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LibertarianismIn Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford handbook of metaphysics, Oxford University Press. 2003.
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3Comments on Plantinga’s two-volume work on warrantPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (2): 403-408. 1995.
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Norman Malcolm (1911–1990)In A. P. Martinich & David Sosa (eds.), A Companion to Analytic Philosophy, Blackwell. 2001.This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Knowledge Mind Memory Philosophy of religion.
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145On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style CasePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2): 440-446. 2010.Alfred Mele and David Robb (1998, 2003) offer what they claim is a counter-example to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), the principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In their example, a person makes a decision by his own indeterministic causal process though antecedent circumstances ensure he could not have done otherwise. Specifically, a simultaneously occurring process in him would deterministically cause the decis…Read more
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28Review of Carl Ginet and Sydney Shoemaker: Knowledge and Mind: Philosophical Essays (review)Ethics 95 (2): 357-358. 1985.
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52On Action.Explaining Human Action.The Philosophy of Action: An IntroductionPhilosophical Quarterly 41 (165): 498. 1991.
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89Knowledge and Mind: Essays Presented to Norman Malcolm (edited book)Oxford Univresity Press. 1983.
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Reasons explanation of action : an incompatibilist accountIn Alfred R. Mele (ed.), The philosophy of action, Oxford University Press. 1997.
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Can an Indeterministic Cause Leave a Choice Up to the Agent?In David Palmer (ed.), Libertarian Free Will: Contemporary Debates, Oxford University Press. pp. 14-26. 2014.This chapter argues for a noncausal libertarian account of free will. According to this account, a person’s free actions cannot be caused at all. The chapter compares its libertarian view to Kane’s event-causal libertarian view. It critiques Kane’s proposals concerning self-forming actions and indeterministic causation. The chapter explains why it thinks that its non-causal view is to be preferred over Kane’s event-causal view. The chapter also discusses the luck objection to libertarianism. The…Read more
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4Res Cogitans: An Essay in Rational Psychology (review)Philosophical Review 85 (2): 216-224. 1976.
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56The Significance of Free WillPhilosophical Review 107 (2): 312. 1998.If among the spate of books on free will in recent years there are any that a philosopher concerned with that topic should have handy, this is one of them. Its coverage of the free-will issues debated in the philosophical literature of the last twenty years or so is penetrating, instructive, and by far the most thorough I’ve seen. Kane defends his own positions, but he is unusually fair, even generous, in expounding opposing views. And, while the book is not a popular treatment, it is written in…Read more
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137Working with Fischer and Ravizza’s Account of Moral ResponsibilityThe Journal of Ethics 10 (3): 229-253. 2006.This paper examines the account of guidance control given in Fischer and Ravizza's book, Responsibility and Control, with the aim of revising it so as to make it a better account of what needs to be added to having alternatives open to yield a specification of the control condition for responsibility that will be acceptable to an adherent of the principle that one is responsible for something only if one could have avoided it
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462In defense of the principle of alternative possibilities: Why I don't find Frankfurt's argument convincingPhilosophical Perspectives 10 403-17. 1996.
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12Self-EvidenceVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 54 (2): 9-31. 2009.Este estudo desenvolve uma abordagem do que significa para uma proposição ser autoevidente para alguém, baseado na ideia de que certas proposições são tais que plenamente entendê-las significa crer nelas. Argumenta-se que, quando uma proposição p é autoevidente para alguém, tem-se justificação a priori não-inferencial para crer que p e, eis um traço bem-vindo, uma justificação que não envolve exercer qualquer tipo especial de faculdade intuitiva; se, em adição, é verdade que p e não existe nenhu…Read more
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6Reasons explanations of action: Causalist versus noncausalist accountsIn Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 386-405. 2001.
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59Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – DiscussionPhilosophical Studies 123 (3): 261-272. 2005.
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257On ActionCambridge University Press. 1990.This book deals with foundational issues in the theory of the nature of action, the intentionality of action, the compatibility of freedom of action with determinism, and the explantion of action. Ginet's is a volitional view: that every action has as its core a 'simple' mental action. He develops a sophisticated account of the individuation of actions and also propounds a challenging version of the view that freedom of action is incompatible with determinism.
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57JustificationJournal of Philosophical Research 15 93-107. 1990.This paper argues that a fact which constitutes part of a subject’s being justified in adopting an action or a belief at a particular time need not be part of what induced the subject to adopt that action or belief but it must be something to which the subject had immediate access. It argues that similar points hold for justification of the involuntary acquisition of a belief and for the justification of continuing a belief (actively or dispositionally.)
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57Book Review. Teleological realism. Scott Sehon. (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3). 2008.No Abstract
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Reason's explanation of actionIn Timothy O'Connor (ed.), Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will, Oxford University Press. 1995.
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33Causal Theories in EpistemologyIn Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Blackwell's A Companion to Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992.
Ithaca, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Action |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |