Nicholas Rescher

"Go and design a perfect car," "Go and arrange a perfect vacation." These are instructions no one can possibly fulfill. For cars and vacations, like other goods in general, are inherently complex and multidesideratal, since it is a key fact of axiology that every evaluation-admitting object combines a plurality of evaluative features and every good a plurality of desiderata. And this circumstance makes perfection unattainable. For it lies in the nature of things that desirable features are in general competitively interactive. A conflict or competition among desiderata is an unavoidable fact of life. They cannot all be enhanced at once since more of the one can only be realized at the expense of less of the other. Take a car—an automobile. Here the relevant parameters of merit clearly include such factors as speed, reliability, repair infrequency, safety, operating economy, aesthetic appearance, road handling ability. But in actual practice such features are interrelated. It is unavoidable that some will trade off against others. And it would be ridiculous to have a supersafe car with a maximum speed of two miles per hour or to have a car that is very inexpensive to operate but spends most of its time in a repair shop. And similarly throughout the range of the desirable we encounter inherent conflicts among the relevant desiderata. There is no avoiding the fact that we cannot concurrently maximize all of the parameters of merit of any object of desire.

In recent years possible worlds and individuals have been in philosophical vogue, playing an important role in logical semantics, analytic metaphysics, linguistic theory, and elsewhere. In the enthusiasm over this much-promising device people have lost sight of the fact that the actual identification and introduction of such possibilia is effectively impossible. For the prospect of ostensive confrontation is here lost, and the purely descriptive individuation of nonexistent individuals is an altogether impracticable project. The very most we can accomplish here is to deal with schemata and scenarios-items whose element of generality is always present. We can indeed meaningfully operate a possibilism that is proportionately oriented , but cannot succeed with one that is substantively oriented

(1) Diametrically opposed standpoints can be maintained regarding God’s place in philosophy, namely that God has a central place here and, contrariwise, that philosophers should do their explanatory work without recourse to God. (2) The distinction between theistic and naturalistic issues is crucial here, because (3) the naturalistic sphere is substantially secular in orientation and is, in general, explanatorily closed. (4) A recourse to theistic considerations is not in order in the naturalistic domain insofar as the issues are local in character. (5) And since this in generally the case, the vast majority of philosophical issues admit of purely secular treatment. After all, philosophical theology is but a small part of philosophy. (6) Such localism is assured by considerations of explanatory economy. (7) What is at issue is not a matter of odium theologicum but simply of the rational procedure of beings whom God himself would surely want to make the fullest possible use of their God-given reason.

This article identifies and criticizes fallacies found in arguments against the existence of free will. These arguments draw in a variety of issues, including: natural causation, deliberation, the relation of mind and body, agent-internal and agent-external determinism, motivation for action, and the evolutionary role of free-will. The paper contends that, in each case, the misconception at issue can be overcome by drawing appropriate distinctions, the heeding of which makes for a more viable construal of how freedom of the will—if such there is—should be taken to work. So at each stage there is some further clarification of what free will involves. There gradually emerges from the fog an increasingly clear view that what is at issue here is the capacity of intelligent beings to resolve matters of choice and decision through a process of deliberation on the basis of their beliefs and desires, a process that allows for ongoing updates and up-to-the-bitter-end revisability.

Introduction -- The nature of free will -- Requirements of freedom : preeminently deliberation -- Free will requires the absence of thought-external -- Determination over choices and decisions -- Choice and decision are crucial -- Doing and trying -- Free action and agent causality -- Modes of freedom -- Metaphysical and moral freedom -- Moral freedom is removed by manipulation and especially -- Compulsion -- Intention and moral standing -- Moral freedom of the will involves agent intent and motivation -- Ramifications of freedom -- Free will requires up-to-the-end revisability but this does not gainsay probabilistic predictability -- Issues of revision and control -- The counterfactual dimension : "could have done otherwise" -- Problem cases : machines and lunatics -- Free will as outside causality but compatible with it -- Averting the zenonic fallacy of casual regression -- Averting predetermination (contrasting pre-determination with precedence determination) -- The crucial contrast between events and eventuations -- Choices and decisions as terminating eventuations -- Free will stands outside the stream of natural causality -- On freedom and causality -- Free will excludes pre-determinism but not motive determinism -- Motivational determinism vs. casual necessitation -- Motivations and motives -- Freedom from what? : certainly not from one's own motives -- And reasons: freedom demands motivational determination -- Free will requires motivational determinism -- Determination by one's autonomous motives is the crux of moral freedom -- Compulsion is impulsion -- Objections to motive determinism can be met -- Freedom and motivation -- Must an agent choose his motives for a decision to qualify (morally) as free? -- Freedom does not require motivational self-construction -- Does freedom require self-understanding? -- Willing to will : does freedom require the will to be self-endorsing? -- Does freedom require the approval of intellect and reason? -- Does freedom require self-approved motives? -- Buridan's ass : a random willfulness is not freedom -- Compatibilism regains : what free will excludes is not agent -- Determination but gant-bypassing nature determination -- The explanation of free acts via agent determination -- Freedom, responsibility, and "could have done otherwise" -- Reasons and motives impel but do not compel -- Compatibilism again -- Mind-matter partnership -- A two-sided coin -- The issue of initiative -- A salient duality -- Mind-brain interaction works by coordination not by causality -- Does free will exist? deliberations -- Pro and con -- On evidentiating free will -- Is free will unscientific? -- So does science counter-indicate free will -- Free-will naturalism and evolution.