Cornell University
Sage School of Philosophy
PhD, 1960
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology
Philosophy of Action
  • Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology (review)
    with Sally M. Ginet
    Philosophical Review 85 (2): 216-224. 1976.
  •  35
    The Significance of Free Will
    Philosophical Review 107 (2): 312. 1998.
    If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
  •  116
    Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral Responsibility
    The Journal of Ethics 10 (3): 229-253. 2006.
    This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it
  •  18
    Philosophy of the Person. P. A. Minkus
    Philosophy of Science 29 (3): 320-322. 1962.
  •  5
    Self-Evidence
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 9-31. 2009.
    This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self-evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists no reason t…Read more
  • On Action
    Mind 100 (3): 390-394. 1991.
  •  2
    Qualia and Private Language
    Philosophical Topics 26 (1-2): 121-137. 1999.
  •  77
    Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrant
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
  •  24
    On Action
    Philosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498-500. 1991.
  •  5
    Book Review. Freedom and Will. DF Pears. (review)
    Philosophical Review 75 (1): 124-25. 1966.
  •  62
    Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account
    The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3): 219-228. 2016.
    If moral responsibility requires uncaused action, as I believe, and if a reasons explanation of an action must be a causal explanation, as many philosophers of action suppose, then it follows that our responsible actions are ones we do for no reason, which is preposterous. In previous work I have argued against the second premise of this deduction, claiming that the statement that a person did A in order to satisfy their desire D will be true if the person, while doing A, intended of that action…Read more
  •  11
    Deciding to Believe
    In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth and Duty, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-76. 2001.
  •  21
    Metaphysics and Explanation
    with W. H. Capitan and D. D. Merrill
    Philosophical Review 80 (4): 525. 1971.
  • Knowledge and Mind (edited book)
    with Syndey Shoemaker
    Oxford University Press. 1983.
  •  26
    An Incoherence in the Tractatus
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2): 143-151. 1973.
    In rejecting, In 1929-30, The complete independence of the elementary propositions--According to which any combination of truth-Values for any set of elementary propositions is logically possible--Wittgenstein did not reject an essential element of the "tractatus" system but rather one that fails to cohere with the central picture-Theory of propositions, According to which a method of truth-Valued representation must be capable of presenting 'competing alternative' representations, The false one…Read more
  •  48
    Infinitism is not the solution to the regress problem
    In Steup Matthias & Sosa Ernest (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 140--149. 2005.
  •  5
    The works of agency: On human action, will, and freedom
    Philosophical Review 109 (4): 632-635. 2000.
    This book comprises eleven essays in the philosophy of action, six of which were previously published. The book has a fairly extensive index. The essays are arranged in four groups. The first group contains two essays on the individuation of action. The second contains four essays that argue for the view that what makes an event an action is, not how it is caused, but that it is, or begins with, a volition, “an intrinsically actional” mental event. The third contains three essays that defend the…Read more
  •  319
    Self-Evidence
    Logos and Episteme 1 (2): 325-352. 2010.
    ABSTRACT: This paper develops an account of what it is for a proposition to be self- evident to someone, based on the idea that certain propositions are such that to fully understand them is to believe them. It argues that when a proposition p is self-evident to one, one has non-inferential a priori justification for believing that p and, a welcome feature, a justification that does not involve exercising any special sort of intuitive faculty; if, in addition, it is true that p and there exists …Read more
  •  23
    Review of Richard Holton, Willing, Wanting, Waiting (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (11). 2009.
  •  3
    GJ Warnock, JL Austin Reviewed by
    Philosophy in Review 11 (5): 375-377. 1991.
  •  20
    Réplica a Comesaña
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 55 (2): 24-32. 2010.