-
2The intentionality of perceptionIn Barry Smith (ed.), John Searle, Cambridge University Press. pp. 154-168. 2003.
-
92Mental CausationThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2 (7): 81-88. 1999.Materialist explanations of cause and effect tend to embrace epiphenomenalism. Those who try to avoid epiphenomenalism tend to deny either the extrinsicness of meaning or the intrinsicness of causality. I argue that to deny one or the other is equally implausible. Rather, I prefer a different strategy: accept both premises, but deny that epiphenomenalism is necessarily the conclusion. This strategy is available because the premises do not imply the conclusion without the help of an additional pr…Read more
-
33Apistemology and Cognition by Alvin Goldman (review)Journal of Philosophy 85 (5): 265-270. 1988.
-
26Two Conceptions of KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 15-30. 1991.There are two ways to think about knowledge: From the bottom-up point of view, knowledge is an early arrival on the evolutionary scene; it is what animals need in order to coordinate their behavior with the environmental conditions. The top-down approach, departing from Descartes, considers knowledge constituted by a justified belief which gains its justification only in so far as the process by means of which it is reached conforms to canons of sciemific inference and rational theory choice. Ke…Read more
-
4373MisrepresentationIn Radu Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function, Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36. 1986.
-
2What must actions be for reasons to explain them?In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 13--21. 2009.
-
32XI*—IntrospectionProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 94 (1): 263-278. 1994.Fred Dretske; XI*—Introspection, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 94, Issue 1, 1 June 1994, Pages 263–278, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/9.
-
4Putting information to workIn Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition, University of British Columbia Press. 1990.
-
77How reasons explain behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and NoordhofMind and Language 11 (2): 223-229. 1996.Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny that the partial supervenience of conte…Read more
-
56The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (review)International Studies in Philosophy 21 (3): 101-102. 1989.
-
45
-
60The Metaphysics of InformationIn Herbert Hrachovec & Alois Pichler (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information: Proceedings of the 30th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2007, De Gruyter. pp. 273-284. 2008.
-
Modes of perceptual representationIn Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge University Press. pp. 147--157. 1993.
-
1Aspects of cognitive representationIn Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, University of Arizona Press. 1986.
-
3Does meaning matter?In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
-
72" 1 A Misrepresentation"In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Mit Press. pp. 297. 1993.