Marcus Düwell

Numerous ethical guidelines and regulatory frameworks have been developed to assess and shape digital systems. However, these efforts often rest on the dubious assumption that individuals and organisations possess the necessary _capacities_ to assess such systems in terms of justice, reliability, and other normative standards – especially given the growing complexity and corresponding opacity of many digital models. This issue is therefore of central importance to both legal and ethical debates surrounding AI and digital systems in general. The contributors to this volume propose a new approach to digital governance to enhance the capacity to evaluate and shape digital systems.

Conceptual clarifications: general overviewThe concepts of human dignity and socialism are both extremely indefinite and should here be understood in a broad sense. I will only briefly indicate how the concept ‘human dignity’ is here used (Lohmann 2013). Historically, social conceptions of a particular dignity and honour (for example, of a position, of a class, due to special achievements) can be differentiated from conceptions of general dignity accorded to all humans (for different reasons: for example ontological position in the cosmos, capacity to reason, creation in the image of god). Since the new beginning of international law after the Second World War, universal human dignity has been tied to the possession of human rights. Human dignity as a ‘basis’ of human rights is a morally grounded norm enacted as nationally and internationally applicable law through the shaping of political will. To respect, protect and guarantee these rights are in the first instance duties of the respective state, second of all states, and by means of a ‘horizontal effect’ of all humans as well. The content of ‘human dignity’ refers to the capabilities of humans for free, reflected self-determination, to their equal legal recognition and self-recognition and to the conditions of a minimum subsistence level which allow a life worthy of human dignity (in German, menschenwürdiges Leben).‘Socialism’ is an equally encompassing concept applicable to different conceptions of society which aspire to a social organization of the economy, of ownership structures, of society and/or of the state in criticism of capitalism and its associated individualism. Historically, the concept first appears as a category of philosophy of law (sozialismo, A. Buonafede, 1798), following Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, in order to establish natural law on the basis of sociability against catholic views (Schnieder 1984). In England, the concept has been used only since 1837 for the designation of Robert Owen's visions of society (Cole 1962). The development of socialist movements and corresponding conceptions range from early socialism (or, in Engels’ terms, ‘utopian socialism’, 1789–1848) in France, Marx’ scientific socialism and numerous variations (anarchistic socialism, state socialism, reform socialism, market socialism, democratic socialism etc.), the creation of labour unions and socialist, communist or social democrat parties in Europe to the present (Schnieder 1984; Wildt 2008). The different conceptions of socialism have highly differing normative ideas and demands.

Discussions in bioethics were perhaps the main reason why human dignity was so intensely debated over the last years. However, the role of human dignity in bioethics is unclear. But the reason is not that the concept is “useless”—as some have claimed—but rather that the dominant methodologies in bioethics (such as principlism) are not sufficiently prepared to deal with this concept. Moreover, bioethical debates are often overshadowed by ideological and religious attempts to monopolize the notion. The result is that most bioethical methodologies are not well suited to appreciate the specific function of human dignity as a foundation of the entire human rights framework.

Since Barry Stroud's classic paper in 1968, the general discussion on transcendental arguments tends to focus on examples from theoretical philosophy. It also tends to be pessimistic, or at least extremely reluctant, about the potential of this kind of arguments. Nevertheless, transcendental reasoning continues to play a prominent role in some recent approaches to moral philosophy. Moreover, some authors argue that transcendental arguments may be more promising in moral philosophy than they are in theoretical contexts. Against this background, the current volume focuses on transcendental arguments in practical philosophy. Experts from different countries and branches of philosophy share their views about whether there are actually differences between "theoretical" and "practical" uses of transcendental arguments. They examine and compare different versions of transcendental arguments in moral philosophy, explain their structure, and assess their respective problems and promises. This book offers all those interested in ethics, meta-ethics, or epistemology a more comprehensive understanding of transcendental arguments. It also provides them with new insights into uses of transcendental reasoning in moral philosophy.

Hatte Jeremy Bentham den von ihm geprägten Begriff deontology in seinem gleichnamigen Werk noch im etymologisch buchstäblichen Sinne (von griech. to deon: das Schickliche, die Pflicht) als »Lehre vom Sollen« verstanden und mit der »Wissenschaft von der Moral« gleichgesetzt (Bentham 1834), so dient das Adjektiv ›deontologisch‹ heutzutage ausschließlich der Kategorisierung einer spezifischen Teilklasse allgemeiner Konzeptionen normativer Ethik. ›Deontologische‹ Theorien normativer Ethik werden dann in der Regel ›teleologischen‹ Theorien (so erstmals Muirhead 1932), und/oder ›konsequentialistischen‹ Theorien (so etwa Alexander/Moore 2008) gegenübergestellt.

In environmental ethics, many approaches are searching for a justification of the protection of nature and biodiversity via an account of the intrinsic or inherent value of non-human nature, i. e. a justification that does not rely on the perspective of human beings. This leads to intricate problems regarding value theory. This paper proposes to avoid those problems by investigating explicitly anthropocentric pathways. It discusses what kinds of reasons for the protection of nature can be developed from the consistent practical self-understanding of agents. First, it is argued that the practical commitments of agents necessarily involve some normative commitments to the protection of the generic conditions of agency, which are particularly relevant for the ecological conditions that enable us to act and to realise goals. Second, it is discussed whether the presence of non-human nature is particularly relevant from the perspective of philosophical anthropology. Is it not important for human beings to experience non-human nature as an environment that is not fully planned and designed by human beings? The general aim is to show that it is worthwhile to search for justifications of the protection of nature and biodiversity from the practical self-understanding of human beings.

Thaddeus Metz, in his book “A Relational Moral Theory” compares the relational African view to Western theories of right action with a focus on Kant (respective contemporary Kantianism) and Utilitarianism. In focussing on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view, Metz questions the interpretation of basic normative assumptions that are guiding central Western moral and political institutions. He particularly focusses on Kantian and Utilitarian approaches to which he ascribes substantive moral assumptions in terms of utility respective autonomy. In this paper, we reconstruct Metz’s position on the opposition between a relational and an individualistic view on ethics. We then investigate whether his relational conceptualisation is a convincing reconstruction of African views and question his take on Western positions, focussing in particular on views around individual rights and communality as presented in the Kantian tradition. We highlight the value of ubuntu in intercultural discourse to foster ethical and moral reasoning in a holistic way and conclude that any reflection on ethics necessarily involves an understanding of our common human nature, which is at the core of philosophical anthropology.

This chapter aims at an understanding of the distinctive role of the humanities. The first part offers, with reference to Helmuth PlessnerPlessner, H., an outline under which conditions it is conceivable that a specific life form might develop the capacity to strive for understanding and self-understanding. Such a foundation in philosophical anthropology is needed for the possibility of a hermeneutical understanding of the role of the human being. On the basis of this hermeneutic perspective the second part sketches how knowledge, orientation and morality are possible. The capacity of humans to judge makes ‘reflective knowledge’ possible. Likewise, morality is given with the ability of human beings to form a reflective relationship with themselves. On the basis of such a hermeneutic and critical view of the human being, the societal role of the humanities can be understood. The third part outlines this role by stressing that it is this fundamental role of the humanities, to make understanding in a methodologically reflective way possible, that gives the humanities both intrinsic importance and societal relevance.

Der Beitrag untersucht zunächst einige Beispiele für die Berufung auf Menschenbilder in bioethischen Diskussionen. Dabei wird deutlich, dass die Rede von ‚Menschenbildern‘ selbst undeutlich und auch manipulations- und ideologieanfällig ist. Es besteht sowohl die Gefahr, dass moralische Diskurse relativistisch an bestimmte Traditionen gebunden werden als auch, dass der Verweis auf eine Fundierung von Normativität in Menschenbildern moralische Verständigung nahezu aussichtslos macht. In Auseinandersetzung mit der philosophischen Anthropologie wird über alternative Konzeptualisierungen nachgedacht. Dabei geht es darum, Menschenbilder in einer menschlichen Grundsituation zu lokalisieren, wonach Menschen symbolische und normative Ordnungen schaffen. Eine solche Reflexion auf die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit, Menschenbilder zu schaffen, öffnet die Diskussion auf eine universalistische Perspektive. Abschließend werden einige Implikationen für den bioethischen Diskurs skizziert.

Hatte Jeremy Bentham den von ihm geprägten Begriff deontology in seinem gleichnamigen Werk noch im etymologisch buchstäblichen Sinne als »Lehre vom Sollen« verstanden und mit der »Wissenschaft von der Moral« gleichgesetzt, so dient das Adjektiv ›deontologisch‹ heutzutage ausschließlich der Kategorisierung einer spezifischen Teilklasse allgemeiner Konzeptionen normativer Ethik. ›Deontologische‹ Theorien normativer Ethik werden dann in der Regel ›teleologischen‹ Theorien, und/oder ›konsequentialistischen‹ Theorien gegenübergestellt.

Das Gendiagnostikgesetz verbietet seit 2010 die pränatale Diagnostik spätmanifestierender Erkrankungen GenDG). In seiner Begründung bezog sich der Gesetzgeber in Analogie zu internationalen Empfehlungen für den pädiatrischen Bereich vor allem auf das Recht des heranwachsenden Kindes bzw. des späteren Erwachsenen auf Nichtwissen. Mit diesem gesetzlichen Verbot hat Deutschland einen viel diskutierten Sonderweg in der Regulierung genetischer Pränataldiagnostik eingeschlagen. Seither jedoch hat sich nicht nur die Perspektive auf prädiktive Testungen im Kindesalter verändert. In zunehmendem Maße generieren auf das gesamte Genom abzielende Diagnostikangebote auch andere vorgeburtlich genetische Informationen, die – in ähnlicher Weise wie diejenigen zu spätmanifestierenden Erkrankungen eine potenzielle Gefahr für das Recht auf Nichtwissen der späteren Person darstellen. Es soll daher im Rahmen dieses Beitrages überprüft werden, inwiefern das deutsche Diagnostikverbot und dessen Bezug auf das Recht auf Nichtwissen des späteren Kindes eine tragfähige Basis zur Regulierung gendiagnostischer Untersuchungen in der Pränatalmedizin insgesamt darstellt bzw. zukünftig darstellen kann.Untersucht wird der Argumentationsgang des Diagnostikverbotes im Hinblick auf spätmanifestierende Erkrankungen vor dem Hintergrund der Entwicklungen in der prädiktiven Diagnostik. Eine Analyse des normativen Begründungsrahmens zeigt, dass nach wie vor deutlicher Klärungsbedarf hinsichtlich der philosophisch-ethischen Fundierung wie auch hinsichtlich der Interpretation eines Rechts auf Nichtwissen eines Kindes im Kontext von genetischer Diagnostik besteht. Darüber hinaus müssen auch Interessen des Kindes an eventuell möglich werdender pränataler Behandlung oder Prävention von Erkrankungen in die Abwägung miteinbezogen werden.Um zukünftigen Herausforderungen genomischer Pränataldiagnostik und -therapie begegnen zu können, müsste dringend geklärt werden, inwiefern Rechte zukünftiger Personen tatsächlich in der speziellen Situation der Schwangerschaft relevant sein können und mit welchen Pflichten diese für den Gesetzgeber, aber insbesondere auch für zukünftige Eltern und Ärzte einhergehen. Der Menschenrechtsdiskurs könnte hierfür eine tragfähige Basis und hilfreiche Strategien liefern.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of Kant’s justification of the categorical imperative. The book contests the standard interpretation of Kant’s views by arguing that he never abandoned his view about this as expressed in his Groundwork. It is distinctive in the way in which it places Kant’s argument in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, which is essential to understand it as an argument from within human agential self-understanding. The book reviews that existing literature, then presents a logical construction of Kant’s argument, which it defends by examining what Kant has to say about synthetic a priori practical propositions in the context of his transcendental philosophy as a whole, and by a detailed examination of how he presents his argument in the Second Critique and the Groundwork. Particular attention is given to the views of two scholars who share many of the views expressed in this book: Klaus Steigleder and Michael Wolff. Special attention is also given to the views of Owen Ware, who, while sharing many of our arguments has a very different overall view. The concluding chapter provides a statement about the validity of Kant’s argument.

"The history of human rights suggests that individuals should be empowered in their natural, political, political, social and economic vulnerabilities. States within the international arena hold each other responsible for doing just that and support or interfere where necessary. States are to protect these essential human vulnerabilities, even when this is not a matter of self-interest. This function of human rights is recognized in contexts of intervention, genocide, humanitarian aid and development. This book develops the idea of environmental obligations as long-term responsibilities in the context of human rights. It proposes that human rights require recognition that, in the face of unsustainable conduct, future human persons are exposed and vulnerable. It explores the obstacles for long-term responsibilities that human rights law provides at the level of international and national law and challenges the question of whether lifestyle restrictions are enforceable in view of liberties and levels of wellbeing typically seen as protected by human rights. The book will be of interest to postgraduates studying Human Rights, Sustainability, Law and Philosophy."--Provided by publisher.

The history of human rights suggests that individuals should be empowered in their natural, political, political, social and economic vulnerabilities. States within the international arena hold each other responsible for doing just that and support or interfere where necessary. States are to protect these essential human vulnerabilities, even when this is not a matter of self-interest. This function of human rights is recognized in contexts of intervention, genocide, humanitarian aid and development. This book develops the idea of environmental obligations as long-term responsibilities in the context of human rights. It proposes that human rights require recognition that, in the face of unsustainable conduct, future human persons are exposed and vulnerable. It explores the obstacles for long-term responsibilities that human rights law provides at the level of international and national law and challenges the question of whether lifestyle restrictions are enforceable in view of liberties and levels of wellbeing typically seen as protected by human rights. The book will be of interest to postgraduates studying Human Rights, Sustainability, Law and Philosophy.