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347Freedom, responsibility, and agencyThe Journal of Ethics 1 (1): 85-98. 1997.This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined…Read more
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3The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Carl GinetIn Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions, Blackwell. pp. 79. 1998.
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89Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
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92Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal AccountThe Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3): 219-228. 2016.If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while doing A, intended of that action…Read more
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LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 587-612. 2003.
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9The Works of Agency (review)Philosophical Review 109 (4): 632-635. 2000.This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains three essays that defend the…Read more
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12Deciding to BelieveIn Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76. 2001.
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28Review of Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11). 2009.
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26An Incoherence in the TractatusCanadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 143-151. 1973.In rejecting, In 1929-30, The complete independence of the elementary propositions--According to which any combination of truth-Values for any set of elementary propositions is logically possible--Wittgenstein did not reject an essential element of the "tractatus" system but rather one that fails to cohere with the central picture-Theory of propositions, According to which a method of truth-Valued representation must be capable of presenting 'competing alternative' representations, The false one…Read more
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302Might We Have No ChoiceIn Keith Lehrer (ed.), Freedom and Determinisim, Random House. pp. 87--104. 1966.
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432Self-EvidenceLogos and Episteme 1 (2): 325-352. 2010.ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists …Read more
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75Infinitism is not the solution to the regress problemIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 140--149. 2013.
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15The Justification of Belief: A PrimerIn Carl Ginet & Sydney Shoemaker (eds.), Knowledge and Mind, . 1985.
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69Contra ReliabilismThe Monist 68 (2): 175-187. 1985.The reliability of a belief-producing process is a matter of how likely it is that the process will produce beliefs that are true. The term reliabilism may be used to refer to any position that makes this idea of reliability central to the explication of some important epistemic concept. I know of three such positions that appeal to some epistemologists: a reliabilist account of what makes a belief justified, a reliabilist account of what makes a true belief knowledge, and a reliabilist answer t…Read more
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128Reasons explanation of action: An incompatibilist accountPhilosophical Perspectives 3 17-46. 1989.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |