-
17Plantinga and the Philosophy of MindIn James Tomberlin & Peter van Inwagen (eds.), Alvin Plantinga (Profiles, Vol. 5), D. Reidel Publishing Company. pp. 199-224. 1985.
-
115Book Review. Living Without Free Will. Derk Pereboom (review)The Journal of Ethics 6 (3): 305-309. 2002.
-
105
-
57The Works of Agency: On Human Action, Will, and FreedomPhilosophical Review 109 (4): 632. 2000.This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains three essays that defend the…Read more
-
35
-
312The conditional analysis of freedomIn P. Van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause: Essays Presented to Richard Taylor, Reidel. pp. 171-186. 1980.
-
57Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 123 (3): 261-272. 2005.
-
6Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accountsIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405. 2001.
-
254On ActionCambridge University Press. 1990.This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
-
56JustificationJournal of Philosophical Research 15 93-107. 1990.This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.)
-
57Book Review. Teleological realism. Scott Sehon. (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3). 2008.No Abstract
-
33Causal Theories in EpistemologyIn Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992.
-
Reason's explanation of actionIn Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press. 1995.
-
25Book Review. The Significance of Free Will. Robert Kane. (review)Philosophical Review 107 (2): 312-315. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
-
108An Action Can be Both Uncaused and Up to the AgentIn Lumer (ed.), Intentionality, Deliberation, and Autonomy, Ashgate. pp. 243--255. 2007.
-
174In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons ExplanationsThe Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4). 2008.This paper defends my claim in earlier work that certain non-causal conditions are sufficient for the truth of some reasons explanations of actions, against the critique of this claim given by Randolph Clarke in his book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |