Andrea Borghini

Cet article pose les bases d’une analyse philosophique des problèmes publics. Nous partons du constat qu’aucun problème dans la sphère publique ne naît comme public — il le devient — et que ce processus de devenir public requiert une explication. Après avoir introduit notre sujet (section 1), nous le recontextualisons dans le cadre plus large de l’étude de la nature des problèmes et des activités de résolution de problèmes (section 2). Nous écartons ensuite certaines manières, parfois intuitives mais inopérantes, d’expliquer la nature des problèmes publics, qui consistent respectivement à les assimiler à des problèmes sociaux, à des problèmes juridiques ou à des pratiques qui, par leur nature, épuisent ou alimentent les biens publics (section 3). Nous examinons alors le changement qui s’opère lorsqu’un problème devient public, en suggérant que c’est dans ce changement que réside la clé permettant d’évaluer et de justifier le caractère public d’un problème donné (section 4). Enfin, nous formulons quatre questions ouvertes qu’il reste à traiter afin de fournir une approche unifiée des problèmes dans la sphère publique (section 5).

Cet article pose les bases d’une analyse philosophique des problèmes publics. Nous partons du constat qu’aucun problème dans la sphère publique ne naît comme public — il le devient — et que ce processus de devenir public requiert une explication. Après avoir introduit notre sujet (section 1), nous le recontextualisons dans le cadre plus large de l’étude de la nature des problèmes et des activités de résolution de problèmes (section 2). Nous écartons ensuite certaines manières, parfois intuitives mais inopérantes, d’expliquer la nature des problèmes publics, qui consistent respectivement à les assimiler à des problèmes sociaux, à des problèmes juridiques ou à des pratiques qui, par leur nature, épuisent ou alimentent les biens publics (section 3). Nous examinons alors le changement qui s’opère lorsqu’un problème devient public, en suggérant que c’est dans ce changement que réside la clé permettant d’évaluer et de justifier le caractère public d’un problème donné (section 4). Enfin, nous formulons quatre questions ouvertes qu’il reste à traiter afin de fournir une approche unifiée des problèmes dans la sphère publique (section 5).

Research on music semantics has demonstrated the existence of a cognitive capacity to represent virtual sources of sounds, distinct from the capacity to represent sounds and sources of sounds. Our research explores a parallel phenomenon in the olfactory domain. The first contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that a smell can inform us about an entity — referred to as its virtual source — that is not causally tied to the characteristics of the smell. We exemplify two types of virtual sources of smells: some deriving from representations of smellscapes, some from representations of odor sources. The second contribution is an explanation of some practices of perfumery that intend to shape mental representations elicited by perfume smells, through their temporal structures and their constituent notes. The third contribution is a comparison between key features of the capacities to represent virtual sources of music and of smells. Three of those features are shared by both capacities: (1) only some of the properties of the stimulus are interpreted; (2) musical pieces and smells have an extremely underspecified semantics; (3) inferences may be about objects that are not able to produce the stimulus.

According to Lewis, mereology is the general and exhaustive theory of ontological composition (mereological monism), and every contingent feature of the world supervenes upon some fundamental properties instantiated by minimal entities (Humean supervenience). A profound analogy can be drawn between these two basic contentions of his metaphysics, namely that both can be intended as a denial of emergentism. In this essay, we study the relationships between Humean supervenience and two philosophical spin-offs of mereological monism: the possibility of gunk and the thesis of composition as identity. In a gunky scenario, there are no atoms and, thus, some criteria alternative to mereological atomicity must be introduced in order to identify the bearers of fundamental properties; this introduction creates a precedent, which renders the restriction of the additional criteria to gunky scenarios arbitrary. On the other hand, composition as identity either extends the principle of indiscernibility of identicals to composition or is forced to replace indiscernibility with a surrogate; both alternatives lead to the postulation of a symmetric kind of supervenience which, in contrast to Humean supervenience, does not countenance a privileged level. Both gunk and composition as identity, thus, display a tension with Humean supervenience.

The green revolution, the biotech revolution, and other major changes in food production, distribution, and consumption have deeply subverted the relationship between humans and food. Such a drastic rupture is forcing a rethinking of that relationship and a careful consideration of which items we shall preserve and why. This essay aims at introducing a philosophical frame for assessing the biodiversity of that portion of the living realm that I call the edible environment. With such expression I intend not simply those plants and animals (including in this category, henceforth, also fish and insects) that were domesticated for human consumption, but also the thousands of species that are regularly consumed by some human population and that are regarded to some degree as wild. The visceral, existential, and identity-related relationship that link humans with the edible environment can be regarded as sui generis and can constitute a ground for explaining why it should receive a preferential treatment when it comes to preservation, propagation, and development. First of all, I discuss whether we should draw a sharp divide, when it comes to preservation efforts, between wild and domesticated species (§1); secondly, I assess whether to draw a sharp divide between natural and unnatural entities, when it comes to measurements and interventions regarding the edible environment (§2); finally, I ask what is the value of biodiversity as far as food is concerned, and how best to preserve and foster it (§3 and §4). The closing section draws some suggestions for future investigations and interventions.

Recent research suggests that preschool (three- to six-years-old) children’s food cognition involves much more than the nutritional information usually conveyed by traditional food education programs. This review aims at collecting the empirical evidence documenting the richness of preschoolers’ conceptual knowledge about food. After introducing the relevance of the topic in the context of the research in early food rejection dispositions (Sect. 1), we draw from empirical contributions to propose the first classification of food knowledge in the field, which includes taxonomic (2.1.), relational (2.2.), and value-laden food knowledge (2.3.). Finally, in Sect. 3, we highlight some theoretical shortcomings of extant literature, suggesting that the account of food knowledge we propose could be employed to develop more effective educational strategies that mitigate early food rejection behaviors (e.g., food neophobia). Early conceptual knowledge about food.

This is a book about food, philosophy, and intellectual property rights. Taken separately, these are three well-known subjects; but it is uncommon to consider them together. Delivering a rich field of disputes, the book is comprised of 50 case studies, organized around eight themes: images; genericity and descriptiveness; language traps; procedures; menus, recipes, and creativity; boundaries; biotech; and empowerment. The introductory chapter frames the selection of cases and encourages readers to look beyond them, envisaging new lenses to look at food vis-à-vis intellectual property. The terrain encompassed is wide-ranging and reaches out to fine-grained aspects of food products, recipes, and cooking. Conceived for a wide scope of readers, the volume ultimately interrogates the links between food and cultural identity, bringing to the fore the ethical, political, aesthetic worth of culinary arts and gastronomic experiences. This accessible book will be of value to scholars, students, practitioners and others with interests in the areas of intellectual property, food law and food studies.

Contemporary philosophers have studied food and its consumption from several disciplinary perspectives, including normative ethics, bioethics, environmental ethics, political philosophy, epistemology, and aesthetics. Many questions remain, however, underexplored or unaddressed. It is in the spirit of contributing to fill in these scholarly gaps that we designed the current issue, which represents the first collection of papers dedicated to food from a perspective of analytic metaphysics. Before presenting the five papers published in this issue, we shall briefly frame the current research on food linked to analytic metaphysics and point out future directions of research in this area. We begin with the most basic interroga- tive, namely What is food?, and then offer three illustrations of more specific re- search questions. We hope these examples suffice to demonstrate that food is a fertile terrain of inquiry for analytic metaphysics and that it deserves to be devel- oped.

This chapter surveys the most philosophically pressing issues associated with food and climate change. It highlights the main scholarly accomplishments and suggests avenues for further research, drawing from a cross-disciplinary body of literature as well as from recent scholarship in philosophy of food. The discussion follows two intertwined yet distinct directions of investigation: how climate change impacts food; and how the production, distribution, and consumption of food affect climate patterns. More specifically, section “Introduction” offers an introduction to the study of food and climate change in a philosophical perspective; section “Climate Change and the Future of Food: Three Frameworks” showcases three intuitive frameworks that form the backdrops of current discourses about the future of food in light of climate change; section “The Impact of Climate Change on Food: a Philosophical Analysis” discusses the influence of climate change on humans through three case studies: geographical indications, global hunger, and food biodiversity finally, section “The Impact of Food on Climate Change: a Philosophical Analysis” deals with the influence of our practices of food production and consumption on climate change by looking at three case studies: food waste, sustainable diets, and food sovereignty.

Healthy Eating Policy and Political Philosophy: A Public Reason Approach by Barnhill and Bonotti is a terrific effort to provide a systematic method for appraising the ethical aspects, broadly understood, of regulations and policies connected to food, diet, and eating. In this commentary I purport to highlight the originality and the merits of the volume by considering what it doesn’t accomplish in three of its parts. I first call attention to the specific construction of the subject matter, namely on the question whether to be at stake are eating behaviors, dietary patterns, or certain food items; while Barnhill and Bonotti do not problematize it, this question is arguably pivotal to design effective policies and to adequately assess them. Second, I discuss the technical concept of “constitutive evaluative standards,” used by Barnhill and Bonotti to lay out their view, as this part of their work calls for an alignment with research on the philosophy of nutritional science and, more generally, philosophy of science. Finally, I take up the technical concept of “accessible reason,” which plays a central role in ascribing the public status to reasons, advocating for a more thorough determination of this concept based on recent work in epistemology.

In this paper, we establish gastrospaces as a subject of philosophical inquiry and an item for policy agendas. We first explain their political value, as key sites where members of liberal democratic societies can develop the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good. Integrating political philosophy with analytic ontology, we then unfold a theoretical framework for gastrospaces: first, we show the limits of the concept of “third place;” second, we lay out the foundations for an ontological model of gastrospaces; third, we introduce five features of gastrospaces that connect their ontology with their political value and with the realization of justice goals. We conclude by briefly illustrating three potential levels of intervention concerning the design, use, and modification of gastrospaces: institutions, keepers, and users.

What is the nature of time? Does it flow? Do the past and future exist? Drawing connections between historical and present-day questions, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time provides an up-to-date guide to one of the most central and debated topics in contemporary metaphysics. Introducing the views and arguments of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Newton and Leibniz, this accessible introduction covers the history of the philosophy of time from the Pre-Socratics to the beginning of the 20th Century. The historical survey presents the necessary background to understanding more recent developments, including McTaggarts 1908 argument for the unreality of time, the open future, the perdurance/endurance debate, the possibility of time travel, and the relevance of current physics to the philosophy of time. Informed by cutting-edge philosophical research, A Critical Introduction to the Metaphysics of Time evaluates influential historical arguments in the context of contemporary developments.

In this volume, Andrea Borghini and Elena Casetta introduce a wide spectrum of key philosophical problems related to life sciences in a neat framework and an accessible style, with a special emphasis on metaphysical issues. The volume is divided into three parts. The first addresses the two main questions stemming from life sciences: what is life, and what is the correct understanding of the theory of evolution? The second part looks at metaphysical questions concerning biological entities: environments, species, organisms, and biological individuals. The third part focuses on theoretical questions of particular ethical and political significance: sex and gender, the biotechnological revolution, and the evolution of behavior and culture. Each chapter is followed by a list of further readings.

This essay enriches causal models capturing the propagation of prejudice, bias, and other aggregative social mechanisms, negative or positive. These explananda include the reinforcement of economic inequality, “mob-like” behavior, peer pressure, and the establishment of social norms. The stage is set by introducing various forms of redundant causation and discussing some difficulties with mainstream preemption. Next the main proposal extends current representations of aggregative social mechanisms in two respects. First, it is more nuanced, as it identifies three distinct kinds of inferences: relevance of causes to effects, degree of redundancy of an effect, and the influence that causes exert on other causes. Second, it offers a quantitative—as opposed to merely qualitative—distinction between the causal contribution of preempting and preempted causes.

In this paper we provide a framework for studying the ways in which food endures the passage of time. Central to our inquiry is the following Duration Question: when is it that the predicate-schema “Is an X-Food,” where “X-Food” stands for a certain type of food (e.g., Champagne, yoghurt) ceases to apply to an entity? We show that the answer depends on two independent theoretical aspects: the underlying conception of food and the kinds of change that a specific food can undergo. We then argue that specific answers to the duration question should take the form of conceptual rethinking among different stakeholders (e.g., producers, consumers, institutions), where philosophers would feature among the experts guiding the negotiation.

Eating local food has become a mainstream proxy for virtue and a reliable model of sustainable dieting. It suffers, nonetheless, from genuine criticisms and limitations. In this paper, we suggest theoretical amendments to reorient the local food movement and turn eating local into a robust concept—comprehensive, coherent, and inclusive, affording a firm grip over structural aspects of the food chain. We develop our argument in three parts. The first contends that ‘local’ can be said of lots of entities (e.g. whole or multi-ingredient foods, recipes, menus) and that its meaning varies depending on which entities are under consideration. The second examines three dimensions of being local: the distance from the place of production; the geographical origins; the social links to consumers and producers. The third presents our robust conception of eating local, grounded on a more realistic model that accommodates for heterogeneous and complex actors.

Our aim in this paper is to employ conceptual negotiation to inform a method of rethinking defective food concepts, that is concepts that fail to suitably represent a certain food-related domain or that offer representations that run counter to the interests of their users. We begin by sorting out four dimensions of a food concept: the data upon which it rests and the methodology by which those data are gathered; the ontology that sustains it; the social acts that serve to negotiate and establish the concept; and the aims and values that it fosters. We then discuss the conditions that make a food concept defective, pointing out four types of defects—fragility, polarization, incoherence, and schizophrenia—which we illustrate by means of two specific examples: local food and healthy food.

In this paper, we aim at rethinking the concept of obesity in a way that better captures the connection between underlying medical aspects, on the one hand, and an individual’s developmental history, on the other. Our proposal rests on the idea that obesity is not to be understood as a phenotypic trait or character; rather, obesity represents one of the many possible states of a more complex phenotypic trait that we call ‘energy metabolism.’ We argue that this apparently simple conceptual shift can help solve important theoretical misconceptions regarding the genetics, epigenetics, and development of obesity. In addition, we show that our proposal can be fruitfully paired with the concept of developmental channeling of a trait, which connects to the study of the plasticity and canalization of complex traits. Finally, we discuss the potential impact of our approach on the assessment, treatment, and social narratives of obesity.

World food production is facing exorbitant challenges like climate change, use of resources, population growth, and dietary changes. These, in turn, raise major ethical and political questions, such as how to uphold the right to adequate nutrition, or the right to enact a gastronomic culture and to preserve the conditions to do so. Proposals for utopic solutions vary from vertical farming and lab meat to diets filled with the most fanciful insects and seaweeds. Common to all proposals is a polarized understanding of food and diets, famously captured by Warren Belasco in the contraposition between technological fixes and anthropological fixes. According to the first, technology will deliver clean, just, pleasurable, affordable food; future generations will not need to adjust much of their dietary cultures. According to the second, future generations should dramatically change their dietary habits (what they eat and how they eat it) to achieve a sustainable diet. The two fixes found remarkably distinct perspectives over dietary politics and the ethics of food production and consumption. In this paper we argue that such polarized thinking rests on a misrepresentation of the ontological status of food, which in turn affects the underlying ethical and political issues. Food is a socially constructed object that draws in specific ways on habits, norms, traditions, geographical, and climatic conditions. Although this thesis seems somewhat obvious, its consequences on the ethical and political perspectives on the future of food have not been derived properly. After introducing the issue at stake (¤1), we point out the polarities that characterize food utopias (¤2) and their ontological faults (¤3). We hence suggest that a socio-ontological analysis of food can better deliver the principles for a foundation of food utopias (¤4).

This volume addresses three major themes regarding recipes: their nature and identity; their relationship to territory, producers, consumers and places of production. The first part looks at taxonomies of recipes, the relationship between recipes and their source, and how recipes have changed over time, including case studies that look at unsourced recipes through to recipes for foods that are very highly processed. The second part identifies the constitutive relationships that characterize recipes, between territory, producers, consumers, places and spaces of production. The third part studies the values and norms guiding the naming, production and consumption of recipes, scrutinising the cultural appropriation of recipes, how to stake authority in claiming a recipe, and the interplay between aesthetics and ethics in recipe making. With contributors ranging across disciplines including philosophy, law and history, and including established academics such as Carolyn Korsmeyer and food writers such as Rachel Laudan this volume will be of vital importance for those looking to understand how archival material forms our understanding of eating habits and culture throughout history.

Liberal democracies across the world have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by implementing measures that significantly curtail the rights and liberties of individual citizens. These measures must receive public justification in order to be politically legitimate. By combining analytical political philosophy with ontology in an original way, in this article we argue that liberal democratic governments have so far failed to adequately justify these measures, since they have not systematically targeted the scholarly study of COVID-19 in everyday environments, consequently implementing rules that are epistemically unsound and not publicly justified, at least not fully.

In this paper we suggest that discussions about the identity of recipes should be based on a distinction between four categories of recipes. The central feature that we use to single out a category is the type of relationship that a recipe bears to its author. The first category comprises “open recipes” like wine, pizza, or salad, which come in taxonomic layers and are structurally open for new authors to reshape them. The second category comprises “institutional recipes,” namely those whose authors typically form consortium-like institutions, such as Champagne wines or Quebec maple syrup. The third category comprises “brand recipes” like Coca-Cola, Nutella, or Big Mac, whose names are elusive semantic devices and connote rather than denote recipes. Finally, the fourth category comprises “flagship recipes,” which include all the personal renditions of a recipe whose identity is strongly bound to individual authors; we suggest that their semantics follows a causal-reference model of proper names. Besides its theoretical value, the classification we put forward is offered as a ground for settling legal disputes about recipes, evaluating charges of cultural appropriation that concern recipes, and guiding consumers, producers, and policy makers when they think about foods and diets.