Adriano Naves De Brito

The basic assumption present in these articles is that naturalism is highly compatible with a wide range of relevant philosophical questions and that, regardless of the classical problems faced by the naturalist, the price paid in endorsing naturalism is lower than that paid by essentialist or supernaturalist theories. Yet, the reader will find a variety of approaches, from naturalism in Moral Philosophy and Epistemology to naturalism in the Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Mind and of the Aesthetics.

Resumo: O texto reconstrói as bases teleológico-morais para a constituição da moderna ciência da história. A chave dessa reconstrução é o escrutínio da idéia kantiana de plano da natureza, idéia que é investigada nas obras de Adam Smith, Hegel e Marx. Para criticar essa idéia, argui-se o pensamento de Fukuyama e defende-se que a ligação entre democracia e economia liberal é melhor explicada pela natural inclinação humana para a simetria do que pela noção de reconhecimento. O argumento é que o projeto de Fukuyama não encontra amparo na seleção da espécie, ao passo que o desejo por simetria sim. A essa abordagem subjazem as teses de que feita a crítica à teleologia moral, a história tem de ser compatível com a evolução, e de que a naturalização da história implica numa naturalização da moral.Palavras-chave: teleologia - moral naturalizada - plano da natureza - teoria da história - evolucionismo.: The text reconstructs the teleological-moral foundations for the constitution of the modern science of history. The key to that reconstruction is a scrutiny of Kant's idea of "plan of nature", which is investigated in the works of Adam Smith, Hegel and Marx. In order to criticize this idea, the paper discusses the thinking of Fukuyama and argues that the connection between democracy and liberal economy is best explained by the natural human inclination towards symmetry, rather than by the notion of recognition. It also argues that Fukuyama's project finds no support in the selection of species, whereas the desire for symmetry does. The theses that underlie this approach are that, once the critique of moral teleology has been made, history must be compatible with evolution and that the naturalization of history implies a naturalization of morals

The normative phenomenon is ubiquitous in human interactions, emerging in a wide range of fields studied by social science and considered as one of the essential traits of human’s way of life. The modern subjectivist tradition of social science has been based on a model in which elements like self, freedom and reason play the most relevant roles in explaining normativity by connecting beliefs to behaviors by means of motives that are non-reducible to preferences, desires or impulses. In this paper I will discuss normativity in general in order to turn into normativity as it is conceived in social science and then with a focus on normativity based on reasons. I will argue in favor of a naturalistic approach to normativity by means of a defense of a concept of will, which can provide a bridge between social and natural science, rather than giving further reason to sustain a dualistic approach to them. Moreover, I will claim that mental qualities usually alleged to be essential for assigning personality, agency, and moral responsibility, such as rationality, self-consciousness, and freedom, are neither sufficient nor necessary for a naturalistic characterization of moral agents, or for explaining normativity in human evaluative practices.

The general thesis 1 want to defend in this paper is the following: the knowledge by acquaintance with an indeterminate object is not sufficient to guarantee the naming of this object because the acquaintance with it is not sufficient to guarantee neither its identification nor its future reidentification. If I am right in defending this thesis, then it should be accepted that the reference made by demonstratives depends on primitive elements with predicative function. Now, if this point about demonstratives (which Russell called logical proper names) could be established with some plausibility, important supports for the rigid designation's thesis about proper names would be lost. In this case, a moderate descriptivistic theory of proper names could be vindicated. I am interested on this last consequence of my argumentation but I will not develop it here. What I intend to do is to reconstruct the Russell's theory of names, specially his theory of the logical proper mimes, to discuss the distinction between naming and describing and than to argue against the referential privilege of demonstratives.