Birkbeck, University of London
Birkbeck College, University Of London
  • The Intentional Structure of Moods
    Philosophers' Imprint. forthcoming.
    Moods are sometimes claimed to constitute an exception to the rule that mental phenomena are intentional (in the sense of representing something). In reaction, some philosophers have argued that moods are in fact intentional, but exhibit a special and unusual kind of intentionality: they represent the world as a whole, or everything indiscriminately, rather than some more specific object(s). In this paper, I present a problem for extant versions of this idea, then propose a revision that solves …Read more
  • There are at least two threads in our thought and talk about rationality, both practical and theoretical. In one sense, to be rational is to respond correctly to the reasons one has. Call this substantive rationality. In another sense, to be rational is to be coherent, or to have the right structural relations hold between one’s mental states, independently of whether those attitudes are justified. Call this structural rationality. According to the standard view, structural rationality is associ…Read more
  • Against the Middle Ground: Why Russellian Monism is Unstable
    Analytic Philosophy 60 (2): 109-129. 2019.
  • This is a short (c. 4000 words) teaching piece aimed at first year undergraduates, on the topic of moral relativism.
  • The Routledge Handbook of Propositions (edited book)
    Routledge. 2019.
  • Intention and the Basis of Meaning
    Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5. 2018.
  • I know that I could have been where you are right now and that you could have been where I am right now, but that neither of us could have been turnips or natural numbers. This knowledge of metaphysical modality stands in need of explanation. I will offer an account based on our knowledge of the natures, or essencess, of things. I will argue that essences need not be viewed as metaphysically bizarre entities; that we can conceptualise and refer to essences; and that we can gain knowledge of them…Read more
  • One of the most important objections to sense data theory comes from the phenomenon of indeterminate perception, as when an object in the periphery of one’s visual field looks red without looking to have any determinate shade of red. As sense data are supposed to have precisely the properties that sensibly appear to us, sense data theory evidently has the implausible consequence that a sense datum can have a determinable property without having any of its determinates. In this article, I show th…Read more
  • Beyond Resemblance
    Philosophical Review 122 (2): 215-287. 2013.
    What is it for a picture to depict a scene? The most orthodox philosophical theory of pictorial representation holds that depiction is grounded in resemblance. A picture represents a scene in virtue of being similar to that scene in certain ways. This essay presents evidence against this claim: curvilinear perspective is one common style of depiction in which successful pictorial representation depends as much on a picture's systematic differences with the scene depicted as on the similarities; …Read more
  • Question‐directed attitudes
    Philosophical Perspectives 27 (1): 145-174. 2013.
    In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.