Conceptions of KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 15-30. 1991.There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Ke…Read more
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271Knowing what you think vs. knowing that you think itIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. 2004.
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218Psychological vs. biological explanations of behaviorBehavior and Philosophy 32 (1): 167-177. 2004.Causal explanations of behavior must distinguish two kinds of cause. There are triggering causes, the events or conditions that come before the effect and are followed regularly by the effect, and structuring causes, events that cause a triggering cause to produce its effect. Moving the mouse is the triggering cause of cursor movement; hardware and programming conditions are the structuring causes of cursor movement. I use this distinction to show how representational facts can be structuring ca…Read more
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Sensation and perception (1981)In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Bradford Book/mit Press. 1988.
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3Information-theoretic SemanticsIn Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, Oxford University Press. 2009.
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162Where is the mind?In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics, Csli Publications. 2001.
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507Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia?Philosophical Issues 7 143-158. 1996.
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32XI*—IntrospectionProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1): 263-278. 1994.Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
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Reply to reviewers of explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 819-839. 1990.
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The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
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Mental events as structuring causes of behaviorIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Clarendon Press. pp. 121--135. 1993.
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135Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behaviorIn J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 157--173. 1998.
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18Richard Rorty., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (review)International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 96-98. 1982.
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204The epistemology of beliefSynthese 55 (1). 1983.By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively acquired concep…Read more
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95Simple seeingIn Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--15. 1979.