-
162Where is the mind?In Anthonie W. M. Meijers (ed.), Explaining Beliefs: Lynne Rudder Baker and Her Critics, Csli Publications. 2001.
-
507Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain't in the head, where are qualia?Philosophical Issues 7 143-158. 1996.
-
Sensation and perception (1981)In Jonathan Dancy (ed.), Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Bradford Book/mit Press. 1988.
-
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, Volume 2: MetaphysicsBowling Green: Philosophy Doc Ctr. 1999.
-
Mental events as structuring causes of behaviorIn John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation, Clarendon Press. pp. 121--135. 1993.
-
Reply to reviewers of explaining behavior: Reasons in a world of causesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4): 819-839. 1990.
-
61Naturalizing the MindPhilosophical Review 106 (3): 429. 1997.Aware that the representational thesis is more plausible for the attitudinal than for the phenomenal, Dretske courageously focuses on sensory experience, where progress in our philosophical understanding of the mental has lagged. His view, essentially, is that what makes any mental state what it is is not so much what it's like as what it's about.
-
135Minds, machines, and money: What really explains behaviorIn J. A. M. Bransen & S. E. Cuypers (eds.), Human Action, Deliberation and Causation, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 157--173. 1998.
-
18Richard Rorty., Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (review)International Studies in Philosophy 14 (1): 96-98. 1982.
-
204The epistemology of beliefSynthese 55 (1). 1983.By examining the general conditions in which a structure could come to represent another state of affairs, it is argued that beliefs, a special class of representations, have their contents limited by the sort of information the system in which they occur can pick up and process. If a system — measuring instrument, animal or human being — cannot process information to the effect that something is Q, it cannot represent something as Q. From this it follows (for simple, ostensively acquired concep…Read more
-
95Simple seeingIn Donald F. Gustafson & Bangs L. Tapscott (eds.), Body, Mind, and Method, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 1--15. 1979.
-
Knowledge and the Flow of InformationRevue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (1): 69-70. 1981.
-
22Perception, Learning and the Self (review)International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 82-83. 1987.
-
16Chisholm on Perceptual KnowledgeGrazer Philosophische Studien 7 (1): 253-269. 1979.Two general approaches to the analysis of knowledge are distinguished: a liberal view that takes the truth of what is known as a condition independent of the justificatory condition, and a conservative view that regards the truth of what is known as implied by the level of justification required for knowledge. Chisholm is classified as a liberal on perceptual knowledge, and his analysis is criticized from a conservative standpoint.
-
325Information and ClosureErkenntnis 64 (3): 409-413. 2006.Peter Baumann and Nicholas Shackel defend me against a serious criticism by Christoph Jäger. They argue that my account of information is consistent with my denial of closure for knowledge. Information isn’t closed under known entailment either. I think that, technically speaking, they are right. But the way they are right doesn’t help me much in my effort to answer the skeptic. I describe a way in which information, like knowledge, fails to be closed in a way that makes an information-based acc…Read more