Nicholas Rescher

In this pioneering study of communicative conventions, distinguished philosopher Nicholas Rescher focuses on the principles at work in the communicative use of language. Rescher explores various aspects of explanatory and expository uses of language across a wide range of applications, ranging from the factual to the fictional, and from the expository to the literary. A unifying theme of the book is pragmatic conventionality. Rescher explores the fundamentally pragmatic conception of communicative conventions: rules of procedure that form part of the setting of tacit undertakings that function in various sectors of communicative practice. Only in this setting, he argues, can one achieve an adequate understanding of the way in which the business of communication is actually carried on within its wider setting of its service in the conduct of human affairs

Nicholas Rescher tackles the major questions of philosophical inquiry, pondering the nature of truth and existence. In the authoritative voice and calculated manner that we’ve come to expect from this distinguished philosopher, Rescher argues that the development of knowledge is a practice, pursued by humans because we have a need for its products. This pragmatic approach satisfies our innate urge as humans to make sense of our surroundings. Taking his discussion down to the level of particular details, and addressing such topics as inductive validation, hypostatization fallacies, and counterfactual reasoning, Rescher abandons abstract generalities in favor of concrete specifics. For example, philosophers usually insist that to reason logically from a counterfactual, we must imagine a possible world in which the statement is fact. But Rescher argues that there’s no need to attempt to accept the facts of a world outside our cognition in order to reason from them. He shows us how we can use our own natural system of prioritizing, our own understanding of the fundamental, to resolve the inconsistencies in such statements as, “If the Eiffel Tower were in Manhattan, then it would be in New York State.” In using dozens of real-world examples such as these, and in arguing in his characteristically succinct style, Rescher casts light on a wide variety of concrete issues in the classical theory of knowledge, and reassures us along the way that the inherent limitations on our knowledge are no cause for distress. In pragmatic theory and inquiry, we must accept that the best we can do is good enough, because we only have a certain (albeit large) set of tools and conceptualizations available to us. A unique synthesis, this endeavor into pragmatic epistemology will be of interest to scholars and students of philosophy and cognitive science.

v. 1. Studies in 20th century philosophy -- v. 2. Studies in pragmatism -- v. 3. Studies in idealism -- v. 4. Studies in philosophical inquiry -- v. 5. Studies in cognitivr finitude -- v. 6. Studies in social philosophy -- v. 7. Studies in philosophical anthropology -- v. 8. Studies in value theory -- v. 9. Studies in metaphilosophy -- v. 10. Studies in the history of logic -- v. 11. Studies in the philosophy of science -- v. 12. Studies in metaphysical optimalism -- v. 13. Studies in Leibniz's cosmology -- v. 14. Studies in epistemology -- suppl. v. Autobiography.

Leibniz' Metaphysik sieht sich mit folgender Aporie konfrontiert: (1) Notwendigerweise gilt: Gott verwirklicht die beste mögliche Wahl. (2) Notwendigerweise gilt: die mögliche Welt, die auf die Beschreibung der tatsächlichen Welt antwortet, ist die beste aller möglichen Welten. (3) Die Existenz der tatsächlichen Welt (als die von Gott erschaffene) ist nicht notwendig, sondern möglich. Diese drei Sätze - die alle von Leibniz anerkannt worden sind - sind gemeinsam allem Anschein nach inkonsistent. Um diese Inkonsistenz zu vermeiden, entwickelt Leibniz eine komplexe Strategie, welche die beiden Unterscheidungen zwischen moralischer und metaphysischer Notwendigkeit einerseits und zwischen der Notwendigkeit der Folgerung (necessitas consequentiae) und der Notwendigkeit des Gefolgerten (necessitas consequentis) andererseits einbezieht. In dem er dieses herausarbeitet, entwickelt Leibniz eine komplexe Theorie, welche die Teilmöglichkeiten in den Zusammenhang eines unendlichen Analyseprozesses stellt

SOME TWENTY YEARS AGO I wrote a small book entitled Conceptual Idealism, which ultimately saw the light of print in 1973. In the wake of its appearance, a considerable number of reviews were published in the philosophical literature, and their perusal, as well as discussions with various colleagues, brought home to me how easy it is to misunderstand and misconstrue a position which, to its exponent, seems quite clear and straightforward. In due course, I have come to think it useful to exploit the benefit of distant hindsight to try to restate the position more clearly and to try to safeguard it against various misunderstandings that have come to view. The present essay is the result of this endeavor.