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6Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accountsIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405. 2001.
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57Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 123 (3): 261-272. 2005.
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254On ActionCambridge University Press. 1990.This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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56JustificationJournal of Philosophical Research 15 93-107. 1990.This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.)
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57Book Review. Teleological realism. Scott Sehon. (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3). 2008.No Abstract
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Reason's explanation of actionIn Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press. 1995.
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33Causal Theories in EpistemologyIn Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992.
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25Book Review. The Significance of Free Will. Robert Kane. (review)Philosophical Review 107 (2): 312-315. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
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108An Action Can be Both Uncaused and Up to the AgentIn Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy, Ashgate. pp. 243--255. 2007.
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174In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons ExplanationsThe Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4). 2008.This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
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190The dispositionalist solution to Wittgenstein's problem about understanding a rule: Answering Kripke's objectionMidwest Studies in Philosophy 17 (1): 53-73. 1992.The paper explicates a version of dispositionalism and defends it against Kripke's objections (in his "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language") that 1) it leaves out the normative aspect of a rule, 2) it cannot account for the directness of the knowledge one has of what one meant, and 3) regarding rules for computable functions of numbers, a) there are numbers beyond one's capacity to consider and b) there are people who are disposed to make systematic mistakes in computing values of functio…Read more
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32Four Difficulties with Dretske's Theory of KnowledgeBehavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1): 69-70. 1983.Four difficulties with Dretske's theory of knowledge
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30Castaneda on Private LanguageIn Tomberlin (ed.), Agent, Language, and the Structure of the World: Essays Presented to Hector-Neri Castaneda, Hackett. 1983.
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On Wittgenstein's Claim that There Could Not Be Just One Occasion of Obeying a RuleActa Philosophica Fennica 28 154-165. 1976.
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12JustificationJournal of Philosophical Research 15 93-107. 1990.This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.)
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57Trying to ActIn Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism, Mit Press. 2004.
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |