•  181
    The Metaphysics of Freedom
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (1): 1-13. 1992.
    I offer Jimmy a dollar to wiggle his ears. He wiggles them because he wants the dollar and, as a result of my offer, thinks he will earn it by wiggling his ears. So I cause him to believe something that explains, or helps to explain, why he wiggles his ears. If I push a button, and a bell, wired to the button, rings because the button is depressed, I cause the bell to ring. I make it ring. Indeed, I ring it. So why don’t I, by offering him a dollar, make Jimmy wiggle his ears? Why, indeed, don’t…Read more
  • Misinterpretation
    In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Mental Representation: A Reader, Blackwell. pp. 157--173. 1994.
  •  208
    Reasons and Consequences
    Analysis 28 (5): 166-168. 1968.
  •  612
    Contrastive statements
    Philosophical Review 81 (4): 411-437. 1972.
  •  5
    The explanatory role of content
    In Robert H. Grimm & Daniel Davy Merrill (eds.), Contents of Thought, Tucson. 1988.
  •  2005
    This book presents an attempt to develop a theory of knowledge and a philosophy of mind using ideas derived from the mathematical theory of communication developed by Claude Shannon. Information is seen as an objective commodity defined by the dependency relations between distinct events. Knowledge is then analyzed as information caused belief. Perception is the delivery of information in analog form for conceptual utilization by cognitive mechanisms. The final chapters attempt to develop a theo…Read more
  •  49
    Perception, Learning and the Self (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 19 (1): 82-83. 1987.
  •  350
    Change blindness
    Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3): 1-18. 2004.
  •  139
    How reasons explain behaviour: Reply to Melnyk and Noordhof
    Mind and Language 11 (2): 223-229. 1996.
    Melnyk complains that my account of the way reasons explain behaviour cannot be extended to cover novel behaviours. I admit that I did not extend it, but deny that it is not extendible. This, indeed, is what Chapter 6 of Dretske (1988) was all about. Noordhof finds faults with my account and claims there is another account (partial supervenience) that does a better job. I acknowledge one of the defects—a defect I was aware of when I wrote the book‐but deny that the partial supervenience of conte…Read more
  •  156
    Naturalizing the Mind
    with David Sosa
    Philosophical Review 106 (3): 429. 1997.
    Aware that the representational thesis is more plausible for the attitudinal than for the phenomenal, Dretske courageously focuses on sensory experience, where progress in our philosophical understanding of the mental has lagged. His view, essentially, is that what makes any mental state what it is is not so much what it's like as what it's about.
  •  131
    Perception (review)
    International Studies in Philosophy 10 199-201. 1978.
  •  486
    A Recipe for Thought
    In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, Oxford University Press Usa. 2002.
  •  96
    Stalking intentionality
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (1): 142-143. 1986.