• Psychopathy and answerability
    In Luca Malatesti & John McMillan (eds.), Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy, Oxford University Press. 2010.
  •  14
    Defending the Realm of Criminal Law
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (3): 465-500. 2020.
    This is a response to ten critiques of my 2018 book The Realm of Criminal Law, by Stephen Bero and Alex Sarch, Kim Ferzan, Stuart Green, Doug Husak, Nicola Lacey, Sandra Mayson, Victor Tadros, Patrick Tomlin, Alec Walen, and Gideon Yaffe. I take the opportunity to explain the main aims and themes of the book, to clarify some of its arguments, and to note some of the ways in which those arguments need expansion, development, or revision. Topics discussed include: the usefulness and limits of ‘rat…Read more
  •  2
    The Ethics of Homicide
    Philosophical Quarterly 30 (120): 273-274. 1980.
  •  58
    Moral Relativity
    Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142): 99-101. 1986.
  •  5
    Editorial
    with Claire Grant, Douglas Husak, Ronnie Lippens, and Matt Matravers
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1): 1-3. 2007.
  •  14
    Two Models of Criminal Fault
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4): 643-665. 2019.
    I discuss two problems for the standard Anglo-American account of recklessness, and the distinctions between intention, recklessness, and negligence. One problem concerns the over-breadth of recklessness as thus defined—that it covers agents whose actions display different kinds of culpability. The other problem concerns the importance attached to awareness of risk in distinguishing recklessness from negligence—that one who is unaware of the risk that he takes or creates sometimes displays just …Read more
  • Editorial
    with Claire Grant, Douglas Husak, Ronnie Lippens, and Matt Matravers
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 1 (1): 1-3. 2006.
  •  5
    Crimes Against Humanity and Hostes Generis Humani
    Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy 47 (2): 138-148. 2018.
  •  35
    Trials and Punishments
    Philosophical Quarterly 37 (149): 448. 1987.
    How can a system of criminal punishment be justified? In particular can it be justified if the moral demand that we respect each other as autonomous moral agents is taken seriously? Traditional attempts to justify punishment as a deterrent or as retribution fail, but Duff suggests that punishment can be understood as a communicative attempt to bring a wrong-doer to repent her crime. This account is supported by discussions of moral blame, of penance, of the nature of the law's demands, and of th…Read more
  •  31
    Responsibility and Reciprocity
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4): 775-787. 2018.
    Discussions of responsibility typically focus on the person who is held responsible: what are the conditions or criteria of responsibility; what can be done to or demanded of a person who is responsible? This paper shifts focus onto those who hold, rather than those who are held, responsible: what do we owe to those whom we hold responsible? After distinguishing responsibility as answerability from responsibility as liability, it attends mainly to the former, and points out the ways in which it …Read more
  •  33
    Crimes, Public Wrongs, and Civil Order
    Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1): 27-48. 2019.
    The idea that crimes can usefully be understood as ‘public wrongs’, and that this can generate a plausible principle of criminalisation, has found some support in recent years; it has also been subjected to some sharp criticism. This paper aims to sketch the most plausible version of that idea, and to show how, once properly explained, it is not vulnerable to those criticisms. After a brief defence of the negative principle, that we may not criminalise conduct that does not constitute a public w…Read more
  •  19
    Legal reasoning, good citizens, and the criminal law
    Jurisprudence 9 (1): 120-131. 2018.
    I discuss some of the roles that lay people play in relation to the criminal law, and how that law should figure in their practical reasoning: this will also cast light on the place of criminal law in a democratic republic. The two roles discussed in this paper are those of citizen, and juror. Citizens should be able to respect the law as their law – as a common law; but this must be a critical respect, captured in the idea of ‘law abidance’ as a civic virtue. Jurors are tasked with making norma…Read more
  •  18
    The Constitution of the Criminal Law (edited book)
    with Lindsay Farmer, S. E. Marshall, Massimo Renzo, and Victor Tadros
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    The third book in the Criminalization series examines the constitutionalization of criminal law. It considers how the criminal law is constituted through the political processes of the state; how the agents of the criminal law can be answerable to it themselves; and finally how the criminal law can be constituted as part of the international order.
  • Criminalization: The Political Morality of Criminal Law (edited book)
    with Lindsay Farmer, S. E. Marshall, Renzo Massimo, and Victor Tadros
    Oxford University Press. 2014.
  • Trials and Punishments
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 727-728. 1989.
  •  11
    Intention, Agency, and Criminal Liability
    Law and Philosophy 11 (3): 265-281. 1992.
  •  13
    Attempted Homicide: R. A. Duff
    Legal Theory 1 (2): 149-178. 1995.
    Criminal attempts, it is often said, are crimes of intention. While many complete crimes can be committed recklessly, criminal attempts require “purposive conduct”; in attempts “the intent is the essence of the crime.” But what kind of intention is required; what must be intended, or purposed, by someone who is to be guilty of a criminal attempt?
  •  5
    Iv *—answering for crime
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Paperback) 106 (1): 85-111. 2006.
  • No Title available: New Books (review)
    Philosophy 62 (242): 539-541. 1987.
  •  13
    Introduction: Crime and Citizenship
    Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (3): 211-216. 2005.
  • Book Review (review)
    Ethics 104 181-182. 1993.
  • Jean Hampton, The Authority of Reason (review)
    Philosophy in Review 19 185-188. 1999.
  •  2
    Criminal Attempts
    Mind 109 (435): 583-587. 2000.
  •  8
    Critical Notice
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 19 (1): 131-144. 1989.
  • In Response
    In Rowan Cruft, Matthew H. Kramer & Mark R. Reiff (eds.), Crime, Punishment, and Responsibility: The Jurisprudence of Antony Duff, Oxford University Press. 2011.
  •  2
    Subjectivism, objectivism, and criminal attempts
    In A. P. Simester & A. T. H. Smith (eds.), Harm and Culpability, Oxford University Press. pp. 19--44. 1996.
  •  2440
    Symposium. The Apology Ritual
    with Christopher Bennett, Edgar Maraguat, J. M. Pérez Bermejo, J. L. Martí, Sergi Rosell, and Constantine Sandis
    Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 31 (2). 2012.
    Symposium on Christopher Bennet's The Apology Ritual. A Philosophical Theory of Punishment [Cambridge University Press, 2008].