Geoffrey Bennington

A recurrent typographical slip makes a democrat of Democritus, Demokratos of Demokritos, in an exemplary instance of the atomists' persistent analogy of atoms and letters. This essay argues that the rhythmic resonances between ancient materialism and democracy can be read in terms of a fundamental scatter that tends to deconstruct the teleologism endemic in the philosophical tradition's thinking about politics (and indeed matter). The curious resistance that scatter opposes to any kind of telos (including that of any absolute scatter) might itself make deconstruction interestingly resonate with the differential vibrations of string theory.

The principle whereby any bit of deconstruction brings with it all of deconstruction must affect the philosophical understanding of art usually subsumed under the title ‘aesthetics’. There can in principle be no deconstructive aesthetics (any more than there could be a deconstructive ethics or a deconstructive epistemology. Aesthetics in general is mortgaged to sensory perception, and from very early Derrida ‘perception does not exist’. Whence his interest in blinking, blindness and the trait of drawing. But the trace is not the trait, colour too is differential, and aesthetic judgement in general is thereby marked with a secret ‘political’ dimension.

Following Derrida's identification of the death-penalty as the (quasi-) transcendental of penal law in general, this essay traces the logic of its justification by the talionic principle in Kant (whose arguments in favour of the death penalty Derrida repeatedly describes as the most rigorous) and Hegel (who in a certain sense is even more rigorous than Kant in this respect). Showing how the death penalty (inflicted for murder) is in fact the only case in which the talionic principle operates without mediations or a calculus of equivalents, it is argued that this im-mediacy locates the death penalty (for murder) contradictorily at both the height of the rational and the depth of the barbaric. This allows the further suggestion that the concept of sovereignty functions as a non-dialectical attempt to resolve that contradiction, but one that leaves the Kantian attempt to defend the principles of sovereignty paradoxically outside the law it was concerned to defend, ex lex, treasonable, thus opening onto deconstructive possibilities beyond Kant's explicit claims.

One of the most significant contemporary thinkers in continental philosophy, Jacques Derrida’s work continues to attract heated commentary among philosophers, literary critics, social and cultural theorists, architects and artists. This major new work by world renowned Derrida scholar and translator, Geoffrey Bennington, presents incisive new readings of both Derrida and interpretations of his work. Part one sets out Derrida’s work as a whole and examines its relevance to, and ‘interruption’ of, the traditional domains of ethics, politics and literature. The second part of the book presents compelling insights into some important motifs in Derrida’s work, such as death, friendship, psychoanalysis, time and endings. The final section introduces trenchant appraisals of other influential accounts of Derrida’s work. This influential and original contribution to the literature on Derrida is marked by a commitment to clarity and accuracy, but also by a refusal to simplify Derrida’s often difficult thought.

One of the most significant contemporary thinkers in continental philosophy, Jacques Derrida’s work continues to attract heated commentary among philosophers, literary critics, social and cultural theorists, architects and artists. This major new work by world renowned Derrida scholar and translator, Geoffrey Bennington, presents incisive new readings of both Derrida and interpretations of his work. Part one sets out Derrida’s work as a whole and examines its relevance to, and ‘interruption’ of, the traditional domains of ethics, politics and literature. The second part of the book presents compelling insights into some important motifs in Derrida’s work, such as death, friendship, psychoanalysis, time and endings. The final section introduces trenchant appraisals of other influential accounts of Derrida’s work. This influential and original contribution to the literature on Derrida is marked by a commitment to clarity and accuracy, but also by a refusal to simplify Derrida’s often difficult thought.

Derrida's earlier work has a good deal to say about the question of metaphor. Very strikingly in view of Derrida's later thematic interest in the question of animality, metaphor is also presented in a piece on Edmond Jabès as an “animality of the letter,” as “the primary and infinite equivocality of the signifier as Life”. “White Mythology” argues for a certain irreducibility of “metaphor in the text of philosophy”. The trajectory of Derrida's thought here is especially difficult to capture, but seems to be circling around the question of being itself and to involve a crucial detour via Heidegger, and more notably his notion of the als‐Struktur. This point of Derrida's thinking must also be thought beyond the reach of any ontology and of any “thinking of being,” to which the early remarks on metaphor might seem to be leading us, but which the thought of dissemination always resists.

It is at least plausibly arguable that Derrida's will have been the most important philosophical contribution (in French, at least) of the last 30 years, in spite of the impassioned argument his work has provoked and still arouses (concretized most recently in the argument over Cambridge University's proposal to award him an honorary degree, but also in a series of other “affairs” and polemics). It is entirely proper that an account of his work should appear in a volume such as this, and yet the philosophically most striking thing about Derrida's work is probably that it is not philosophy in any straightforward sense, but its permanent traversal, excess, or outflanking. Derrida has not so much re‐defined philosophy (the traditional task of philosophy) as rendered it permanently in‐definite. This difficult situation has been the cause of many misunderstandings of Derrida, by both philosophers and non‐philosophers, and demands a delicacy of reading which is all but unmanageable, but which goes some way towards explaining the attraction Derrida's work has held for students of literature. It is unhelpful to view Derrida as belonging to any particular philosophical lineage, because his work upsets all the concepts that allow us to posit philosophical lineages (he is thus arguably as “close” to Plato or Kant as to Heidegger or Nietzsche), and it is also difficult to discern any obvious lines of development or change in his thinking, which seems to have remained remarkably consistent – though constantly surprising and unpredictable – since the 1960s. But in spite of its undeniable difficulty, Derrida's work is in fact quite susceptible of reasoned exposition up to a point, beyond which something “undecidable” begins to happen, as we shall see.