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2What must actions be for reasons to explain them?In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 13--21. 2009.
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4Putting information to workIn Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition, University of British Columbia Press. 1990.
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56The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (review)International Studies in Philosophy 21 (3): 101-102. 1989.
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77How reasons explain behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and NoordhofMind and Language 11 (2): 223-229. 1996.Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny that the partial supervenience of conte…Read more
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60The Metaphysics of InformationIn Herbert Hrachovec & Alois Pichler (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Information: Proceedings of the 30th International Ludwig Wittgenstein-Symposium in Kirchberg, 2007, De Gruyter. pp. 273-284. 2008.
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Modes of perceptual representationIn Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences, Cambridge University Press. pp. 147--157. 1993.
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1Aspects of cognitive representationIn Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief, University of Arizona Press. 1986.
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72" 1 A Misrepresentation"In Alvin Goldman (ed.), Readings in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Mit Press. pp. 297. 1993.
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3Does meaning matter?In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Information, Semantics, and Epistemology, Blackwell. 1990.
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1Knowledge: Sanford and CohenIn Brian P. McLaughlin (ed.), Dretske and His Critics, Blackwell. pp. 185--96. 1991.
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246Particular reidentificationPhilosophy of Science 31 (2): 133-142. 1964.A certain dilemma is inherent in relational accounts of space and time. If any objects endure through change, then temporal elements other than relations are required to describe them. If, on the other hand, no objects endure through change, no permanent reference system is available in terms of which to define the "same place" at different times. An argument which, by exploiting this latter difficulty, attempts to show that "objects with some endurance through time" must be accepted as fundamen…Read more
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21The Case Against ClosureIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 13--25. 2013.
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23Is Knowledge Closed Under Known Entailment? The Case Against ClosureIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 13-26. 2013.
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25What Good is Consciousness?Canadian Journal of Philosophy 27 (1): 1-15. 1997.If consciousness is good for something, conscious things must differ in some causally relevant way from unconscious things. If they do not, then, as Davies and Humphreys conclude, too bad for consciousness: ‘psychological theory need not be concerned with this topic.’Davies and Humphreys are applying a respectable metaphysical idea — the idea, namely, that if an object's having a property does not make a difference to what that object does, if the object's causal powers are in no way enhanced by…Read more
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100Challenging Closure: Is It A Way To Answer The Skeptic?The Harvard Review of Philosophy 19 61-68. 2013.
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577Naturalizing the MindMIT Press. 1995.In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of...