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LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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3Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
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Norman Malcolm (1911–1990)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Knowledge Mind Memory Philosophy of religion.
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140On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style CasePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 440-446. 2010.Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decis…Read more
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28Review of Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker: Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays (review)Ethics 95 (2): 357-358. 1985.
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49On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An IntroductionPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498. 1991.
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88Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm (edited book)Oxford Univresity Press. 1983.
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Reasons explanation of action : an incompatibilist accountIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 14-26. 2014.This chapter argues for a noncausal libertarian account of free will. According to this account, a person’s free actions cannot be caused at all. The chapter compares its libertarian view to Kane’s event-causal libertarian view. It critiques Kane’s proposals concerning self-forming actions and indeterministic causation. The chapter explains why it thinks that its non-causal view is to be preferred over Kane’s event-causal view. The chapter also discusses the luck objection to libertarianism. The…Read more
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4Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology (review)Philosophical Review 85 (2): 216-224. 1976.
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51The Significance of Free WillPhilosophical Review 107 (2): 312. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
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131Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral ResponsibilityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (3): 229-253. 2006.This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it
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455In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincingPhilosophical Perspectives 10 403-17. 1996.
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8Self-EvidenceVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 9-31. 2009.Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é verdade que p e não existe nenhu…Read more
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5CommentsIn Calvin Dwight Rollins (ed.), Knowledge and experience, University of Pittsburgh Press. 1962.
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2Infinitism is Not the Answer to the Regress ProblemIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. 2013.
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3The General Conditions of Knowledge: Justification Carl GinetIn Alcoff Linda (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions, Blackwell. pp. 79. 1998.
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347Freedom, responsibility, and agencyThe Journal of Ethics 1 (1): 85-98. 1997.This paper first distinguishes three alternative views that adherents to both incompatibilism and PAP may take as to what constitutes an agent''s determining or controlling her action (if it''s not the action''s being deterministically caused by antecedent events): the indeterministic-causation view, the agent-causation view, and "simple indeterminism." The bulk of the paper focusses on the dispute between simple indeterminism - the view that the occurrence of a simple mental event is determined…Read more
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92Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal AccountThe Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3): 219-228. 2016.If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while doing A, intended of that action…Read more
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89Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |